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Abstract 
 
 
Packaged software is pre-built with the intention of licensing it to users in domestic 
settings and work organisations.  This thesis focuses upon the work organisation 
where packaged software has been characterised as one of the latest ‘solutions’ to the 
problems of information systems.  The study investigates the packaged software 
selection process that has, to date, been largely viewed as objective and rational.  In 
contrast, this interpretive study is based on a 2½ year long field study of 
organisational experiences with packaged software selection at T.Co, a consultancy 
organisation based in the United Kingdom.   
 
Emerging from the iterative process of case study and action research is an 
alternative theory of packaged software selection.  The research argues that packaged 
software selection is far from the rationalistic and linear process that previous studies 
suggest.  Instead, the study finds that aspects of the traditional process of selection 
incorporating the activities of gathering requirements, evaluation and selection based 
on ‘best fit’ may or may not take place.  Furthermore, even where these aspects 
occur they may not have equal weight or impact upon implementation and usage as 
may be expected.  This is due to the influence of those multiple realities which 
originate from the organisational and market environments within which packages 
are created, selected and used, the lack of homogeneity in organisational contexts 
and the variously interpreted characteristics of the package in question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
People in organisations still face difficulties in getting information technology (IT) 
to do what they want it to do.  In recent years, the selection of packaged software 
over custom development has been viewed as the ‘solution’ to this problem.  In the 
information systems research community, this shift has been followed by research 
efforts gaining ground in this area.  However, much of this focus has mirrored 
organisational trends in the adoption of packaged software application types, 
particularly that for Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP).  Whilst this research is 
valuable, research into application types has overridden specific investigation into 
the generic nature of packaged software.  This is problematic as focussing upon the 
nuances of application types at the expense of the issues associated with the 
packaged software element of a study may have broader theoretical implications.  
Thus theoretically, the favouring of application types over package software has led 
to a comparative dearth of work on packaged software.  To compound the problem, 
the work that is available, is largely ignored by ‘application types’ studies, especially 
those concerned with ERP, the most pervasive.  Moreover, it is also clear that the 
longstanding history of research in respect of custom development is largely absent 
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from many packaged software related studies.  In summary therefore, there is a need 
to theorize about packaged software and its place within the field of information 
systems.   
 
Of course, this leaves a large area of potential research that cannot possibly be 
conducted within one thesis.  The literature that is available on packaged software 
has therefore been used to help scope the nature of the contribution.  Earlier 
packaged software studies have examined the barriers to packaged software adoption 
(Gross and Ginzberg, 1984) and selection processes (Chau, 1994).  However, the 
results of recent studies, (Pozzebon, 2001; Sawyer, 2001), when compared with the 
rationalistic assumptions of earlier studies suggest that packaged software selection 
is much more complex, and hence, is worthy of further study.  Moreover, there is 
Lynne Markus’ call for information systems research to examine the different 
rationales for adopting technologies (Markus, 2000).  Thus, this study aims to 
reconsider the theory of packaged software selection. 
 
In the following section, the context of the research is outlined in terms of the 
content and importance of the topic, the tradition in packaged software research and 
the fit of this research with other studies.  In the following section the research 
objective is presented.  The chapter concludes with an overview of the organisation 
of the rest of the thesis. 
 
1.2 The Research Context 
This section expands the context of the research outlined in the introduction.  It 
begins with an introduction to packaged software and its treatment to date in order to 
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demonstrate the motivations for the study.  That is, to respond to the idea that 
packaged software theory is largely ignored in favour of packaged software 
application types, and that those studies that exist are mostly positivistic (and hence 
rationalistic) in nature, particularly those concerned with selection - cf. (Anderson, 
1990) for example.  Then, as the study is concerned with packaged software 
selection, theories of organisational decision-making are presented.  Following this, 
reference is made to the research on custom development which has already 
established the futility of rationalistic views of systems development.  Thus, the 
overall aim of this section is to highlight the futility of rationalistic theorizing in 
relation to packaged software selection and to situate packaged software research 
within the field of information systems. 
 
1.2.1 An Introduction to Packaged Software 
The well documented ‘software crisis’, borne out of the problems of how software is 
(and is not) developed and maintained has been argued to have led to applications 
backlogs in organisations (Pressman, 1997).  Moreover, even when developed and 
implemented, information systems failures are widely reported.  It is doubtful that 
many people in information systems will not have some key information systems 
failure such as the French Railways (Mitev, 1999) or Taurus (Currie, 1995; Flowers, 
1996) with which they are familiar.  Recently, combinations of these problems have 
been conceptualised as legacy information systems problems, resulting in large 
funded research efforts such as the Systems Engineering for Business Process 
Change (SEPBC) programme of the United Kingdom (UK) Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council.  Indeed, a multitude of theories, toolkits and 
cook books to stop cost overruns, ensure success and generally ‘make it work’ next 
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time around are available.  It was whilst working on the SEBPC project at the 
Manchester Business School that I became aware of the latest ‘solution’ - packaged 
software1. 
 
Amongst other benefits, packaged software is supposed to speed up the deployment 
of applications in organisations, tidy up the technical infrastructure, and through 
outsourcing, provide organisations with a constantly renewable state-of-the-art IT 
infrastructure (Klepper and Hartog, 1992; PriceWaterhouse, 1996; McKeen et al., 
2002).  There is broad agreement that packages are pre-written software systems that 
organisations use instead of developing a system in-house.  For example: 
 
- Bansler and Havn (1994) state that generic systems are systems designed and 
developed for general use, as opposed to custom systems, designed for a specific 
user or group of users; 
- Laudon and Laudon (2000) define software packages as pre-written and pre-
coded, therefore eliminating the need for people in organisations to write 
software programs for certain functions;  
- and Kunda and Brooks (2000) suggest that packages carry a sense of getting 
something that already does the job instead of starting from scratch.   
 
Packages are often also perceived as faster and more cost effective to implement 
than custom development.  It is argued that because packaged software is developed 
with large customer bases in mind and, is more or less complete software, it can be 
readily implemented in contrast to custom development (Andersson and Nilsson, 
                                                 
1 Also known as Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software, standard software, shrink-wrapped software, commercial 
software, generic systems and application software packages. 
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1996; Dube, 1998; Lassila and Brancheau, 1999).  Carmel (1997) focuses on the 
commercial perspective of packaged software and suggests that it is sold as a 
tradable product.  Steve Sawyer, who has worked with Carmel in this area, 
unsurprisingly offers commensurate insights: 
“…packaged software (also known as shrink-wrapped, commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) and commercial software) means all software 
sold as a tradable product (purchased from a vendor, distributor or 
store) for all computer platforms including mainframes, workstations 
and microcomputers Typically, packaged software is licensed for use, 
not sold.” (Sawyer, 2000: 47) 
However, it is important to note that the software is not usually sold, as Carmel and 
Sawyer would agree.  Instead, packaged software tends to be licensed for use.  The 
packaged software product is essentially intellectual property and therefore the 
vendor retains the ownership of the application and negotiates a licence governing its 
use with the purchaser (Butler, 1999).  Whilst, packaged software may be 
commercially licensed, there are applications, such as Microsoft Internet Explorer 
and Netscape Navigator, that are not licensed on a commercial basis although users 
still enter into a licensing agreement.  However, this research is mostly concerned 
with packaged software which does incur license fees and therefore this aspect is 
included. 
 
Like most studies, this one focuses upon packaged software used in work 
organisations.  However, it is critically important to point out the significant shift in 
home computing and the considerable emerging domestic market for packaged 
software.  This includes applications supporting ‘Domestic Automation’ (For 
example: Microsoft Money, Email and applications that assist in home improvement 
such as garden design), ‘Entertainment’ (Davis et al., 1996) (games for personal 
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computers and consoles) and ‘Learning’ (language and encyclopaedias such as 
Microsoft Encarta).  In no way are these categories perfect or exhaustive.  These 
examples merely illustrate that packaged software is pervading domestic settings. 
 
Therefore, packaged software can be seen as software that is pre-built with the 
intention of it being licensed for use.  Although it is problematic to attempt to strictly 
define the concept – it is necessary to inform the reader of the conceptualisation for 
the purposes of the study at hand.  The point of this definition is that it recognises 
that packages are products that require licensing for use, but it is inclusive enough to 
cover software which is not commercially licensed or used in work organisations. 
 
1.2.2 The Research Tradition in Packaged Software 
It has been suggested that the packaged software industry traces its roots to the 1968 
United States’ (US) Justice Department’s decision to force International Business 
Machines (IBM) to unbundle hardware and software (Carmel, 1997).  In the late 
1970s and early 1980s they were primarily viewed as a way to ‘deal’ with the 
applications backlog (Gremillion, 1982).  Since then, people in organisations have 
used packages to varying extents although this has mostly been in smaller 
organisations (Markus and Tanis, 2000).  In the mid 1990s, ERP packages became 
an incredibly popular choice for larger organisations and today packages are 
pervasive (Light and Holland, 2000; OECD, 2002).  However, despite the 
phenomenal uptake of packages by organisations, until around 1998 they had 
received scant attention, in contrast to custom developments, by the information 
systems research community.  Even now, most of the research is concerned with 
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packaged software application types rather than packaged software per se (Esteves 
and Pastor, 2001; Westrup, 2002).   
 
This growth and turbulence in the market is reflected in the interest of information 
systems researchers.  It has been reported that during the period 1997-2000, 189 
papers related to the subject of ERP were published (Esteves and Pastor, 2001).   
Panels on the topic were held at key information systems conferences such as the 
Americas Conference on Information Systems, the European Conference on 
Information Systems, the International Conference on Information Systems and the 
Australian Conference on Information Systems.  However, it is again interesting to 
note that the focus is upon a particular application type rather that packaged software 
per-se.  Indeed, Westrup (2002) argues that much ERP research has followed the 
organisational fashion for this application type. 
 
Moreover, the information systems community still primarily focuses upon custom 
software, despite shifts in development strategies in work organisations.  Very few 
courses on packaged software run on undergraduate and postgraduate degree 
programmes, and where they do, these centre on application types, usually with the 
sponsorship of the vendor2.  ERP vendors such as SAP and Oracle have been 
relatively quick to approach universities to set up joint initiatives.  Despite 
undertaking research into ERP packages, myself, for some years I am still unclear 
how this happens.  This is another selection process requiring investigation.  
Certainly, ERP as an area of research, has expanded dramatically since 1997 – is it 
that academics have approached vendors, or vice versa?  This may not be important, 
but it appears that a pre-occupation with this application type has led to distinct 
                                                 
2 See SAP’s University Alliance Programme. 
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neglect of the development of theory about packaged software which generally has 
much more longevity than any particular application type.  There are aspects of ERP 
packages that are worthy of study, as is true of other package application types such 
as Customer Relationship Management (CRM) and groupware.  Yet, the theoretical 
issues that may have broader consequences are generally being ignored.  This 
grounds my motivation for theorizing about packaged software selection.   
 
If an organisation is buying a standardised pre-built product that contains finite 
functionality then the selection process becomes very important.  Thus, it would be 
expected that throughout the selection process, organisational members would 
evaluate products to ensure they chose one that met their requirements.  To put is 
another way, it would be silly to buy a Mini motor car if you have 10 kids!  There 
are several studies of packaged software selection process (see Table 3.2 later) but 
they tend to treat selection in an objective fashion as in the example of the Mini.  The 
majority of studies present the process as one that can be carefully orchestrated and 
executed to achieve a successful result.  The underlying assumption is that those 
involved in the process have an equal stake and share common objectives that will 
lead to a sensible decision.  However, it is clear that organisational decision making 
is not so straight forward, and the same has been recognised in the custom 
development of information systems.   
 
As a result of ‘passing over’ packaged software in favour of the ‘glamour’ of 
application types, valuable lessons that will enable the furtherance of theory in 
information systems are being ignored.  This is because packages, and particularly 
application types, have been sensationalised and held up as remarkably different 
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from what has gone before (cf. (Newell et al., 2001; Westrup, 2002)).  Instead, it 
would be preferable to view packages as information system that may share 
similarities and differences when compared with custom developed systems.  
Moreover, theories of organisational decision making and custom development are 
widely acknowledged as subjective as outlined in the next two sections.  Why 
therefore, should packaged software selection be any different?  Recognition of prior 
work in the area, rather than attempts to jump on the latest bandwagon are incredibly 
important if the field of information systems is to avoid labels such as ‘a fragmented 
adhocracy’.  Banville and Landry ( 1992) afford information systems this label on  a 
number of fronts, but particularly because they perceive research as personal and 
weakly coordinated in the field and where researchers can gain a reputation by 
contributing to specific groups – ERP packages for example. 
 
1.2.3 Decision Making in Organisations 
Decision making, the process of choosing between alternatives, is based on the idea 
that if there are no alternatives, there is no decision to make.  Decision making 
theories fall broadly into two camps, normative and descriptive (Rollinson and 
Broadfield, 2002).  Normative models emphasise rationality and assert how 
decisions should be made whereas descriptive models set out to explain how 
decisions are made (Jennings and Wattam, 1994).  Normative models assume that 
decision makers: 
- have a sound basis of knowledge available to them, so they can know the 
alternatives and successfully predict a variety of outcomes; 
- have excellent judgement so they can rank the outcomes in terms of value; 
- are rational in the way they make decisions (Teale et al., 2003). 
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However, there is a great deal of research which questions rational models of 
decision making (Brunsson, 2000) .  For example, it is rarely the case that decision 
makers have complete information about alternatives and the use of intuition is more 
prevalent that may be reported (Kahneman and Tversky, 1983; Jennings et al., 1994; 
Yiannis et al., 2000).  Moreover, preferences are seldom rigid and may change in the 
light of experience (Singh, 1986).  Also, rational models ignore the contexts within 
which decisions are made, in particular group and organisational influences in this 
respect (Lye, 1994).  
 
Interestingly, even in the light of these critiques, packaged software selection studies 
to date broadly conform to the rational choice model.  Furthermore, in other areas of 
information systems where decision making is required, such as systems thinking 
(Checkland, 1981), systems development (Wood-Harper et al., 1985), strategic 
information systems (Ciborra and Associates, 2000) and strategy planning (Knights 
et al., 1997), mechanistic approaches have been shown to be inherently flawed   This 
therefore raises serious questions regarding the appropriateness of viewing packaged 
software selection in a rationalistic fashion.  The general assumption is that a 
decision making process is linear one.  It begins with the identification of a problem 
that requires solving.  Then, people with relevant interest and knowledge are brought 
together to discuss all the relevant information they can gather and out of this 
emerges the solution to the problem (Watson, 2002).  However, it is useful to 
acknowledge, and even welcome, contributions to decision making processes that 
may not be viewed in such a fashion.  The second category of theory in relation to 
decision making, those that offer descriptive models demonstrate this. 
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A key model in the descriptive tradition is the garbage can model (Cohen et al., 
1972).  The garbage can model indicates that the process of decision making is far 
more complex than normative models would suggest.  It asserts: 
 
- There is typically more than one problem (others may bring different problems to 
the table). 
- Solutions are rarely created in the decision making process (people come to the 
table with ‘the’ solution, and  the one that may suit them). 
- Who is involved and not involved in the decision making process may affect the 
outcomes. 
- The extent to which those who are involved, are involved, may also affect 
outcomes.  cf. (Teale et al., 2003: 288-289) and (Watson, 2002: 339-340) 
 
The utility of this model is that it allows for a degree of interpretation in respect of 
what is ‘the’ rational decision.  The garbage can model implies multiple realities 
(Kaplan and Duchon, 1988) and therefore decision-making becomes less 
straightforward than the rational model suggests.  The process is not linear and is 
heavily influenced by the social context of the decision making process.  Because of 
these multiple realities, multiple rationales are present which may influence decision 
making and which may be variously interpreted as rational/irrational, good/bad by 
those involved (Bullock et al., 1988).  Returning to the Mini example – it may seem 
eminently sensible for the parent to buy the car knowing full well they will not be 
able to seat all the kids if they want an excuse to go out on their own sometimes.  
Alternatively, it may be that the kids view the purchase as limiting their chances of 
getting a lift to school.  
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These two models imply some form of a decision making process.  However, it has 
been suggested that some decisions will not be implemented and some things will be 
implemented that have not undergone a decision process (Brunsson, 1994).  That is, 
where there are no alternatives or perhaps more interestingly, where there are 
perceived to be no alternatives.   
 
In summary the dynamics of packaged software selection processes require further 
theorization in the light of the models presented here.  In particular, there is a need to 
consider the nature of potential problems and solutions (the organisational situations 
and packaged software products), how solutions may be formulated and who is 
involved.  These issues have already received significant attention in information 
systems in relation to custom development and are discussed in the next section. 
 
1.2.4  Rationality in Custom Systems Development 
Early systems development efforts were relatively unstructured.  Lehman (1980) for 
instance, argues that in the 1950's the ecstasy of instructing a machine to undertake 
computations at speed overshadowed the rather dull need for a guiding theory and 
discipline.  However, as organisations came to rely more upon information systems - 
structured programming, design and analysis methods took on more importance.  
The rationale for this was that a perfect system would be produced if a logical and 
structured procedure was followed (Friedman and Cornford, 1989; Fitzgerald, 1996).  
Underpinning this of course is the belief that a ‘perfect’ system can be produced.   
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It has been argued that the systems development methodologies can: 
- accurately record the requirements of an information system 
- provide a systematic method of development so progress can be monitored 
effectively 
- provide an information system within an appropriate time scale and cost 
- produce a system that is well documented and easy to maintain 
- provide an indication of any changes that need to be made as early in the process 
of development as possible 
- provide a system that is liked by those people who are affected by it (Avison and 
Fitzgerald, 1995: 11-12) 
 
Similarly, as ideas on systems development and implementation evolved it was felt 
that the only way of achieving the perfect system was to involve end users (Friedman 
and Cornford, 1989).  Consequently much effort has, and continues to be spent upon 
rationalising the process of custom systems development and involving end users in 
an attempt to build the perfect system.   
 
However, despite the process of systems development being historically 
characterised as inherently rational it has been argued that the custom systems 
development process (and the decision making which forms part of this) is not 
necessarily as rational as some structured approaches might suggest (Lewis, 1994).  
This can be illustrated by considering points in relation to the system developer and 
the end user.   
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In respect of the developer, although they are often thought of as the objective expert 
with a tool kit of logical techniques to make the perfect system, there are other 
factors as play.  Developers may have limited experience or knowledge and their 
own agenda (Yourdon, 1986; Fitzgerald et al., 2002; Kotamraju, 2002).  As Edward 
Yourdon states: 
“For a majority of computer programmers and analysts now, their 
jobs simply occupy them from nine to five and enable them to pay the 
rent and buy two color televisions.” (Yourdon, 1986: 207) 
This may be at odds with system commissioner’s objectives and the organisational 
situation within which the outcome is to be realised.  In terms of end users, they are 
often assumed to share unitary views of organisations where they are believed to 
hold an equal stake in systems development when in reality, as with developers, this 
is not the case (Flynn, 1998).  End users will have varying personal or group 
agendas, levels of interest and degrees of power in systems development efforts 
(Markus and BjØrn-Andersen, 1987; Quintas, 1994).  Clearly then, even in this brief 
example, there are multiple realities and hitherto potential interpretations of 
irrationalities in existence.  Developers, end users and system commissioners (who 
may also be end users) are not heterogeneous communities and will variously impact 
upon decision making processes in custom development.  It has for instance, been 
argued that the developer and the end user cannot be removed from the problem 
domain (Wood-Harper, 1985).  Custom system development is arguably not a 
rational and linear process.  Indeed, it has been characterised, quite some time ago, 
as whilst holding the potential to be explained by rational motives, also being 
inherently influenced by politics and power (Markus, 1983; Robey and Markus, 
1984). 
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Even though packaged software may display differences to custom development 
there are still developers, users, the use of methodologies and of course, hopefully, a 
resulting information system.  Thus, it is difficult to see how packaged software 
selection theory can be presented as, and taken to be, rational given the lessons from 
custom development.  It appears that theory on packaged software has not kept pace 
with the changes in custom development theories and therefore it is still rooted in the 
quest for rationalism evident in systems development in the 1970s.   
 
1.3 Research Objective 
This research questions the utility of existing theories of packaged software 
selection.  Existing theories of packaged software selection implicitly or explicitly 
assume a unitary view of organisations thus ignoring the presence of potentially 
competing organisational realities.  Moreover, these theories assume that it is those 
in the consumer organisation who will ‘control’ the process of selection, and 
therefore they do not adequately account for the influence of others in the market 
within packaged software is created and selected.  Furthermore, packaged software 
selection is currently conceptualized as a linear, well ordered process.  
 
The objective of this study therefore, is to develop an alternative theory to assist in 
developing an understanding of packaged software selection.  The intention is that 
the theory will more plausibly account for the multiple realities of the process and 
the consequent potential ‘disruptions’ to what is usually described as a well ordered 
and rational process. 
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In order to achieve this objective, the study: 
 
- Critically reviews a range of issues associated with existing theories of, and 
related to, packaged software selection from market and organisational 
perspectives (chapters 2 and 3). 
 
- Reports and analyses the experiences of people in one organisation in relation to 
a number of packaged software selection processes (chapters 5 and 6). 
 
- Develops an empirically informed alternative theory of packaged software 
selection (Chapters 6 and 7). 
 
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis 
In order to understand packaged software selection it is necessary to refer to the 
environment within which this occurs.  For the purposes of this study this has been 
split into the environment within which products are created and sold (the market) 
and the environment within which they are selected and used (the organisation).  
 
Chapter 2, examines the market within which selection may be performed by 
reviewing certain aspects of the packaged software industry.  This includes specific 
reference to modes of competition, the process of product development and the role 
of intermediaries.  The major theme of the chapter is that packaged software 
selection may be influenced and controlled by ‘the market’. 
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Chapter 3 considers the selection of packaged software from the organisational 
perspective.  This chapter begins with a review of the reasons for packaged software 
selection.  Existing theories of packaged software selection process are then 
reviewed resulting in the presentation of an ideal model.  Further review of the 
literature on packaged software is then used to highlight the problems of the 
idealised model in terms of its rationalistic assumptions and how it is isolated from 
the market, the process of implementation and the context of usage.  The chapter 
concludes with a conceptual framework which illustrates how packaged software 
selection theory is couched in relation to other packaged software research. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the research process of the study.  It begins by examining the 
research tradition in information systems that is argued to be dominated by 
positivism.  Positivism and the interpretive approach of the study, are then 
introduced and critiqued.  Following this the methodology that was constructed is 
outlined in terms of methods used – case study and action research, the techniques 
for data collection and reporting, theory development and the role of the researcher.  
The approach towards the conduct and evaluation of the research is also outlined. 
 
The story of T.Co. is presented in Chapter 5.  It begins in June 2000 and ends in 
December 2002.  This chapter commences with an introduction to T.Co and then 
offers interpretations of three information systems projects involving packaged 
software selection.  Project 1 began as case study research and then became action 
research.  It involves the selection of office automation, email, operating system and 
database packages in the context of a migration from an Apple Mac to a Windows 
environment.  Project 2 is based upon action research and is concerned with a 
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business intelligence package.  Project 3 is based upon action research and 
documents the selection of a package to support client-tracking activities. 
 
Chapter 6 uses the conceptual framework developed from chapters 2 and 3 to 
organise and analyse the data from the T.Co projects.  The analysis focuses upon 
how the activities involved in the packaged software selection processes differed and 
were constructed by the differing perspectives of those involved and the nature of the 
packages in question.  The findings from the analysis are used as the basis for the 
development of the alternative theory of packaged software selection discussed in 
the final chapter. 
 
Chapter 7 summarises the overall findings of the research, reports the conclusions 
and offers recommendations for further research in the area.  It begins with a review 
of the research process, specifically in relation to the evaluation criteria outlined in 
Chapter 4.  In doing this, the research objective, methodology and the evaluation 
criteria are revisited.  Following this, the overall findings of the research are 
presented.  The thesis closes with some recommendations for future research and the 
overall conclusions of the study. 
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2 A Market Perspective of 
Packaged Software 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In recent years, packaged software has become the preferred form of applications 
deployment in organisations.  Significantly, in contrast to custom development, 
packaged software is primarily thought of in market terms and this has various 
implications for the process of selection.  In order to begin to illustrate these 
implications, this chapter examines aspects of the packaged software market.  The 
chapter begins by reviewing the growth and global nature of the market.  Following 
this, the features of competition in the market are discussed with reference to their 
implications for selection processes.  The nature of product development and the 
issues associated with vendors and implementation partners are also discussed in a 
similar fashion.  This chapter situates the processes of packaged software selection 
within the environment within which the product is created.  It further acts as a basis 
for the next chapter that focuses upon the organisational aspects of packaged 
software selection, or the environment within which it will be implemented and used. 
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2.2  The Packaged Software Market 
There is little doubt that the rise of the packaged software industry over the last two 
decades has been considerable.   
 
- In 1980 the industry was predicted to record sales of US$ 2 billion, growing US$ 
8 billion by 1985 but in 1984 a report suggested figures that outstripped the 
previous estimates stating that sales would reach US$ 10 billion in that year and 
US$ 30 billion by 1988 (Business Week, 1984).   
- In 1991 the world packaged software market stood at US$ 52 billion (Economist, 
1994). 
- Sales for packaged software rose 280% during the period 1986 to 1995 (Sawyer, 
2001).   
- In 1995, packaged software sales were said to represent around 20 per cent of the 
total software market which stood at US$ 77 billion, a 270 per cent increase 
since 1986 (Leebaert, 1995).   
- In 2001 it was estimated that world packaged software markets totalled US$ 196 
billion (OECD, 2002). 
 
This increase in the market has been reflected in predictions by consultancy firms.  
For example, PriceWaterhouse’s IT review for 1995/1996 indicated that by 2000, 
nearly 50 per cent of their respondents would have applications support comprised of 
over 80 per cent packaged software (PriceWaterhouse, 1996).  Even some in-house 
information systems departments have become packaged software companies such 
as ‘Software Corp’ (Dube, 1998).   
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Much of this rise is arguably due to the adoption of packaged software by larger 
organisations.  Traditionally, it has been suggested that packaged software has been 
more acceptable in smaller organisations but throughout the 1990s, faced with 
problems such as the year 2000, packaged software has become more attractive to 
larger ones (Markus and Tanis, 2000).  In particular, this has arguably been driven 
by two key packaged software application types – ERP and CRM software. 
 
The market for ERP packages for example, has grown spectacularly throughout the 
1990s.  Between 1995 and 1999 it was estimated that £18.7 billion had been spent on 
ERP software packages alone.  Numerous other predictions have estimated growth in 
the late 1990s and early into the 2000s – these range from around US$ 31 billion to 
US$ 66 billion (August, 1999c; August, 1999b; August, 1999d).  At the 
organisational level, implementations can last between one and five years and costs 
can range from US$ 2 to 130 million (Ross and Vitale, 2000).  Couple this with a 
recent ERP survey which suggested that 62 per cent of organisations had abandoned 
their ‘legacy information systems’ after adopting an ERP package (Themistocleous 
et al., 2001), and the rising market is understandable. 
 
Following quickly behind ERP packages, came CRM packages with similarly 
astronomical markets and spending.  For example, during 1998-1999 Siebel 
Systems, the CRM packaged software market leader, saw revenue rise by 93 per cent 
to US$ 790.9 million (Goodley and Bennett, 2000) and the Royal Bank of Scotland 
committed to roll out CRM packages across the organisation with spending running 
into to tens of millions of pounds (August, 1999d).   
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Some of the figures above represent license revenues alone and others include 
associated software services.  These include the consulting, contracting, integration, 
training, support staffing for hardware and software.  This has also grown 
extensively in recent years.  Forrester Research (1998) reports that this segment has 
grown at 16 per cent per annum for more than a decade and accounted for US$ 180 
billion in 1997.  Clearly, packaged software has become a critically important feature 
of contemporary information systems support in organisations and it receives much 
applause.  Statements such as those below are not uncommon. 
ERP packages, including those from SAP AG, People Soft, Oracle, 
and Baan, have made a tremendous contribution to the world of 
business (Li, 1999: 31). 
When it came to the promise of packaged software, you could say it 
was an offer we could not refuse.  In fact, most of our respondents 
have said that (PriceWaterhouse, 1996: sic). 
However, packaged software is not as unproblematic and successful as it is often 
described.  A number of highly publicised failures have been associated with the 
ERP packages.   
 
- Hershey, Aero Group and Snap-On have blamed the implementation of ERP 
packages for negative impacts upon earnings (Scott and Vessey, 2000).   
- Cadbury Schweppes implemented plans to fulfil 250 orders where normally they 
would fulfil 1000 due to the increased complexity and the need to re-train staff 
post implementation (August, 1999a).   
- FoxMeyer drug company’s implementation of an ERP package has been argued 
to have lead to bankruptcy proceedings resulting in litigation against SAP, the 
software vendor (Bicknell, 1998). 
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Furthermore, a recent Harvard Business School study findings indicate that 65 
percent of executives felt that ERP packaged software had a moderate chance of 
hurting their business (Cliffe, 1999). 
 
The reported experiences of packaged software are, as would be expected, 
contradictory and multifarious, but clearly the market is burgeoning and the selection 
of products in this ‘highly charged’ predominantly commercial environment offers 
significant interest. 
 
2.3 Globalisation in the Packaged Software Industry 
The packaged software industry is global in nature.  In 1991, the US held 78 per cent 
of the market, with Europe in second place with 16 per cent (Brouthers and van't 
Kruis, 1997).  By 1997, the US still dominated the industry although Japan and 
Europe had both increased their shares of the market significantly and overall 
worldwide growth was evident (OECD, 2000).  
 
An important issue in this respect is the question of whether the origin of a packaged 
software product relates to the inscribed assumptions about the conduct of work that 
they may display as a result.  That is, if software is developed by people in the US – 
will it be in agreement with the ‘ways of life’ that exist throughout Europe or Asia?  
It has been suggested that the origin of the development of the package might be at 
odds with the country of implementation even though the drive for economies of 
scale may require a globally acceptable product (Krumbholz et al., 2000).  Moreover, 
Carmel (1997) in attempting to explain the hegemony of the US in the packaged 
software industry, argues that Japan does not have its creative culture, although he 
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recognises that the ‘American Culture of Software’ is an intersection of 
characteristics including US culture, immigrant culture and that of computer 
programmers and software professionals.  The latter point relating to the culture of 
the developers refers to ‘Mealy’s Law’3 whereby: 
“The eventual structure of the system reflects the structure of the 
organization that builds the system” (Yourdon, 1986: 81-82). 
That is, the product that has been developed apes the organisational structure within 
which the developers operate (Bloomfield, 1992).  Yet, Carmel points out that US 
culture is in fact US ‘cultures’.  Moreover, in respect of ‘Mealy’s Law’, the problem 
is that given the rising complexity of packaged software offerings and the 
characteristics of organisations in the intended markets, developing organisations 
may lack the structures in place for developers to mirror.  One SAP development 
team found it necessary to involve customers in the development of its treasury 
module in an attempt to build a product with high market acceptability (Scott and 
Kaindl, 2000).  These arguments also assume that developers are free to build 
products in a manner that they wish when in fact they, and the organisations they 
belong to, are to some extent, constrained by market demands if they wish to 
continue in business. 
 
Of course, the country of origin of the software, the cultural composition of the 
development team and their environment may impact upon the eventual product but 
this is not as simple as first suggested.  Certainly, many people I have worked with 
on SAP implementations have commented on how ‘German it is in the way it 
expects you to work’.  What this means is that the globalisation of the packaged 
software industry has significant implications where the producer aims for 
                                                 
3 After George Mealy, one of the architects of IBM’s OS/360 
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standardisation to achieve economies of scale across diverse geographical and 
cultural environments.  However, it does not necessarily follow that a product built 
in the US will turn a corner shop in the UK into Wal-Mart.   
 
Thus, in terms of culture, it is perhaps more useful to consider the global argument in 
relation to the problems of implementing a generic product that has been targeted at 
a broad market.  Undoubtedly, there will be features of the product that will be 
engrained with cultures that may be influenced by the origins of production and the 
ethos of the developing organisation.  The issue in relation to selection would appear 
to be understanding the implications of this for the context within which the product 
will be used.  That is, asking the question of whether the package will fit with the 
cultures of the organisation within which is to be implemented.  Of course the matter 
is more much more complicated.  For instance assumptions are made that those 
involved in selection are willing and able to find out about this, that cultural changes 
are not part of the reason for implementation, and that those using the eventual 
system do not subvert the system to avoid any formal culturally rooted directives in 
the system. 
 
2.4 Competing in the Market 
For vendors, the benefits of selling packaged software derive largely from economies 
of scale.  In order to attain these economies, products have to be standardised so they 
have broad appeal in the market (Robson, 1997; Fan et al., 2000).  Thus, the vendor 
need only develop the software once and can distribute the cost of development and 
ongoing maintenance over a large base (Gremillion, 1982; Dube, 1998; Butler, 
1999).   
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Consequently, in order to attain the economies of scale, and thereby increase profit 
margins, vendors have to implement competitive strategies as in any other business 
(Porter, 1980; Porter, 1996).  This means that the vendor has to determine how they 
will compete in this environment and within which market/s they wish to operate.  
From a work organisation perspective, packaged software vendors may, for instance, 
target a mass market with an application type (Microsoft Windows), a particular 
customer organisation size (SAP versus Sage for accounting  products), or  sector 
(IBM’s Corebank) in the banking industry.  Vendors may also choose to manage 
product delivery schedules and consumption patterns, for example by segmenting the 
market via the use of editions4.  Editions serve to differentiate among similar low 
and high-end products particularly via differences in functionality and price.  What 
this essentially means is that a vendor may produce multiple editions of their 
products for various markets e.g. domestic, business, small business, or sector 
specific such as education.  This segmentation activity may of course also be 
combined with targeting a particular market.  That is, various editions may be made 
available with a market sector.  This is done mainly to allow decisions to be made 
regarding tradeoffs of cost and functionality.  It has been argued that this process 
requires consideration of: 
 
- The type and size of the software product 
- The nature of the market -in particular, the status of buyer and seller power 
- The need for market information - vendors may release multiple editions 
simultaneously to gather information 
                                                 
4 Note the difference between editions and upgrades.  Microsoft launched recently launched two editions of Windows XP: 
Home and Professional.  These editions can be seen as upgrades of the Windows Me and 2000 (although XP may be viewed 
by some as a new product). 
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- The required profit margin - releasing better editions, later may increase the 
lifecycle of a product (Raghunathan, 2000) 
 
In respect of the process of selection, a way of reading these activities is that they 
used by the vendor as control mechanisms.  As the vendor effectively determines 
who their market will be, how much they will pay and what they will receive, and 
when (if ever), the consumer organisations palette of choice is limited. 
 
A number of studies have also indicated that time to market is of competitive 
importance (Carmel and Becker, 1995; Carmel and Sawyer, 1998).  It has even been 
argued, that in this segment of the software industry, time-to-completion is the most 
important issue and that future competition will be based upon accelerated release 
cycles (Carmel, 1995b).  However, it has been further proposed by the same author 
that many packaged software companies have not fully recognised cycle time as a 
competitive concept and rather, that other pressures dominate such as features, 
performance, customer service, adherence to standards and price (Carmel, 1995a).  
In order to improve cycle times it is argued that traditional software development life 
cycle approaches do not work and that new ones need to evolve (Carmel and Becker, 
1995; Dube, 1998).  This is particularly important as trust from a customer is 
reportedly often gained through vendor responsiveness and dependability (Gefen, 
2002).  Therefore, for vendors to sell products it is not good enough just to have 
them to market first, they need to release products that are perceived to be of good 
quality too. 
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Consequently, whilst vendors may control landscape of selection to a fair degree, 
they clearly have to respond to market demands to some extent (as further discussed 
in the next section).  Yet, vendors may attempt to circumvent this by engaging in 
processes of convincing consumer organisations that their products are the ‘best’ and 
that they should buy into their vision for the package especially where comparable 
alternatives exist.  Friedman and Cornford (1989) call this ‘salesmanship’, the idea 
that users may be taught what is good for them and to do things in a new way.  Thus, 
it is possible to argue that, due to the competitive nature of the packaged software 
market, the selection process may be directly/indirectly or implicitly/explicitly 
influenced by vendors who bring their own agendas to ‘the table’.  This is not 
generally made explicit in existing theories of selection. 
 
2.5 Product Development 
As the market requires customers to buy the products on offer it is widely 
recommended that there are benefits to be had from including them in product 
development activities.  For instance, it is made clear by Raghunathan (2000) that 
market information, in the form of customer input was essential.  This point is also 
brought out by Carmel and Becker (1995) in their explanation of the requirements of 
a process model for packaged software product development and Holmström (2001) 
in her study of the development of the ‘Clusterball’ online game.  However, the 
extent and nature of the inclusion of consumers in the development process, and for 
what purpose, is far from simple.  This is of particular importance in relation to 
selection, because once organisations buy a package they automatically become 
locked into a vendor’s product development trajectory.  Consequently, there are 
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questions surrounding how the product will develop in the future and the extent to 
which any purchaser will be able to influence that activity. 
 
For example, one study recounts the product enhancement process of the SAP 
Treasury module which involved a number of European and US organisations (Scott 
and Kaindl, 2000).  The study illustrates just how exclusive the packaged software 
development process can become.  Most of the participating organisations were large 
global firms from a variety of industries which where pruned by the SAP team.  
They did this by selecting ones with what they felt to be ‘state of the art’ knowledge 
in the area.  Moreover, to ‘ensure mutual goal alignment’, they chose organisations 
that were willing to change their processes.  The authors suggest, that as a result, the 
chosen individuals felt like members of an ‘elite group’, were excited to influence 
the design and to be among the first customers to have the module.  The process 
demonstrates how the packaged software company used customers to improve its 
product, but in a way that mostly accommodated them rather than their customers.  
They wanted the knowledge of the market, but not the arguments and complexity of 
heterogeneous ways of work.  Essentially, the organisations in the study submitted to 
a form of salesmanship.  
 
One example of conflict within the process however, is illustrated whereby there 
were disagreements regarding the linkage of SAP with other applications in place in 
the participating organisations.  The SAP team was unwilling to write interfaces to 
support these applications.  Instead, the most common applications were catered for 
and users were told to place a request with their software vendors to work with SAP 
to become partners.  This shows how it very difficult for individual user companies 
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to influence the design of packages.  Indeed, it has been suggested that even where 
purchasers do get involved, vendors may not view all requirements as relevant 
(Pozzebon, 2001), especially as they want to maintain a ‘generic’ product so that 
they can sell it to as many customers as possible (Bansler and Havn, 1994). 
 
Again, it can be seen how a vendor may reduce complexity through standardisation 
in order to maximise economies of scale.  Moreover, customers may find it 
necessary to make demands upon the producers of packages.  Yet, even where 
demands were made in a relatively strong fashion, the power of the vendor 
outweighed that of the customers even though they were large companies.   
 
However, it is generally considered to be more expensive to market products to new 
customers rather than existing ones (Gronroos, 1994; Buttle, 1995; Payne et al., 
1999).  Consequently, vendors have to balance their desires for increased 
profitability via economies of scale with customer demands.  Andersson and Nilsson 
(1996) suggest that price competition is less when selling services such as support 
and maintenance to existing customers and that contracts for these can generate 
considerable repeat income.  Essentially what this means is that packaged software 
vendors will have little scope for operating a cost based strategy in relation to the 
initial sale of licences but they will be more successful in generating profit once the 
customer is locked-in through maintenance and upgrade services as switching costs 
increase dramatically.  In contrast to the Scott and Kaindl (2000) case, VF 
Corporation and Reebok were both big enough companies to demand changes in the 
functionality of SAP to suit their requirements (Brown, 1998; Orenstein, 1998; 
Stedman, 1999b; Stedman, 1999c; Stedman, 1999a). 
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Although this is a typical reflection of any competitive environment (Porter, 1980; 
Porter, 1996), it does raise issues in respect of packaged software selection.  
Specifically, issues related to the responsiveness of the vendor and the ability of the 
adopting organisations to influence the development trajectory of a given product 
may require consideration.  This is really no different to custom development where 
various users at the organisational level deal with the development team in various 
ways with various outcomes (Quintas, 1994; Flynn and Davarpanah Jazi, 1998).  
Yet, with packaged software the stakes are higher as this negotiation is undertaken in 
a market environment where the user base is more diverse and diffuse.  Indeed, it has 
been argued that the market represents a barrier between the developer and the user 
(Bansler and Havn, 1994).  With packaged software, the development process is 
divided into two processes performed by at least two different organisations. The 
vendor designs, programs and tests the software, while the customer is responsible 
for the configuration, the organisational implementation, and the operation of the 
information system.  There may be no other connection between the activities of the 
two organisations, other than in the sale.  In addition, the barrier may be further 
‘thickened’ by the presence of intermediaries as discussed in the next section.  
 
2.6 Vendors and Implementation Partners 
2.6.1 Intermediation in the Packaged Software Supply Chain 
The packaged software market has been described as a prime target for 
disintermediation.  Giaglis et al. (2002) argue that given the dominance of companies 
such as Microsoft, intermediaries have struggled to differentiate themselves in order 
to attract customer.  However, the software product market exists in part because of 
the participation of other non software-vendor participants (Sawyer, 2001).  Included 
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here are consulting groups, system integrators, trainers and other software producers.  
These intermediaries facilitate the linkage between software purchasers and 
producers because vendors often minimise their role in implementation.  A dominant 
goal of software vendors is to sell their products, leaving it to others to implement 
them in consumer organisations (Sawyer, 2001).  Intermediaries may even sell the 
vendor’s products on their behalf (sometimes also referred to as vendors, or as 
resellers).  Moreover, these intermediaries may also sell their own services such as 
consultancy to assist with finding a product and implementing it, support services, 
customisations and bolt-on products.  The software product market therefore gives 
rise to a software services market.  The intermediaries that comprise this market can 
thus, also affect selection processes.   
 
In contrast to custom approaches where close links between users and developers are 
considered critical (Flynn and Davarpanah Jazi, 1998; Peppard, 2001), software 
purchasers and developers use a variety of mediated means to communicate.  Some 
of these links are shown in Table 2.1.  Although these links may be necessary for the 
functioning of the packaged software market, they can represent a barrier between 
end users and developers.  This point clearly made in the previous section where 
even large organisations did not necessary have all of their requirements satisfied.  
Moreover, even where direct contact does occur (the preferred kind of link according 
to Keil and Carmel (1995)), it may be that those involved in the link are unable to 
convey requirements and interpret them (again as with custom development (Curtis 
et al., 1988; Flynn, 1998; Lai, 1998).  The dynamics of purchaser-vendor links are 
important considerations in packaged software selection as they give an indication of 
a consumer organisation’s opportunities for influencing the development trajectories 
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of vendors and how they might deal with other matters, such as support, post 
purchase. 
Table 2.1: Customer-Developer Links in Packaged Software Development 
Adapted from: (Keil and Carmel, 1995) 
Link 
 
Support line 
 
Survey 
 
User-interface prototyping 
 
 
Requirements prototyping 
 
 
Interview 
 
Testing 
 
Email/bulletin board 
 
 
Usability lab 
 
 
Observational study 
 
 
Marketing and sales 
 
 
User group 
 
 
Trade show 
 
 
Focus group 
Description 
 
A unit that helps customers with day-to-day problems 
 
Textual surveys administered to a sample of customers 
 
Customers are exposed to a demo, or early version, to uncover 
user-interface issues 
 
Customers are exposed to a demo, or early version to discover 
system requirements 
 
One-on-one with end-user; open-ended or semi-structured 
 
New requirements and feedback stemming from testing 
 
Customers post problems, questions, and suggestions 
electronically 
 
Specially constructed labs for taping and measuring user subjects 
at work. 
 
Customers are followed for an extended period to learn what they 
do 
 
Representatives meet current and potential customers to obtain 
requirements 
 
Customer groups convene periodically to discuss software usage 
and improvements 
 
Customers are exposed to mock-up or prototype and asked for 
feedback 
 
A small group of customers are brought together to discuss the 
software 
 
 
2.6.2 Relationships Amongst Vendors, Implementation Partners and 
Purchasers 
There is a co-dependent relationship amongst vendors, intermediaries and 
purchasers.  Organisations enter into long-term relationships with packaged software 
vendors.  They do not want to customise software and so they need to become active 
in user groups, a mechanism by which software buyers collectively try to influence 
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the vendor's plans for package maintenance and enhancement (Markus and Tanis, 
2000).  Conversely, the packaged software vendors need customers to buy their 
products.  In addition, it is possible to highlight links between vendors and 
intermediaries.  This is often based on the exchange of information about products, 
services and market conditions. In cases where an intermediary has contact with 
customers, a vendor may not be able to offer services such as new versions of 
products without their assistance.  If the vendor bases his range of products/services 
and products and services from the intermediary then a corresponding dependency 
relationship arises (Andersson and Nilsson, 1996).  Therefore, it is also possible to 
highlight a co-dependent relationship between vendors and intermediaries.  
Intermediaries help the consumer organisation in a number of ways and this is their 
reason for being in business.  Unsurprisingly, these relationships amongst purchases, 
vendors and intermediaries can be fraught with difficulties. 
 
Consultants may offer standard solutions to problems that are very specific to the 
organisations that are employing them – they may not want, or be able to, grasp 
specific organisational realities.  Consultants may also be viewed as holding too 
much power, influence and knowledge which may ‘walk out of the door’ when they 
do (Skok and Legge, 2001).  In one ERP project, the company reported that the 
documentation provided by the consulting group was not tailored to their needs.  For 
example, a costing invoice was called a ‘different outlet’ which did not make much 
sense to their employees (Skok and Legge, 2001).  In contrast, Guilbert looked into 
the use of intermediaries to facilitate their ERP implementation process. However, 
the management team decided that it was preferable to use internal expertise to 
enable change management and thus, consultants only used to assist in the technical 
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configuration of the software (Gibson et al., 1999).  However, adopting the solution 
of training a company’s internal staff is only slightly less risky.  Employees with 
experience of packages that are in high demand are often lured away by other 
organisations who wish to implement the same one (Martin, 1998). 
 
As packaged software is a generic product, popular products may see overwhelming 
demand for implementation and this may lead to a dearth of support for selection and 
implementation.  The ERP market in the late 1990s is a good example.  The ERP 
market grew so quickly that this led to a shortage of competent consultants (Bingi et 
al., 1999; Sumner, 2000).  Purchasing organisations therefore widely complained 
about consultants with only a few months training who charge US$ 2,500 a day 
(Martin, 1998).  This further manifested itself in a widespread lack of knowledge 
about the details of ERP products, particularly where integrations and 
partner products were concerned (Markus et al., 2000).  This issue is not new, nor 
ERP specific.  An earlier packaged software study reported difficulties in engaging 
users in the implementation process as the development team were perceived by the 
users as not possessing adequate knowledge of the product in question (Lynch, 
1984).   
 
Agenda differences have also been identified.  In one study ‘Company D’ found that 
their consultants also wanted to get the ERP project completed as quickly as 
possible.  It transpired that they could see a glut of business opportunities on the 
horizon (Skok and Legge, 2001).  Differences in agendas may be further amplified 
and complicated where multiple vendors are involved due to the existence of 
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multiple packages and custom components as in ‘Best of Breed’ implementations 
(Light et al., 2001; Stefanou, 2001). 
 
Finally, when a consumer organisation has entered into an agreement with a 
particular software vendor there may be a problem of path dependency.  This is 
closely connected to lock-in, whereby once implemented it becomes very difficult 
(because of huge switching costs) to select an alternative (Howcroft and Light, 
2002).  Consumer organisations are effectively committing themselves to upgrading 
software periodically (and mostly at the behest of the developer) if they hope to 
avoid major conversion headaches (Markus and Tanis, 2000).  Indeed, the hidden 
costs of support, training, tailoring, maintenance, hardware adjustment, forced 
upgrade and incremental licensing agreements were bemoaned by 33 per cent of 
respondents in one study (PriceWaterhouse, 1996).  Lock-in and switching costs may 
also become a problem if the vendor an organisation has purchased from drops out of 
the market.  It has been argued that, due to the relatively low costs of entry into the 
industry, the financial stability of some vendors is questionable and a cause for real 
concern (Gross and Ginzberg, 1984). 
 
2.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter began by reviewing the rise of the world packaged software market and 
argued that it is rapidly becoming the favoured mode of information systems support 
in many work organisations.  It then argued on a number of fronts that understanding 
the packaged software market is important in terms of understanding processes of 
selection.  This is because packaged software products are highly globalised, 
primarily due to the desire of producers to maximise economies of scale.  The 
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chapter implies that the process of package selection will be influenced by the 
various parties who comprise the market in order to maintain the economies of scale 
or for other ‘profit related’ reasons.  In sum, it suggests that selection decisions are 
ultimately constrained by the ‘market’.  However, it will be shown in the next 
chapter that much of what is presented is not incorporated into existing theories of 
selection.  Although this chapter has begun to explain some of the drivers that may 
influence the selection, the process is usually reported as one that is driven by the 
consumer organisation.   With this in mind, the next chapter focuses upon the 
selection of packaged software from the organisational perspective.   
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3 An Organisational Perspective 
of Packaged Software 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the market-oriented nature of packaged software was 
discussed.  This chapter builds upon this to consider issues related to the 
organisational aspects of packaged software selection – the environment within 
which it will be implemented and used.  The chapter begins by reviewing a selection 
of reasons for packaged software purchase, the ‘trigger’ for the enactment of the 
selection process.  Then, consideration is given to theories of packaged software 
selection.  This involves a critical examination of the typically reported processes of 
requirements gathering, package evaluation and the selection decision.  This is 
followed by an examination of the linkage between packaged software selection and 
its’ implementation. 
 
The chapter concludes by drawing together the findings of this and the preceding 
chapter into a conceptual framework.  This framework maps out the landscape of the 
research.  Most importantly, it demonstrates how existing theories of selection do not 
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take account of the full complexities and nuances of the process.  The conceptual 
framework will be used to guide the research and act as a basis for the development 
of an alternative theory. 
 
3.2 Reasons for Packaged Software Purchase 
Although it has been suggested that time, cost and quality are the three most critical 
considerations in packaged software purchase (Bocij et al., 2003), the matter is 
significantly more complex.  This section presents an overview of the reasons why 
packaged software may be purchased.  Of course, there are also reasons why 
packaged software might not be purchased.  Indeed, as will be illustrated, the reasons 
presented here may well be interpreted as reasons against selection.  However, the 
focus is on the reasons for purchase, as this more readily implies that the selection 
process will be enacted5.  Also, by necessity, this section is fairly descriptive.  The 
aim is solely to put forward a range of reasons why the packaged software selection 
process may be enacted.  It therefore merely lists the reasons and briefly consider 
why each exists and, where necessary, why they might be interpreted as reasons for 
not purchasing packaged software 
 
In summary, it is suggested that some of the reasons why packaged software may be 
adopted over custom development may be intersubjectively agreed as sensible, and 
that others may not. 
 
                                                 
5 I do realise it is simplistic to think in this fashion.  I am quite aware that an organisation may choose to select packaged 
software even when faced with a raft of reasons not to. 
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3.2.1 The Desire for Standardisation 
Standards ensure that a component ‘fits’ with the rest of a system (Schmidt and 
Werle, 1998).  Whether it is to fit with ‘industry standard’ practices (Lassila and 
Brancheau, 1999) or achieve synergy across national boundaries and product lines 
(Bingi et al., 1999; Huber et al., 2000), the allure of standardisation is a key reason 
for the purchase of packaged software.  At Dow Corning for instance, it was 
suggested by a Director in Europe that the SAP product would be a fast and effective 
way to attain global discipline and integrated common systems (Ross, 1999).  The 
same was true at ‘Threads’ were the strategy was to implement common processes 
and IT infrastructures through the SAP package.  Business processes were modelled 
in line with those embedded within the ERP package with the objective being to 
achieve 90 per cent commonality in global processes (Holland et al., 1998; Holland 
and Light, 1999a).    Even earlier, in 1977, the US Forest Service’s top management 
decided that it would begin using a standardised computer based system, known as 
ADVENT, for preparing and submitting program plans.  The management felt that 
using ADVENT would improve program planning through standardisation thereby 
enabling comparisons across units and integrating the process more closely with 
other forest management activities (Gremillion, 1982).  Therefore, not only is the 
standardisation of packaged software seen as beneficial by the producers, but also 
the consumers. 
 
The major reason why consuming organisations are attracted to standardised 
products.  As shown in the examples above, packaged software is thought to enable 
better organisational communication through shared systems and a belief in their 
ability to engender commonality.  Although, it is possible to have some pragmatic 
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sympathy with this aim, other studies of IT and standardisation suggest that 
standards cannot resolve problems in communication.  For instance, in their study of 
electronic data interchange (EDI) standards, Damsgaard and Truex III (2000) argue 
that EDI exchanges are not simply highly standardised technical exchanges.  They 
prefer to see them as part of an ongoing and continuously evolving conversation 
between complex human organisations.  The same argument can be applied to 
packaged software.  Implementing packaged software will not necessarily reconcile 
communications problems or improve communications capabilities.  
 
Moreover, it cannot be assumed that increased communication capabilities are 
necessarily a good thing.  For example, the selection and implementation of a 
standardised package, for the purposes of improving communication throughout the 
organisation at ‘Eng Co.’ was variously interpreted as good and bad by senior 
management and sales staff (Light, 2001c).  Perhaps more significantly, due to the 
standardised nature of packaged software, information systems developments in 
organisations may becoming increasingly homogenised and this has considerable 
implications for selection decisions in terms of organisational fit. 
 
3.2.2 To ‘Overcome’ IT Legacy Problems 
The problems associated with getting IT to work are often characterised as Legacy 
Information Systems – old, outdated technologies that are muddled by years of 
modification, degradation and general lack of attention (Bennett, 1994; Adolph, 
1996; Warren, 1999).  In the 1980s and 1990s, these problems were high on the 
agenda for many organisations as soaring costs of maintenance and interference in 
daily work life through the resultant applications back log became apparent 
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(Swanson and Beath, 1989; Kelly et al., 1999a; Henderson, 2000b).  Yet, strictly 
speaking, ‘legacy’ does not embody problematic connotations, nor does it 
necessarily embody good things.  Legacy merely implies something that is handed 
down and is therefore, in some senses, neutral (Allen, 1990).  Therefore, legacy 
information systems should be viewed as handed down information systems6(Light, 
2003a).   
 
No matter how legacy information systems are conceptualised, packaged software 
has been widely cited as the ‘solution’ to the problems they may pose (Deloitte and 
Touche, 1996; Knowles, 1997).  Packages are argued to be:  
 
- Well structured and allow for maintenance and future development to be 
outsourced to a vendor (KPMG, 1998; Butler, 1999; Scheer and Habermann, 
2000). 
- Easily operated, supported and maintained due to the ability of the implementing 
organisation to tap into available a skills base for the software (Bingi et al., 1999; 
Sumner, 2000; Willcocks and Sykes, 2000). 
- Well documented and organised (Golland, 1978; Butler, 1999; Scheer and 
Habermann, 2000). 
 
For example, at Novartis (Bhattacherjee, 2000) and ‘Global Petroleum’ (Light, 
1999), the proliferation of ad hoc systems, minimal attention to maintenance and the 
lack of interoperability were cited as the reasons for the move to ERP packages.   
Packages got a further boost as companies began to realise the full impact of the 
                                                 
6 For a more thorough explanation of this theory see Appendix A, which contains the working paper. 
 43
Year 2000 problem, and began to view packages as a solution (Holland et al., 1999c; 
Markus and Tanis, 2000).  
 
Yet, there are potential difficulties with viewing packages as the ‘solution’ to legacy 
information systems problems.  At Global Petroleum for instance, the legacy 
information systems comprised packaged software that had been heavily modified.  
Packaged software was merely being introduced in an attempt to deal with problems 
associated with an existing package.  To treat packaged software as different to 
legacy information systems is therefore inherently flawed as they are one in the 
same.  One study highlights the irony of the belief in packaged software as the 
‘replacement’ for legacy information systems.  29 per cent of the respondents said 
they had lost control of the system development process, which was now governed 
by the offerings of their package vendors, and 41 per cent stated they were locked-in 
to the packages they had bought to replace ‘legacy’ custom built programs 
(PriceWaterhouse, 1996).  The implication of this is that although the selection of 
packaged software may well help relieve some of the problems of an organisations 
existing situation, it may also introduce new ones.  However, the fact remains that 
legacy information systems are often characterised as basis of an applications 
backlog that can be dealt with by the implementation of packaged software.  This is 
discussed further in the next section.   
 
3.2.3 To Deal with an Applications Backlog 
It is suggested that, faced with application backlogs due to rising software 
development costs, the need for rapid deployment of new systems to keep pace with 
business, and the migration of applications to the desktop through client-server 
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architectures, organisations have increasingly turned to packaged software to solve a 
variety of business problems (Knowles, 1997; Li, 1999).  Moreover, it has been 
argued that:  
 “Programming developed not just for one user, but for many, can 
help  relieve the bottleneck in user demand for computer systems to 
process information” (Gremillion, 1982: 51) 
As packaged software is pre-built, it has been suggested that information systems 
managers expect shorter implementation timeframes and faster attainment of project 
objectives (PriceWaterhouse, 1996; Li, 1999).  It has also been argued that packages 
can be made available without development delay, so the users can implement the 
package instantly (Heikkila et al., 1991).  Indeed, it is further argued that the lengthy 
lag between a user’s requests for a new system and implementation (a supposed 
feature of custom development) has been replaced by market-based approaches 
where software vendors can produce new releases faster than consumers can absorb 
them (Sawyer, 2001).  Packages have also been reported as lessening the 
requirement for extensive resources to be focussed upon maintenance activity as this 
is essentially outsourced to the vendor (Robson, 1997; Butler, 1999). 
 
However, contrary to the argument that packages may offer speedier implementation 
times, organisations have to wait for the product to be built (Butler, 1999), and when 
they have implemented it, they may have to wait for upgrades and maintenance 
activities to be performed (Gross and Ginzberg, 1984).  For example, Dell decided 
that the deployment cycle for the SAP package would have taken them too long.  
Their plan, to convert all of the company’s information systems to the SAP package, 
was estimated to require several years to implement and thus the project was 
abandoned (Fan et al., 2000).   
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Moreover, when an organisation adopts packaged software, they effectively 
outsource aspects of their change processes to the developer.  That is, if they want to 
change and this change requires changes to the packaged software, they must wait 
and hope that the developer does so and in a fashion that suits them (cf. the 
discussion in respect of the development trajectories of vendors in chapter 2).  A 
good example of this was the rush toward CRM functionality late in the 1990s.  
Although there were major CRM package companies such as Siebel in the market, 
some organisations had already implemented ERP packages which did not offer 
CRM functionality.  These organisations needed to decide if they were going to wait 
for the CRM functionality to be built by their ERP vendor, or if the would stray from 
the planned single vendor approach and adopt a package such as Siebel (Holland et 
al., 1999b; Holland and Light, 2001).  In an attempt to speed up the time to market, 
SAP and People Soft acquired or set up strategic alliances with CRM packaged 
software development companies and then integrated and sold this within their own 
product.  Not only did this move bring the functionality to their customer base 
quickly, they were also in the position of being able to offer them a product with a 
‘tried and tested’ reputation.  In this case – even for the packaged software developer 
– it was easier to buy rather than build.  
 
The potential implication for selection here, is that although packages are thought to 
reduce the applications backlog, their implementation may lead to other similar 
problems. 
 
 
 
 46
3.2.4 The Role of Selling 
An obvious, but often overlooked issue that needs to be considered in relation to 
packaged software selection is that of sales activity.  Oliver and Romm (2000) 
suggest that packages could not be a solution to organisational problems unless 
vendors were selling them.  What this means, and as suggested in chapter 2, is that 
organisations may select packaged software as a result of an approach by a vendor or 
other implementation intermediary that has actively sought them out to sell them a 
product.  This may include the use of vendor promotions, publications, market 
surveys, the internet, mailing lists (Kunda and Brooks, 2000).  For example ‘strong 
ERP vendor marketing’ and ‘The right solution and message at the right time ..’ have 
been cited as key reasons for its adoption (Klaus et al., 2000).  Similar reasoning has 
been reported with CRM packages (Light, 2003b).  It has been further suggested that 
demonstrations of packaged software are only effective in showing the ‘bells and 
whistles’ and do not fully detail the specifics of the package (Gross and Ginzberg, 
1984).  This is because the vendor views the demonstration as an opportunity to sell 
the firm’s image as well as the product to a buying group that may consist of 
representatives from various departments.  Therefore, the salesperson has to tailor 
their pitch to the lowest common denominator.  The ‘bells and whistles’ approach is 
the most usual one.  However, very little research has been undertaken that examines 
this process when it obviously holds great interest and importance in relation to 
packaged software selection.  
 
Another, perhaps more subtle form of selling is that undertaken by people in 
organisations.  In scene one of the case of Metallica, (Avital and Vandenbosch, 
2000) this process is amply illuminated, although not explicitly discussed.  The Head 
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of Systems Development and the Chief Trainer have to explain to the CEO what the 
software package they are proposing is, the benefits of implementing it, allay fears 
about the product in question and the potential problems that might be encountered 
in implementation such as migration and training issues.  Moreover, the process of 
selling has been argued to be elevated above the product being purchased (Howcroft 
and Light, 2002).  
 
Therefore, those in organisations may be ‘sold’ the idea of packaged software and, 
due to the market orientated nature of this strategy, a particular product.  This is 
evidenced by the various marketing campaigns and literature that can easily be found 
via the internet, and even on television, in the case of the Windows operating system.  
The notion of ‘internal selling’ is of importance here. 
 
Thus, those in an organisation may decide to chose packaged software over custom 
development because they have been sold the idea.  Moreover, this selling activity 
may continue into the process of selection and beyond. 
 
3.2.5 Cost 
Cost is widely suggested as a key advantage of packaged software over custom 
approaches.  In one study, 46 per cent of respondents cited this as a reason for 
adoption (PriceWaterhouse, 1996) and in another, 72 per cent, (Klepper and Hartog, 
1992).  It has even been suggested that cost is one of the biggest advantages due to 
the economies of scale companies can tap into (Chau, 1995).  Another advocate of 
packaged software argues: 
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“it should be obvious that buying a package -- unless it is a poor fit or 
product -- will usually cost less money than creating it in-house.  If 
you are not yet convinced of that statement, my suggestion would be 
to examine why you don’t build your own automobile or make your 
own shoes. You night also wish to re-read those chapters in Adam 
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, about division of labor, production 
and wheel re-invention.” (Welke, 1981: 400). 
On top of this, the costs of acquisition, implementation and usage of the package are 
argued to be reliably predictable and lower than for custom developed software 
(Golland, 1978; Heikkila et al., 1991).   
 
Cost may also be a reason for the selection of one product over another.  At Siemens 
Power Corporation, another part of the Siemens group held more licences for the 
package that was needed and therefore, as these could be used, this information was 
added into the reasoning for the decision to implement that product (Hirt and 
Swanson, 1999).   
 
It is not the intention of the author to engage in a grand discussion about the merits 
of the economies of scale and costs of packaged software, especially in comparison 
to custom developments, however it is worth looking at studies that suggest this 
might not be as straightforward as it first seems.  At ‘Threads’ for example, the 
overall project was reported to have increased in cost five-fold from original 
estimates (Holland and Light, 1999a) and it is doubtful that FoxMeyer anticipated 
the ultimate costs of the acquisition, implementation and usage of SAP, which 
resulted in bankruptcy proceedings (Bicknell, 1998).  These two examples highlight 
that the decision to implement packaged software is not just about the price of a 
licence, which may well be suitable for a-priori accounting.  There are also costs of 
implementation which are discussed further in section 3.5.2.  Moreover, another very 
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unpredictable cost is that related to the ongoing maintenance of the software as 
discussed in section 3.5.3.  Packaged software projects may be subject to ‘cost over-
run’ problems normally associated with custom development (Remenyi et al., 1997). 
 
In summary, although packaged software may be widely perceived as less expensive 
than custom development, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the matter is, 
again, more complex. 
 
3.2.6 The Perception of a ‘Tried and Tested’ Product 
A significant attraction of packaged software for many organisations is related to the 
perception of the reduced risks of implementing what is seen as a ‘tried and tested 
solution’ in contrast to custom development (Golland, 1978; Chau, 1995).  Packages 
are proffered as designed and tested by the vendor, and in most cases, as having been 
installed by other organisations allowing for reference site visits by potential 
purchasers in order to evaluate the product (Heikkila et al., 1991).  For example, 
most packaged software vendor websites contain the lists of high profile company 
cases that aim to illustrate the potential benefits resulting from the implementation of 
their product.  Thus, it is argued that the conditions for estimating the quality and 
usefulness of the system and the implications for work content and organisation are 
much better than in traditional development projects (Bansler and Havn, 1994). 
 
Yet, again there are problems with these assertions.  There is the suggestion that 
packaged software is ‘better built’ than custom developed software yet studies 
suggest that there is a lack of rigour in the product development processes of the 
packaged software product industry (Carmel, 1993; Carmel, 1997).   
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To compound this problem, it has been argued that much of product development is 
opaque to most consumer organisations.  Consequently, since production and 
consumption are separated, vendors tend to be evaluated in terms of their 
products, not their processes (Sawyer, 2001; Howcroft and Light, 2002).  Therefore, 
even if a package has been developed in a less than robust fashion, it is possible that 
this will be ignored by organisations when they decide to implement packaged 
software and further overlooked in the selection process.  In addition, even if a 
product is seen to work at a reference site, it does not follow that it will do so in 
exactly the same fashion in another organisation (Light, 2001c).  Finally, the above 
discussion ignores the fact that there are several instances where custom 
development has been favoured over packaged software selection because 
purchasing organisations have been unhappy with the product on offer (Dautermann, 
1990; Light et al., 2001).  As Quintas (1994) suggests, any form of software 
development is often a difficult and flawed process in which timescales, resource 
inputs and product quality cannot be predicted with certainty. 
 
3.2.7 The Availability of a Broader Knowledge and Skills Base 
Packaged software is usually produced for a mass market and this inevitably means 
the wider availability of support in comparison to custom developed software where 
knowledge of the software is specific to the application.  The adoption of packaged 
software for this reason is evident at the Crosfield, DMC Prints and Nokia 
organisations where only a few employees were capable of handling the 
administration and development of their existing custom developed software 
(Dolmetsch et al., 1998).  Furthermore, the benefits of increased familiarity amongst 
the user population can also be realised.  These may include opportunities for 
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increased intra-organisational and inter-organisational knowledge sharing to enable 
the speedier, and more successful, deployment of packages (Pan et al., 2001; Newell 
et al., 2002).  Furthermore, many job advertisements now specify the requirement for 
familiarity with a package, particularly office automation packages such as 
Microsoft Office.  This phenomenon has also witnessed in other forms of packaged 
software such as SAP.  Problems may however, arise if a particular form of package 
or a specific product become very popular and this may lead to difficulties for those 
in a consumer organisation being able to obtain the skills they need (as discussed in 
section 2.6).  Therefore, although packaged software may be chosen to ‘buy into’ a 
knowledge and skills base, difficulties may arise with popular products.  It also 
follows from this that problems may also emerge if a product is, or becomes, less 
popular which might mean that the support for the package may be hard to find.  
Consequently, although the decision to purchase packaged software limits the 
problem of finding someone who knows about the software (in contrast to custom 
development which tends to be much more localised) packaged software does share 
the same problem in terms of acquiring the skills base.  For example, the lack of 
SAP consultants in the late 1990s – early 2000s echoes the reported shortage of 
Assembly skills in 1994 (Bennett, 1994).   
 
3.2.8 To ‘Free up’ the information systems Function 
Very early in the usage of packaged software, it was recognised that it could lead to 
the release of information systems personnel to work on other projects (Golland, 
1978).  Additionally, a recent survey reported that 40 per cent of respondents felt that 
packaged software would allow for reductions in the in-house development team 
(PriceWaterhouse, 1996).  This is argued to be the case as the consumer organisation 
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will need to allocate fewer resources to development and maintenance activity 
because this is outsourced to the vendor (Butler, 1999).   
 
However, it is easy to interpret these findings as a way to slash the need for in-house 
information systems support.  Potentially, there may not be a need for the 
requirement for a large development work force, however the market-oriented 
context of packaged software clearly requires the in-house information systems 
function to perform new tasks and, if customisation is performed, some development 
work will still be necessary (Light, 2001a). 
 
Thus, the extent of the suggested and perceived possible reductions in the 
information systems function may be overstated as a reason for packaged software 
adoption. 
 
3.2.9 To Implement Change and Attain Best Practices 
The general opinion is that when those in organisations choose to implement 
packaged software there will be a need for organisational change (Lucas et al., 1988; 
Glass, 1998; Light, 2000).  Very simply, organisations invariably change the ways 
that they work in concert with those ways inscribed into the software.  Within the 
context of reasons for adoption therefore, it can be argued that people in 
organisations may choose to implement a piece of packaged software with the 
explicit desire to force change, or use the packaged software as the ‘excuse’ for 
change (Champy, 1997; Soliman and Youssef, 1998).  For example, in one interview 
I undertook for a piece of ERP research, the manager in question said that the 
package allowed them to undertake ‘Business Process Reengineering (BPR) by 
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stealth’ (Davenport and Short, 1990; Hammer, 1990).  The link between packaged 
software and organisational change is discussed in much greater detail in section 
3.5.2.  
 
Somewhat allied to the desire to implement change is the use of packages to adopt 
best practices.  The idea that packaged software is tried and tested has already been 
discussed.  Strongly related to this idea is, that through this process of usage and 
testing, ‘best practices’ become inscribed into the software.  Again, in the 
PriceWaterhouse (1996) study, greater functionality and the ability to keep IT 
current were popular reasons for packaged software adoption.  In relation to ERP 
packages one study also cited ‘a desire to fulfil the promise of BPR, to move to a 
process orientation and recognition of best practices’ as key drivers (Klaus et al., 
2000).  The central theme is that through the purchase of packaged software, it is 
possible to ‘buy into’ the best practices, or best processes and functionality, that are 
written into the software. 
 
This discussion raises a number of questions which will be considered later.  These 
are related to the desire for, and recognition of, the need for change and the 
appropriateness of adopting so called best practices. 
 
3.2.10 Bravado 
The adoption of packaged software for the purposes of trying to impress others is not 
widely reported in the literature.  The main reason the that the author has introduced 
this idea is that in a paper by Adam and O'Doherty (2000) regarding ERP 
implementation, in one of the summary tables (number 3) a reason for the adoption 
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of a particular packaged was cited as “To be able to show the big boys”.  
Unfortunately, although the authors discuss the other reasons for implementation, 
they ignore one of the most interesting.  Neither is this an isolated case.  At Dow 
Corning, a reason for the implementation of a package was because many other 
chemical companies were implementing it (Ross, 1999).  It has also been suggested 
that a reason for adoption might be that the organisation wants to obtain the kudos of 
being perceived in the vanguard, and at the ‘cutting edge’ (Oliver and Romm, 2000). 
 
Whilst bravado is not widely reported in packaged software studies it should not be 
surprising that this is involved.  Custom development and other information systems 
research is replete with stories that indicate the presence of bravado (Hammer, 1990; 
Davenport and Stoddard, 1994; Howcroft, 2001).  For example, Ferneley and Light 
(2002) discuss a case of the use of a knowledge management system whereby the 
‘Peacock Effect’ emerged as a result of the users wanting to ‘show off’.  Such 
findings clearly further undermine theories of decision making based upon the 
rational choice model discussed in the introduction to this study. 
 
3.2.11 Policy 
Organisations may determine that the principle actions in respect of their information 
systems support will be rooted in packaged software.  That is, the solution may be 
pre-determined by a parent organisation (KPMG, 1998).  For example at Dow 
Corning there was strong sentiment that the firm should be buying-not developing 
systems that were large (Ross, 1999).  There was a similar situation at Siemens 
Power Corporation where the use of packaged software was company policy (Hirt 
and Swanson, 1999).  Moreover, the policy was more specific in that it specified a 
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particular product (SAP) in respect of enterprise-wide information systems support.  
Thus, there is the potential for policies to interfere with package purchase because of 
the assumption being made by policy makers that there is a product on the market 
that will meet organisational requirements and even more so where a particular 
product has been specified in advance.  In essence, the selection process may 
become invalid.   
 
3.2.12 Functionality 
Software characteristics have been highlighted as an important factor in software 
purchase (Lucas et al., 1988; Chau, 1994).  This again, is inextricably linked with the 
nature of packaged software.  If an organisation is ‘buying into’ packaged software 
over custom development they will generally not want to get involved in 
customising the product as this erodes the economies of scale.  Those in 
organisations deciding if they will purchase packaged software will therefore look to 
for packaged software that contains the functionality they require.  However, it has 
been suggested that software packages seldom, if ever, match user requirements 
exactly (Weing, 1984).  Those in organisations suggest that “Available packages do 
not adequately reflect my industry” and “My needs are too unique to be adequately 
represented in available packages” (Gross and Ginzberg, 1984).  Furthermore, highly 
integrated sets of packages (such as ERP) may vary considerably in quality on a 
module-by-module basis (Andersson and Nilsson, 1996).  For example at ‘Global 
Entertainment’ single vendor based packages were evaluated.  However, they were 
perceived as being historically built from packages aimed at specific functions and 
then expanded for enterprise coverage.  The IT Director stated that although he felt 
that enterprise systems were good, his company would have to build around them 
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(Light et al., 2000).  Furthermore, in another study, IT and business managers were 
reported as perceiving integrated ERP packages as having only one 'best in class' 
application (Light and Holland, 2000).  Therefore, before the selection process is 
enacted, custom development may be chosen over packages (and vice-versa) 
depending upon perceptions of what will satisfy the requirements of the organisation.   
 
3.2.13 Summary of Reasons for Packaged Software Purchase 
This brief review of the reasons why packaged software may be purchased is not 
intended to be exhaustive.  However, what it does begin to illustrate is that the 
reasons for selection may not be universally agreed as rational.  In particular, it raises 
to the surface a number of what might be perceived as ‘highly irrational’ reasons for 
selection such as bravado.  It is also suggested that even reasons which look sensible 
may rely on incomplete information that leads to beliefs in packages that are 
unwarranted and misguided.  In order to draw out the main thrust of the reasons for 
(and against) purchase, a summary of this section is presented in Table 3.1 
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Table 3.1: Summary of Reasons for Packaged Software Purchase 
The Desire for Standardisation - Packages are chosen as they are perceived to facilitate 
integration through commonality.  However, standardisation may not be welcomed by some who 
perceive it’s integration capabilities for facilitating transparency and commonality as unhelpful.  
 
To ‘Overcome’ IT Legacy Problems - In contrast to traditional views of legacy information 
systems, packages are argued to be well structured, organised, documented and resourced because 
they are standard, pre-built products.  Moreover, the problems of development and maintenance 
experienced with existing systems may be viewed as being solved, though their implementation.  
Whilst this may be the case, packages also have the potential to bring new’ legacy information 
systems problems to the organisation. 
 
To Deal with an Applications Backlog - Packages may be chosen over custom development 
because they can be delivered in a shorter timeframe and therefore assist in reducing any 
applications backlog.  Yet, once a package is implemented, development and maintenance is 
outsourced an applications backlog may appear again and which is further outside the control of 
the consumer organisation. 
 
The Role of Selling - Packaged software may be purchased because this development route, and 
more specifically, a product may be sold to those making the decision.  Moreover, these ‘selling’ 
activities may originate from the market, the organisation or another ‘channel’. 
 
Cost - The cost of custom development is argued to outweigh that of installing a package because 
it is built in a standard fashion, for mass markets, there are economies of scale.  Moreover, 
package purchase and implementation is suggested to be much more predictable than custom 
development.  However, like custom development, cost overruns are evident. 
 
The Perception of a ‘Tried and Tested’ Product - Packages are viewed as ‘tried and tested’ 
products because they are adopted by a large user base and thus, in contrast to custom developed 
systems, they are easier to evaluate.  Yet, product development processes tend to be ignored in 
favour of product evaluation even though these have been reported as lacking the rigour of custom 
developed systems. 
 
The Availability of a Broader Knowledge and Skills Base - As packages are developed for mass 
markets, it is suggested that they offer a more readily available pool of knowledge and skills to 
support implementation and usage.  This is arguably in contrast to custom development where the 
pool is very specific.  However, the availability of the support, like programming languages for 
custom development, may depend upon the popularity of the package in question. 
 
To ‘Free up’ the information systems Function - The pre-built and outsourced nature of 
packages implies that a large in-house information systems function might not be needed or those 
that work in one can be allocated other work.  However, although packages are pre-built they may 
require some form of customisation which may not be supported by the vendor.  Moreover, 
packages may not completely replace any existing custom developed or customised packages. 
 
To Implement Change and Attain Best Practices - Packages may be used as an excuse to 
implement change, as they are pre-built and inscribed with implicit ways of work and 
functionality.  Moreover, these ways of work and functionality may be perceived as ‘best in class’ 
further fuelling the desire for change. 
 
Bravado - Packages may be purchased to impress others. 
 
Policy - Packages may be purchased because is it policy not to undertake custom development.  
Moreover, it may also be policy to adopt a particular product. 
 
Functionality - If there is an available packaged software product on the market that is perceived 
as satisfying organisational requirements.  This may be favoured over custom development. 
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3.3 Theories of Packaged Software Selection 
The selection of packaged software products is fairly well documented and has been 
highlighted as one of the most critical issues in respect of this mode of systems 
development (Parr and Shanks, 2000).  However, the process of selection is usually 
theorized in a rationalistic fashion.  Most studies describe the process as broadly 
involving the identification of requirements, the evaluation of packages against 
requirements, and subsequent purchase on the basis of ‘best fit’ (Lynch, 1984; Chau, 
1994; Nelson et al., 1996; KPMG, 1998).  Indeed it has been suggested that buyers 
will seek to choose packages, that for a given software expenditure, will best satisfy 
their computing needs (Anderson, 1990).  Anderson (1990) further suggests that 
these decisions will involve three basic components: an assessment and evaluation of 
the performance attributes of each package, a structure or formulation of evaluations 
that would facilitate package comparisons and a strategy for choosing amongst 
alternatives.  A summary of the theories of packaged software selection is provided 
in Table 3.2 and an ideal model, based upon these, is presented in Figure 3.1.   
 
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1, can be used to further the argument developed so far that 
packaged software selection is far from rational.  For example, it is possible to ask: 
- Whose requirements are gathered, and why? 
- Whose understanding of the available packages is used? 
- How is the package compatibility determined, who is involved? 
- How objective can vendor demonstrations be? 
- Who decides which package is purchased, and how? 
The existing theories do have utility and the model of selection they put forward 
appears sensible.  However, the ideal model oversimplifies the process.  In the light 
 59
of what has been presented so far in this thesis, it is clear that selection is in no way 
as clear cut as existing theories suggest.  Yet, they are still a useful starting point for 
understanding packaged software selection, and developing an alternative theory.  In 
the following sections therefore, I will consider the various aspects of the process 
with the intention of characterising them in a richer fashion. 
 
 
Definition
of User 
Requirements
Package 
Evaluation
Final selection of 
on the basis of 
the evaluation 
process
 
Figure 3.1: An Ideal Model of Packaged Software Selection 
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Table 3.2: A Summary of Packaged Software Selection Processes 
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3.4 Packaged Software Selection: Definition of User Requirements 
It would be expected, that due to the pre-built nature of packaged software, user 
requirements gathering would be critical in order to obtain the best fit between the 
product and the organisational requirements.  This is because although end users and 
information systems personnel may have similar views regarding the ease of use 
of software packages, their views may differ in respect to the usefulness of software 
due to a lack of ‘organisational knowledge’ on the part of information systems staff 
(Montazemi et al., 1996).  Therefore, it has been argued that in packaged software 
environments, there is a need to need to develop consumer-focused techniques, such 
as work process analysis, gap-fit analysis, and market analysis in order to assist end 
users in the selection process (Sawyer, 2001).   
 
This point is further supported by Sherer (1993) who states that packaged software 
projects embody significant risks associated with function-fit misfits that can only be 
reduced if users really understand how the proposed system will operate.  Similarly, 
it is argued that in order to get the best technical product, user requirements need to 
be agreed upon (Kunda and Brooks, 2000)7.  Therefore, the many proponents of the 
ideal model of selection would advocate the involvement of users in the 
requirements gathering and product evaluation activities.  
 
As with custom development though, the extent and purpose of the involvement of 
users is variable.  Views may be sourced only from senior management where their 
agendas and their perceptions of staff requirements override the requirements of 
staff.  For instance, at one company, the introduction of a Sales Force Automation 
                                                 
7 This assumes that there is best technical product, that consensus can be achieved and that the organisation knows what it is 
looking for rather than the selection process being a concurrent educational process as eluded to in section 3.5.2.1. 
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system was discussed at regional manager level, but did not include the sales staff. In 
the study, a sales representative is reported as saying that she had been one of three 
personnel invited to a meeting to discuss possible developments in IT.  However, she 
had arrived to discover that the process was complete and that her role was merely to 
provide approval for these decisions on behalf of her colleagues (Lloyd and Newell, 
1998).  Moreover, in extreme circumstances, package adopters will forgo or curtail 
the analysis of information requirements and completely fall in with those embodied 
within the packaged software (Markus and Tanis, 2000). 
 
Therefore, there are inconsistencies – user involvement is championed, yet in 
practice this may not always happen.  This is interesting as in a packaged software 
selection context user involvement could be useful for obtaining an appreciation of 
package suitability (assuming the users in question have an idea of what is needed) 
or even on managerially oriented grounds of increasing chances of the acceptability 
of the package when implemented. 
 
3.5 Packaged Software Selection: Evaluation 
Package evaluation may be based upon a number of sources.  Word of mouth for 
example, has been highlighted as invaluable in identifying available packages 
(Kunda and Brooks, 2000).  Others may include publications, market surveys, the 
internet and mailing lists.   However, it has been suggested that these sources may 
put purchasers at the risk of being enticed by the vendors’ marketing people or being 
locked into a certain way of thinking by looking only at the available packages 
(Bansler and Havn, 1994).  A further alternative might be to experimentation.  
Indeed, it is suggested that the best way of evaluating packages, is through 
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experimentation with the operating environment in which the product will be used 
(Martin and McClure, 1983; Kunda and Brooks, 2000).  In an ideal world, this 
would no doubt be possible, but for most packages is it arguable that this would be 
too resource intensive.  It is difficult to imagine a global company implementing 
SAP on a trial basis for instance, but a trial of the Netscape Navigator or Opera 
browser is readily achievable.  Indeed, however package evaluation is performed, it 
is a difficult process because: 
 
- Searching for products is resource intensive, requiring personnel, travel, the 
development of requests for proposals, gathering and analysing data, 
development of selection criteria and vendor interviews for instance. 
- It may be difficult to find independent guidance.  Purchasers may be forced to 
rely on vendor proposals, presentations and marketing materials.  
- If there is a lack of a selection methodology political agendas and/or gut feelings 
may well dominate rather than well thought out requirements (Hecht, 1997). 
 
What this shows is the wide ranging scope for the process to be shaped by different 
view points and actions.  Marketing documentation for example, however ethical the 
vendor, will be populated with arguments as to why their product should be chosen.  
Moreover, even Hecht’s advice of having selection criteria in place is no guarantee 
of objectivity – the criteria themselves are the results of interpretations as is their 
application.  Selection criteria will be specific to organisational context and even 
individuals, just as with custom development such as those decisions about which 
requirements are chosen to be satisfied (Markus, 1983; Kling and Iacono, 1984; 
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Markus and BjØrn-Andersen, 1987).  In general however, the major criteria for the 
evaluation of packaged software centre on the themes of: 
 
- The functionality of the software – currently and in the future. 
- The capabilities of the vendor – currently and in the future. 
 
Indeed some of theories of packaged software selection explicitly incorporate these 
criteria - see (Welke, 1981; Martin and McClure, 1983; Sharland, 1991).  Much of 
the reasoning behind the importance of these themes is concerned with taking a long 
term view of living with the outcome of the selection process.  That is, selecting a 
product and vendor that meets and will continue to meet the requirements of those in 
the organisation.  Therefore in section 3.5.1, the issues associated with vendors and 
implementation partners are briefly revisited, adding to those discussed in section 
2.6.  Following this, section 3.5.2 considers the potential issues associated with 
functionality of packaged software, section 3.5.3 those associated with customisation 
and section 3.5.4 those with maintenance and upgrades.  
 
3.5.1 Vendors and Implementation partners 
Several studies highlight the importance of consumer organisation views of the 
vendors of, and implementation partners associated with, particular packaged 
software products.  First, purchase is often motivated by expectations of the direction 
of  vendor products as much as by specific internal needs (Butler, 1999; Sawyer, 
2001). That is, a consumer organisation will be interested in the development 
trajectory of a vendor.  Furthermore, the vendor’s perceived strength and stability is 
also a significant consideration (Chau, 1994).  In one study it is suggested that: 
 65
“universities are not likely to make an investment in an ERP system 
that is intended to provide institutional support for many years unless 
they are convinced that the vendor is totally reliable. Continued 
enhancement of the ERP product is less likely to be achieved by a 
supplier of dubious stability.”  (Oliver and Romm, 2000: 1042). 
Reputation, capability, training and support offered, product reputation and whether 
they are a market leader are further related indicators of the significance of 
organisational perception of vendor and implementation partner (Kunda and Brooks, 
2000). At Siemens, consultants were chosen based on a recommendations from 
within the company (Hirt and Swanson, 1999) and at Mitek and DMC prints, SAP 
was chosen as it was perceived as the market leader in ERP packages (Dolmetsch et 
al., 1998).  The whole idea of deciding if a vendor is good or bad is a purely 
interpretive act.  Despite checklists such as those provided by (Sharland, 1991) and 
(Welke, 1981), the choice of a vendor - as shown above - may be based upon very 
personal criteria and very little rigour. 
 
3.5.2 Functionality Considerations 
A critical part of packaged software selection is that of finding out if the 
functionality of the package being evaluated is suitable.  Indeed, one of the major 
barriers to the adoption of packages more widely by organisations is a lack of 
products in the market with appropriate functionality (Deloitte and Touche, 1996).  
In response, many organisations still adopt custom approaches as with the Nursing 
Information System at a US hospital, where previously there were attempts at the 
incorporation of several nationally promoted standard approaches (Dautermann, 
1990).  However, contrast claims that: 
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- packaged software provides relatively complete support for standardised business 
processes (Li, 1999) 
- and, it would be expected that it will be some time before regretting any loss of 
freedom as a result of adopting packages (PriceWaterhouse, 1996),  
 
with the experiences outlined in Table 3.3 and it becomes clear that functionality is a 
significant issue.   
Table 3.3: Examples of Function Miss-Fits 
 
Materials Requirements Planning at American Seating - A shortcoming in the 
bill of material package was its lack of ability to handle variations of final level 
assemblies.  The implementation of Bill of Material and Product Cost failed to 
provide an easy way to handle this problem.  It was one which the company had to 
‘crow bar’ around (Donoghue, 1983). 
 
Material Requirements Planning at ‘Cable’ - The ERP software did not 
sufficiently cater for the notion of length.  For example, a customer may want to 
order a 100-metre length of cable.  The ERP software would indicate that the order 
could be fulfilled stocks totalling 200 metres were held.  In fact, physical stock 
levels comprised 4 x 50 metre lengths of cable (Light, 2001a). 
 
Pricing at ‘Home’ - The detailed geographical breakdown of Home's market was 
used to assist pricing based on the distance travelled to deliver the product. The 
combination of this with other cost elements led to the generation of millions of 
prices.  The customisation was extensive - it applied conditions to the data used to 
generate the prices lists via custom software developed by an external contractor.  
The price lists were integrated with the ERP software (Light, 2001a). 
 
 
3.5.2.1 Packaged software as Organisational Educator 
It would be expected that those in organisations would usually need to have some 
idea of their functional requirements before they begin to assess whether a particular 
package will fit with these.  This is because some required functionality might only 
be partially met and in others, missing entirely (Butler, 1999).  Moreover, the 
significance of this is increased in the light of the various selling acts that may occur 
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in the process of selection and procurement, for example, the blurring of packaged 
software capabilities by vendors as eluded to below: 
 
“with the huge explosion in the CRM market it is not surprising that 
the ERP vendors are quick to jump on the bandwagon, touting the 
benefits of an extended product” (August, 1999b: 38). 
However, it is widely reported that software purchasers often do not understand their 
own requirements and that they may choose a package on the basis of one sales pitch 
(Butler, 1999).  Furthermore, as the software and the systems architecture will be 
new to an organisation, the business practices that the software supports may also be 
new and therefore it is suggested that organisations must engage in a process of 
organisational learning (Scott and Vessey, 2000).  The idea that people in 
organisations may have to learn about the packages they have adopted is touched 
upon in the literature, interestingly though – this is usually during implementation.  
For example at Dow Corning, team members who requested modifications to the 
SAP package they were implementing were often unsure if the need for this had 
arisen from a deficiency in the package or their ability to learn how the package 
allowed a process to be performed (Ross, 1999).  Adam and O'Doherty (2000) also 
report that in a few cases the packages adopted led to the development of managerial 
expectations – they learnt what was possible and became more ambitious in terms of 
their objectives for the system.  These issues do not vary widely from those 
encountered for some time in custom development.  For example, (Flynn, 1998) 
states that users often only have a vague notion of requirements at the beginning of a 
project, there may be changes in external environments and initial requirements may 
have unfeasible implications that are not realised until implementation.  So, it is 
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unexpected that they are being reported, with some surprise, again by those working 
in the area of packaged software.  
 
The development of knowledge of canonical and non-canonical processes embedded 
in  packages has been cited as a key success and failure consideration in packaged 
software implementation (Lee and Lee, 2000).  What this means is that not only do 
packages require extensive user training in terms of how to operate the package, 
there may also be issues associated with the changes the package brings about in the 
working environment.  For example, Cadbury Schweppes implemented plans to 
fulfil 250 orders where normally they would fulfil 1000 following its ERP 
implementation.  This was reported to be due to an increase in the number of people 
who are involved in the process who were involved in new ways and therefore 
needed to re-orient themselves (August, 1999a).  A similar story was reported by 
Skok and Legge (2001).  In their study, staff at Company B thought that the reason 
ERP projects failed was because people were not able to accept standard processes 
or see the impact of integration on other areas.  This issue has been discussed 
extensively in earlier BPR studies (Hall et al., 1993; Bashein et al., 1994; Martinez, 
1995). 
 
This discussion raises the idea that, requirements may not be fully known.  Thus, this 
may have implications for the selection process in terms of evaluating products.  It 
also begins to highlight a link between the selection of a product based upon 
‘incomplete’ user requirements and its implementation and usage in organisations.  
These issues are not explicitly addressed by the ideal model of selection. 
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3.5.2.2 Expectations of Functionality Fit 
It is argued that a better fit between the packaged software functionality and user 
requirements leads to successful implementation and usage (Janson and 
Subramanian, 1995).  At a simple level, this seems logical.  However, as illustrated 
in the last section, those in organisations are often uncertain about their precise 
requirements and therefore it may prove difficult to evaluate a package upon the 
basis of these ‘incomplete’ or ‘inadequate’ requirements.  Moreover, even where 
requirements are fairly well articulated, evaluation can still be problematic as 
packages may well meet the requirements in an unfamiliar or unacceptable way 
(Gremillion, 1982).  It has been suggested for example, that most package purchasers 
find that at least 20 per cent of their requirements are missing from the functionality 
of packages (Scott and Kaindl, 2000).  This is potentially no small mismatch either if 
the missing 20 per cent is that which is perceived to be the most crucial to those in 
the consumer organisation. 
 
In one study of CRM package implementation, ‘ManCo’ expected a package to be 
suitable as they had liked the way they had seen it operating at a reference site that 
was in a different industry and had different ways of working.  In the same study, a 
package was sold to two organisations as a CRM product yet it the organisations 
could not use the package to find out who their most profitable customers were8 
(Light, 2001c).  Similarly, at the University of Nebraska, the average fit between the 
implemented SAP packaged was 60 per cent and as low as 30 per cent in some areas  
yet they bought the package with the expectation of it providing enterprise support 
(Sieber et al., 2000). 
 
                                                 
8 Ironically, CRM is supposed to assist organisations to target their most profitable customers. 
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This discussion implies that even though it has been argued that an organisation 
purchasing a package must determine its functional requirements and weigh these 
against various products, as shown in the ideal model, this may not happen as 
expectations are fuelled by a combination of selling acts and organisational learning.  
Moreover, as a result, expectations of package functionality may also shift when the 
realities of implementation and usage are experienced. 
 
3.5.2.3 Packaged Software and Organisational Change 
It is argued that packaged software is more likely to require a degree of 
organisational change than custom development (Lassila and Brancheau, 1999).  As 
discussed earlier, this is because packaged software is inscribed with ways of work.  
Moreover, packaged software has finite capabilities unlike custom approaches and 
therefore package adoption requires changes in ways of work in line with way the 
software has been built (Lucas et al., 1988).  Furthermore, because packages are 
embedded with ways of work, organisational changes in line with this imply 
learning, as discussed earlier (Hanseth and Braa, 1998).  This may of course also 
mean ‘unlearning’ ways of work and the realisation of this may cause an 
organisation not to select a package.  For example, a major sportswear company the 
author has worked with wanted to dynamically perform stock re-allocations.  In 
effect, they wanted to reduce certain customers’ orders to satisfy those which were 
perceived as more important.  The packages they evaluated would not allow them to 
do this so they decided not to implement one.  Packaged software has further been 
associated with intended or unintended change9 (Hanseth and Braa, 1998; Hanseth et 
al., 2001) and  explicit or implicit change agendas (Glass, 1998; Light, 2000) mostly 
                                                 
9 This despite them being supposedly predictable due to their pre-built standard nature. 
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in the form of BPR activities.  Therefore, in terms of evaluating packaged software, 
the ‘change agent’ potential of the software and the various agendas and capabilities 
for the exploitation of this cannot be ignored.   
 
3.5.3 Customisation Considerations 
Packaged software is generally tailored to the specific requirements of an 
organisation (Klaus et al., 2000).  The notion of tailoring needs to be explained as the 
terminology surrounding the manipulation of packages is diverse.  For the purposes 
of this study, configuration (sometimes called tailoring) and customisation 
(sometimes called modification, custom fitting and tailoring!) are used.  
Configuration refers to the ‘switching on and off’ of functionality that is part of the 
blueprint of the software (Holland and Light, 1999b).  Customisation is used to 
describe changes or additions to the functionality pre-built into a package (Light, 
2001a).   
 
A number of early studies of packaged software indicate that there was an intention 
to customise products as a short cut to development – and thereby deal with the 
applications backlog (Weing, 1984; Trauth and Cole, 1992).  Indeed, in one study, a 
whole category of analysis is devoted to problems with product customisation (Gross 
and Ginzberg, 1984).  To clarify this, the subject’s problems were that they were 
unable to customise the software easily, rather than that they had difficulties 
following the customisation activity.  However, from this point, and more strongly in 
the 2000s, packaged software is linked with the minimisation of customisation 
activity (Dolmetsch et al., 1998; Brehm et al., 2001). 
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Even though the decision to implement packaged software carries with it the idea 
that development is effectively outsourced to the vendor, further development work 
may be required. Packaged software can be customised to meet organisational 
requirements.  However, the more extensive this becomes it is argued, the more 
economies of scale are traded away.  At some point, heavy customisations become 
more expensive than custom development (Gremillion, 1982; Lynch, 1984)10.  
Customisation activity may also result in the loss of vendor support for the product 
or at the very least, a lack of support for the customisations (Golland, 1978; Markus 
and Tanis, 2000).  Moreover, customisations might not work properly after a patch 
or upgrade (Butler, 1999).  Despite the customisation of packaged software being 
heavily discouraged, many adopters undertake this as a result of a lack of knowledge 
about the package or cannot avoid it even though they may experience difficulties in 
getting the result to work (Brehm et al., 2001; Light, 2001a).   
 
Packaged software adoption costs may therefore rise in the same way as they have in 
custom development projects (Remenyi et al., 1997).  In the case of packages, this 
might be due to the performance of customisations where they were not necessary 
because of a perceived lack of functionality or ‘incomplete’ requirements during the 
process of selection.   
3.5.4 Maintenance and Upgrade Considerations 
In order to avoid problems of invalidating packaged software support, an 
organisation may attempt to minimise customisation and rely upon the vendor to 
develop the package in an appropriate fashion.  However, this means that those in the 
consumer organisation may have to live with the vendor’s decisions about 
                                                 
10 Assuming that custom development was more expensive in the first place. 
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maintaining and upgrading their software products (Bansler and Havn, 1994).  
Usually, because of the desire for vendors to maintain economies of scale and a 
generic product, they will determine who gets involved in this.  As shown in section 
2.5, SAP chose customers that suited their product development objectives for their 
R/3 3.1 and 4.0 releases, rather than aiming to satisfy the requirements of their user 
base.   
 
It is also necessary to point out that maintenance can be a form of revenue generation 
for the vendor.  For example, patches may be provided at no cost, beyond any 
maintenance agreement.  However, changes to smooth out operable, but badly fitting 
or designed functionality often form the basis of new releases for which additional 
charges are made (Sawyer, 2001).  For example, Microsoft will release service 
patches for its windows products via the web at no charge.  However, changes aimed 
at improving interfaces and that bring new features are generally (although not 
always) released as a new version requiring customers to pay an upgrade fee. 
 
Therefore, the maintenance and development trajectories of vendors are once again 
highlighted, as they were in section 2.6, to be an important consideration when 
evaluating a package.  Furthermore, this discussion makes the agenda of the vendor 
more explicit than the ideal model and supports the argument for a view of selection 
that recognises multiple realities and other drivers of the process in addition to that 
of the consumer organisation. 
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3.6 Packaged Software Selection: The Final Decision 
It has been suggested that presenting a strong business case will attract management 
support and user participation in the selection process (Kunda and Brooks, 2000).  
However, this implies that information systems staff are the driver of the selection 
process and may even be the ones who make the decision.  Certainly, information 
systems staff may be involved in the selection process (assuming they are present in 
an organisation), but they may not necessarily make the final decision.  Many studies 
related to packaged software suggest that the primary decision makers in this 
environment tend to be non-information systems senior managers (Sawyer, 2001).  
At Siemens Power Corporation for instance, the information systems staff worked on 
collecting the necessary information on which top management could base a sound 
decision for a particular package (Hirt and Swanson, 1999) and at ‘NIBCO’ the 
selection of package was made by eight, predominantly director level, non-
information systems members of staff (Brown and Vessey, 2001).   
 
So, the literature reports the presence of two decision making groups – information 
systems staff and non information systems senior managers, with the latter appearing 
to carry more weight. Moreover, as amply illustrated earlier, the factors driving the 
purchase decision are much more complicated than the ‘ideal’ models would 
suggest.  The decision will be made based upon complex and sometimes highly 
personal criteria.  Furthermore, the criteria might not be agreed with, or perceived as 
the most sensible by other people involved in, or affected by, the decision.  Again, 
this is something long understood in relation to custom development (Wilson and 
Howcroft, 2000). 
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3.7 Packaged Software Implementation 
There is a noticeable absence of literature relating to the success and failure of ‘pure’ 
packaged software implementation.  However, as mentioned earlier, it is possible to 
examine the literature related to ERP packages and indeed much work on success 
and failure has been undertaken in this respect.  Consequently, the discussion that 
follows is very much rooted in the ERP literature.  However great care has been 
taken to exclude factors that are specific to the ERP application type and include 
factors that are appropriate to packaged software in general.  A number of studies 
that offer frameworks for understanding the process of implementation of ERP 
packages are shown in Table 3.4.   
 
In summary, these essentially begin with some form of needs analysis (comparable 
with the selection processes described in section 3.2).  This is followed by other 
implementation activities such as the software configuration, business process 
change and the roll out of the application.  A bedding in process follows as those in 
the organisation become accustomed to the new package and then it begins to be 
exploited as necessary.  Moreover, there is a deluge of literature that aims to 
facilitate packaged software implementation, specifically in identifying factors 
which may contribute to success and failure.  In the following sections, I discuss the 
contributions of these studies in relation to the general factors that can be drawn 
from them.  However, as this study is concerned with the process of selection, the 
specific focus is upon how the factors are linked with this.  Note that, at this stage, I 
make no attempt to critique the nature of the links made.  I merely wish to highlight 
the conventional wisdom reported in the literature.  I shall return to these issues in 
chapter 6, section 6.6. 
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Table 3.4: Typical Process Models of ERP Packaged Software Implementation 
(Esteves and Pastor, 1999) 
Selection Implementation  Use and Maintenance 
(Parr and Shanks, 2000) 
Project planning and 
software selection. 
Identification of 
modules for 
implementation 
through to 
installation. 
 Repair, extension and transformation. 
(Ross and Vitale, 2000) 
Design Implementation Stabilisation Continuous improvement and transformation. 
(Markus and Tanis, 2000) 
Build case for purchase and 
selection of the software. 
Configuration of 
the software and 
roll out to the 
organisation. 
Transition from 'go live' 
to 'normal conditions' 
Capture business benefits 
(if any) from the ERP 
system and plan the next 
steps for technology 
implementation. 
 
 
3.7.1 User Involvement and Acceptance 
The need for user involvement is probably the most widely reported factor that 
contributes to the success of packaged software implementation.  This is seen as 
important in the belief that those who will interact with the package must have some 
input in order to determine functionality requirements and facilitate change processes 
(Gremillion, 1982; Markus and Tanis, 2000; Al-Mudimigh et al., 2001; Akkermans 
and van Helden, 2002).  User/client acceptance is also included here.  This is 
because if users are not involved in the process of selection, requirements may not be 
determined properly leading to inadequate product selection.  There may also be 
resistance to change and lack of system acceptance (Gibson et al., 1999; Holland et 
al., 1999a; Holland and Light, 1999b). 
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3.7.2 Appropriate Business Process Change 
This factor involves determining and performing the necessary changes in ways of 
work to conform with the standard processes embedded within a given package in 
order to maximise the reported benefits over custom development (Lucas et al., 
1988; Holland and Light, 1999b; Markus and Tanis, 2000).  As this is often a key 
goal, it would therefore be expected that the selection process would take into 
account this factor, and that those involved would aim to choose a package that most 
closely resembles their intended ways of working (whether this is currently similar to 
the existing ways of working is another matter). 
 
3.7.3 Top Management Commitment 
This factor is generally used to make that point that engaging senior management 
keeps the project moving, it may also involve the development of a good case for 
implementation (Avital and Vandenbosch, 2000; Al-Mudimigh et al., 2001; 
Akkermans and van Helden, 2002).  In terms of packaged software selection, it has 
been demonstrated earlier that senior managers are most likely to make purchase 
decisions and it would therefore make sense for them to be enrolled in the process.  
Moreover, even if selection and implementation are seen as separate processes, 
implementation may prove difficult if ‘top management’ have not been involved in 
selecting the package. 
 
3.7.4 Personnel Capabilities 
Packaged software will require the recruitment, training and retention of staff to 
implement and use the package (Holland and Light, 1999b; Markus et al., 2000; 
Skok and Legge, 2001; Kraemmergaard and Rose, 2002).  At the stage of selection, 
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this may involve internal and external staff in requirements gathering and product 
evaluation activities.  The assumption here is that those involved in the selection 
process (whether users or external consultants) can assist in choosing the ‘right’ 
package only if they are of the right ‘calibre’.  Moreover, as demonstrated earlier the 
package selected may have implications in respect of the availability of the personnel 
capabilities required to implement, operate and maintain the package. 
 
3.7.5 Understanding of the Capabilities of the Package 
Understanding the capabilities of the package is highlighted as being important 
throughout the process of implementation (Lucas et al., 1988; Markus and Tanis, 
2000; Al-Mudimigh et al., 2001; Akkermans and van Helden, 2002).  The 
implications for the selection process are that the package needs to be fully 
understood in order that the most suitable product is purchased.  If the most suitable 
product is purchased, the belief is that this will facilitate implementation as 
acceptance is increased. 
 
3.7.6 Appropriate Decisions Regarding Customisation and/or Configuration 
Packaged software is usually selected on the basis that customisations will not be 
performed.  However, sometimes customisation may be unavoidable (Lucas et al., 
1988; McKeen et al., 2002; Holland and Light, 2003).  Many packages also require 
configuration.  Where this occurs, it is argued that implementation plans use 
configuration strategies to facilitate implementation.  Plans may include the roll out 
of partial functionality, rather than full functionality, in ‘difficult’ implementation 
conditions or where a faster, simpler, implementation is desired (Holland and Light, 
2003).  The link between selection and implementation here is that, through the 
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selection activities, products may be assessed in terms of their need for 
customisation and/or the potential for implementing numerous configuration 
strategies. 
 
3.7.7 Recognition of Legacy Information Systems 
Even though packages are often implemented to standardise and attain best practices, 
the literature suggests that explicit recognition of the legacy information systems can 
facilitate implementation as this is the context for any new development(Lucas et al., 
1988; Al-Mudimigh et al., 2001; Holland and Light, 2003).  In terms of selection, 
knowing the ‘as is’ situation (part of requirements gathering) may assist those in 
organisations to appreciate the extent of change that may be brought about through 
implementation. 
 
3.7.8 Sound assessment of User Requirements 
Knowing the requirements for the package for implementation purposes is argued to 
be necessary in order to scope the project (Lucas et al., 1988; Gibson et al., 1999; 
Markus and Tanis, 2000).  Clearly, changes in requirements during implementation 
could increase timescales and costs.  A sound assessment of needs is, therefore, 
highlighted as important at the time of package selection. 
 
3.7.9 Management of Change and Expectations  
Finally, the implementation of packaged software is associated with varying degrees 
of change and it is argued that the expectations of organisational members need 
managing in this environment (Markus and Tanis, 2000; Akkermans and van 
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Helden, 2002).  The selection process therefore links with implementation in this 
fashion via notions of user involvement and moderating the various sales pitches that 
might be made in order to obtain the package/package sale. 
 
3.7.10 Summary 
In summary, it is clear that, however implementation is characterised (either to 
include selection or treat it as a separate process), there are implications for those 
activities that arise from selection activities.  Therefore, theories of packaged 
software selection need to take this into account but at present those that emulate the 
ideal model do not explicitly do so.  As reported elsewhere: 
 “Our overall experience however suggests that far from being a “take 
it off the shelf, plug it in” experience, the installation of packaged 
software has hidden costs that only become apparent during 
implementation” (Lynch, 1984: 234). 
Many of these ‘hidden costs’ can be traced back to the selection process, and before. 
3.8 The Conceptual Framework 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that theory can be used as an initial guide to data 
collection.  In order to begin the empirical work, it was necessary to develop a range 
of theoretical bases to help guide the study.  The conceptual framework shown in 
Figure 3.2 is based upon the review of the literature in this and the preceding 
chapter.  Indeed, it has been suggested elsewhere that literature reviews represent the 
foundation for research and that they facilitate theory development (Hart, 1998; 
Webster and Watson, 2002).  However, any theory could obscure other viewpoints.  
As Silverman (2000) notes, theories provide the impetus for research by provoking 
enquiries about the unknown, but they can be self-confirming in that they instruct us 
to look at phenomena in particular ways.  Therefore, the principles of the 
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hermeneutic circle and dialogical reasoning were used to question and modify initial 
assumptions and theories (as discussed in much greater detail in chapters 4 and 7).   
In line with Walsham (1995b), the initial conceptual framework presented here was 
open to be expansion, revision or disposal. 
 
Reasons 
for 
Packaged 
Software 
Selection
Implementation 
and Usage
The Organisational Environment
The Market Environment
Competition - Product Development - Actors - Globalisation
Leads
to
Leads
toRequirements 
Gathering Evaluation
Final selection of 
on the basis of the 
evaluation process
An Idealised Model of Packaged Software Selection
Leads
to
Leads
to
 
Figure 3.2: The Conceptual Framework 
 
 
At the heart of the framework is the ideal model of packaged software selection as 
drawn from the literature.  Although packaged software selection theory tends to 
adopt a rationalistic view, other aspects of the literature suggest otherwise.  The 
wider literature on packaged software, and its selection has therefore been drawn 
upon to begin to create a richer theoretical picture of packaged software selection 
that can be used to guide the rest of the study.  
 
The framework first raises to the surface the reasons for packaged software adoption 
as described in section 3.2.  It further suggests how these might ‘trigger’ and 
influence the selection process.  Similarly, the idea that the process of selection has 
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implications for implementation and usage as discussed in sections 3.5.2-3.6 is 
incorporated.  These issues have been grouped into the category of the 
‘organisational environment’.  Within the realms of the conceptual framework, the 
organisational environment is situated in a ‘market environment’ – the subject of 
chapter 2.  The framework therefore raises the idea that packaged software selection 
processes are subject to direct and indirect market influences clearer.  These 
influences include those associated with competition in the packaged software 
industry, product development, the various actors (customers, consumers, vendors 
and their intermediaries) and globalisation.   
 
The framework simplifies a very complicated area and it could be viewed as 
rationalistic.  However, at this stage, it is merely a guide for the research and a 
stimulus for the interpretation of the multiple realities of packaged software 
selection.  It should not be taken to be the way to conduct the packaged software 
selection process.  
3.9 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter began by discussing the reasons why packaged software may, or may 
not, be purchased.  These reasons where shown to be highly subjective and in some 
cases far from considered.  In summary, the discussion demonstrates how 
experiences of packaged software, prior to the enactment of the ‘formal’ selection 
process, can be shaped by a range of factors.  Following this, the chapter considered 
the process of packaged software selection as reported in the literature resulting in an 
ideal model of selection.  This model is unpacked, and the processes of requirements 
gathering, package evaluation and the final selection decision are shown to add 
further complexity.  The chapter then considers how the rest of the process of 
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implementation can be impacted by selection decisions.  These discussions further 
highlight the problems of rationalistic views of packaged software selection 
processes.  Moreover, they provide support for the development of an alternative, 
and arguably more realistic, theory which recognises the uncertainties and multiple 
realities of the process.   
 
The next chapter introduces the research process for the fieldwork and theory 
development in the thesis. 
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4 The Research Process 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the approach to this research.  It could have been 
divided into two – one focussing upon the paradigms and the other, methodology.  
However, the intention is to demonstrate the inextricable link between the two and 
how they can be confused.   
 
The chapter begins by introducing the research tradition in the information systems 
community.  This will be followed by a critique of the underpinnings and application 
of positivism and interpretivism.  Proceeding this, will be an explanation and 
analysis of the research approach for this study which is to adopt a combination of 
action research and case study research.  The approach to data collection, theory 
development and an role of the research are then discussed.  Finally, there is a 
discussion of the evaluation of the research. 
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4.2 The Research Tradition in Information Systems 
There is still little agreement on ‘the’ paradigm for the information systems 
community resulting in the formation of a number of communities of meaning.  
These include positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, interpretivism and 
constructivism.  Within information systems research, the two most popular are 
positivism and interpretivism, often characterised as objective/subjective, 
qualitative/quantitative, outsider/insider and etic/emic, see (Lee, 1991).  However, 
critical perspectives common in Sociology (Travers, 2001), have begun to receive 
more attention in information systems, see (Adam, 2002; Brooke, 2002).  For the 
purposes of this study, the focus will be on the differences between interpretivism 
and positivism but specifically, the interpretive approach of this study. 
 
In the field of information systems, the positivistic paradigm and its associated 
methods continue to be the most widespread (Goles and Hirschheim, 2000).  In 1991 
one study suggested that 96.8 per cent of the 155 articles surveyed, were 
underpinned by positivism (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991).  However, this picture is 
changing.  By 1995 it was reported that various groups of interpretive researchers 
had emerged to make up an ‘interpretive school’ although it was noted then that 
positivism still dominated and it remained to be seen if interpretivism would take off 
(Walsham, 1995a).  Recently, it has been suggested that information systems has 
reached the stage where many different research methods and approaches (e.g., 
quantitative or qualitative, positivist or interpretive) are accepted (Myers, 1999).  In 
further support, the introduction to a special issue of Management Information 
Systems Quarterly, one of the leading information systems journals reads: 
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“An unstated objective for the Special Issue was to publish excellent 
intensive research simply to increase the legitimacy of such research. 
From its inception until quite recently, the academic information 
systems field has often been hostile to non-quantitative and non-
positivist research. We found, however, that this goal had already 
been accomplished well before publication of this first instalment. 
Indeed, the acceptance of intensive research has been so total that 
serious challenges to the legitimacy of such research no longer arise. 
Today, intensive researchers have substantial representation on the 
editorial boards of major information systems journals.”(Markus and 
Lee, 1999: 35). 
 
 
The development of information systems in this fashion bodes well for interpretive 
research.  Yet, despite the reporting of its uptake and pockets of high profile 
research, positivism still remains the most dominant paradigm in information 
systems.  It has even been suggested that positivism is still viewed by many as the 
‘normal science’ (Truex III, 2001).  A large contributor to this, is the dominance of 
the US as a major segment of the information systems research community.  
Moreover, it has been suggested that this may well have been fuelled by information 
systems researchers gravitating towards business schools (which are argued to have a 
tendency to advocate the paradigm of positivism) and because the backgrounds of 
many also included computer science and engineering (Goles and Hirschheim, 
2000).   
 
In addition to arguments of paradigm, a further issue that occupies the information 
systems research community is that of relevance.  The question here is does 
information systems research have to be relevant?  
 
Briefly, some researchers such as Davenport and Markus (1999) argue that 
information systems research needs to become more practitioner oriented but this 
does not mean a resulting lack in rigour.  Mitroff (1985) also states that good 
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research should operate with high academic and high 'street' or organisational 
knowledge and that this requires mutual respect.  I concur with the idea but actually 
think the relevance debate is a red herring.  This is because the question of relevance 
to whom needs to be asked.  Is research supposed to be relevant to society, those in 
organisations, the information systems community or the researcher?  Thus, it is 
possible that all research is relevant.  The main argument that appears in information 
systems is that research needs to be relevant outside of the research community.  In 
response, there may well be research that does not appear directly relevant to those 
in work organisations.  However, the ‘supply chain’ of ideas from highly theoretical 
and into practice arguably makes them indirectly relevant.  In any case, this research 
is very relevant.  The topic is arguably of interest to the information systems research 
community and practitioners.  Moreover, the use of action research has been 
suggested to be directly relevant as it implies learning on the part of practitioners and 
researchers (Truex III, 2001). 
 
4.3 Paradigms of Inquiry 
A paradigm may be viewed as a set of basic ‘beliefs’ that represent a worldview that 
defines for its holder, the nature of the world, an individual’s place in it and the 
possible relationships to that world and its parts (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).  Burrell 
and Morgan (1979) further use the term to mean a commonality of perspective which 
binds the work of a group of theorists together.  Moreover, it has been argued that 
the fundamental beliefs of inquiry paradigms can be summarised by the responses 
given to three inextricably linked questions - answering one constrains how the 
others may be answered.  These questions are shown in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1: Fundamental Questions for Determining Inquiry Paradigms 
 
1. The ontological question.  What is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is there that 
can be known about it? For example, if a “real” world is assumed, then what can be known about it 
is “how things really are” and “how things really work.” Then only those questions that relate to 
matters of “real” existence and “real” action are admissible; other questions, such as those 
concerning matters of aesthetic or moral significance, fall outside the realm of legitimate scientific 
inquiry.  
 
2. The epistemological question.  What is the nature of the relationship between the knower or 
would-be knower and what can be known? The answer that can be given to this question is 
constrained by the answer already given to the ontological question; that is, not just any relationship 
can now be postulated. So if, for example, a “real” reality is assumed, then the posture of the knower 
must be one of objective detachment or value freedom in order to be able to discover “how things 
really are” and “how things really work.”  
 
3. The methodological question.  How can the enquirer (would-be knower) go about finding out 
whatever he or she believes can be known? Again, the answer that can be given to this question is 
constrained by answers already given to the first two questions; that is, not just any methodology is 
appropriate. For example, a “real” reality pursued by an “objective” inquirer mandates control of 
possible confounding factors, whether the methods are qualitative (say, observational) or 
quantitative (say, analysis of covariance).  
 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994: 108).  
 
Issues of ontology, epistemology and methodology can therefore be seen as 
facilitating the exposition of the characteristics of researchers from a paradigmatic 
perspective which sets the boundaries for what is deemed to be legitimate inquiry.  
The remainder of this section is devoted to developing a critical understanding of 
positivism and interpretivism. 
 
4.3.1 Positivism 
Positivism is fundamentally concerned with the view that true knowledge is 
scientific, in the sense of describing the coexistence and succession of observable 
phenomena (Bullock et al., 1988).  This infers that the positivistic researcher is in a 
position from which they are able to speak for the phenomena observed (Truex III, 
2001).  Proponents of positivism also assert that scientific knowledge is only 
obtainable from data that can directly experienced and verified between independent 
observers (Susman and Evered, 1978).   Furthermore, this view propounds that 
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research, in fields such as information systems, should emulate how it is done in the 
natural sciences (Lee, 1999b).  Positivism assumes that: 
 
- “Objective” reality can be captured 
- The observer can be separated from what is observed 
- Observations and generalizations are free from situational and temporal 
constraints; that is, they are universally generalizable 
- Causality is linear, and there are no causes without effects and no effects without 
causes 
- Inquiry is value-free (Denzin, 2001: 44). 
 
The aim of positivistic inquiry is explanation that ultimately enables the prediction 
and control of phenomena, whether physical or human (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).  
The positivist approach therefore involves the manipulation of theoretical 
propositions using the rules of formal logic and the rules of hypothetico-deductive 
logic, so that the theoretical propositions satisfy the four requirements of 
falsifiability, logical consistency, relative explanatory power, and survival (Lee, 
1999a).  As this study has a qualitative bent it is perhaps worth noting here how 
positivistic assumptions would influence this.  Qualitative researchers who hold 
positivistic views are said to favour building techniques into their studies which 
emulate those of natural scientists or quantitative researchers.  For example, they 
may aim to count the instances they observed, in order to make claims about the 
representativeness of their findings and also favour collecting large amounts of data 
(Travers, 2001).  Many positivists have, therefore, argued for and against the ideas 
and practicalities of theory building from qualitative case study data based upon the 
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argued need for large numbers of cases (Yin and Heald, 1975; McClintock et al., 
1979; Yin, 1981; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1991; Yin, 1994). 
 
Despite its success in the natural sciences, it has been suggested that the positivistic 
paradigm is not the only, or indeed always the most appropriate, basis for 
information systems research (Galliers and Land, 1987).  They argue that the factors 
that can be studied under laboratory conditions are limited and that there are 
difficulties in reproducing a ‘real world’ environment.  They suggest that a study of 
decision-making aids on the decision-making behaviour of a manager can only be 
properly studied in the real world decision-making environment where, for instance, 
it may be noisy and stressful.  Moreover, they propound that the requirement to give 
variables values, leads to the elimination of factors that are difficult to value.  
However, these factors may be the ones with the most value.  The problems of 
attempts by positivistic researchers to control and manipulate variables as in the 
laboratory conditions of the natural sciences have been further critiqued in terms of 
epistemology.  It has for instance, been argued that:  
“the transformations in organizational life through computing are so 
multifarious as to encompass the most disparate cause-effect relations 
in different contexts. There is no reason why computing should not 
result in deskilling in some settings and the enhancement of job 
content elsewhere, or in greater responsiveness to public diminished 
responsiveness in others.  Indeed, one might well expect quite 
different effects to ensue from what appear to be the “same” causes in 
similar or even identical organizations, according to contextual 
changes in such things as the environments in which organizations 
act.  In short, we see no reason to believe that any simple set of 
theoretical relationships can account for all the data that one might 
expect empirical inquiry to bring to light on these subjects.”(Attewell 
and Rule, 1984: 1190) 
Here, Attewell and Rule question the hypothetico-deductive logic embodied in many 
positivistic studies.  Smith (1989) further illuminates the problems of positivism by 
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arguing that attempts of researchers at attaining, and proclaiming objectivity are 
illusory and damaging to research outcomes.  He argues that positivism ignores the 
inevitable act of interpretation by the researcher and that because of the need for 
objectivity (and therefore the inevitable attempts of the researcher to distance 
themselves from the phenomenon) the researcher is not sufficiently close to the 
phenomenon under investigation to begin to understand it. 
 
4.3.2 Interpretivism 
In contrast to positivism, the interpretive position considers the methods of natural 
science to be inappropriate where human beings are concerned, mainly because 
different people will interpret the same situation differently (Braa and Vidgen, 
1999).  Research of an interpretive nature adopts the position that our knowledge of 
human action is a social construction and therefore an objective reality cannot be 
discovered by researchers and then replicated by others (Walsham, 1993).  Walsham 
continues, stating that theories concerning reality are ways of making sense of the 
world and that shared meanings that occur are a form of intersubjectivity rather than 
objectivity.  Interpretivism is therefore concerned with approaches to the 
understanding of reality that assert that all such knowledge is a social construction 
and thus subjective (Schwandt, 1994).  Moreover, the phenomenological tradition of 
subjectivity argues that a world constructed by an individual subjectivity is as ‘real’ 
and as ‘true’ to that individual as any reality or truth imposed from outside (Bullock 
et al., 1988).  However, care has to be taken to avoid forms of interpretivism that 
emphasise nihilism.  Indeed, Myers argues that interpretivists may assume that an 
independent reality exists and therefore they can also be a realist (Myers, 1997).  The 
difference, in contrast to positivists, is that interpretivists assume that access to 
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reality is only through social constructions such as language, consciousness and 
shared meanings, which are not neutral. 
 
Interpretivism offers a good basis for conducting relevant research because it can 
facilitate the development of understandings of the realities of organisational life.  If 
organisational life is treated in the same way as a laboratory experiment, with the 
aim of the reductionism of problematic situations.  The problem is that views 
become obscured.  Thus, much of what can be termed ‘relevant messes of 
interpretive origin’ that people encounter on a daily basis may be ignored.  The latter 
point is emphasised below:  
“In social life there is only interpretation.  That is, everyday life 
revolves around persons’ interpreting and making judgments about 
their own behaviors and experiences and those of others. Many times 
these interpretations and judgments are based on faulty or incorrect 
understandings. Individuals, for instance, mistake their own 
experiences for the experiences of others…..  But often the 
understandings that these programs are based upon bear little 
relationship to the meanings, interpretations, and experiences of the 
persons they are intended to serve. As a consequence, there are gaps 
or failures in understanding.” (Denzin, 2001: 3). 
However, interpretivism is not without critique (Fay, 1987; Gibbons, 1987; 
Schwandt, 1994).  Schwandt (1994) suggests that there are problems of criteria.  He 
asks, what is an ‘adequate warrant’ for a subjectively mediated account of 
intersubjective meaning?  This is concerned with how the decision is made regarding 
which is the most interesting and plausible account?  He infers that interpretive work 
could be seen as holding little value as accounts become subject to charges of 
solipsism (these are only my accounts) and/or relativism (all accounts are equally 
good/bad, worthy/unworthy).  
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It is further argued that interpretive accounts lack critical interest or the ability to 
critique the very accounts they produce.  The basis of this is that, historically, 
interpretive researchers have been directed to ‘discipline’ their subjectivity and only 
go ‘marginally native’.  The problem with this is that such distance means that the 
research will find it difficult to undertake any critical evaluation of the social reality 
it seeks to portray (Fay, 1987; Schwandt, 1994). 
 
Also, defining interpretation as an act of inscription vests authority and control in the 
inscriber (the researcher) and suppresses the dialogic dimension of constructing 
interpretations of human action.  This refers to the idea that, as the researcher is 
usually the one that ‘writes up’ the research, it will, inevitably be their interpretation 
that is put forward (Schwandt, 1994). 
 
Interpretivism leaves no room for an examination of the conditions which give rise 
to the actions, rules and beliefs which it seeks to explain.  It will usually be desired 
to study these factors as well as the resultant meanings (Fay, 1987). 
 
It has also been stated that interpretivism neglects to explain the pattern of 
unintended consequences of actions.  By definition, these cannot be explained by 
referring to the intentions of the individuals concerned (Fay, 1987). 
 
4.3.3 A Comparison of Positivistic and Interpretive Paradigms 
The questions of ontology, epistemology and methodology as outlined in section 4.3 
are useful for further understanding the differences between the positivistic and 
interpretive paradigms.   
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The positivistic ontological position is that reality exists independently of our 
construction of it (Walsham, 1995b).  This implies that reality is objective and, as 
was implied earlier, the researcher is independent of any area of investigation.  In 
contrast, interpretivism adopts the position that the knowledge of human action is a 
social construction, and therefore an objective reality cannot be discovered by 
researchers and replicated by others (Walsham, 1993).  As suggested in section  4.3, 
this leads to very different epistemological positions which are summarised in Table 
4.2.  Therefore, the theory developed from this interpretive field study for example, 
should be viewed as a means for negotiating a shared understanding of the process of 
packaged software selection and not the process for packaged software selection. 
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Table 4.2: Differences Between Positivist and Interpretivist Epistemology 
From: (Myers, 1997: 243). 
Epistemological assumptions of positivism Epistemological assumptions of 
interpretivism 
1. Experience is taken to be objective, testable, 
and independent of theoretical explanation 
1. Data are not detachable from theory, for what 
counts as data are determined in the light of 
some theoretical interpretation, and facts 
themselves have to be reconstructed in the light 
of interpretation 
 
2. Theories are held to be artificial constructions 
or models, yielding explanation in the sense of a 
logic of hypothetico-deduction (if T is true, 
phenomenon x follows) 
2. In the human sciences theories are mimetic 
reconstruction of the facts themselves, and the 
criterion of a good theory is understanding of 
meanings and intentions rather than deductive 
explanation 
 
3. Law-like relations (generalisations) are 
derived from experience and are independent of 
the investigator, his/her methods and the object 
of study 
3. The generalisations derived from experience 
are dependent upon the researcher, his/her 
methods and the interactions with the subjects of 
study.  The validity of the generalisations does 
not depend upon statistical inference ‘but on the 
plausibility and cogency of the logical reasoning 
used in describing the results from the cases, and 
in drawing conclusions from them’ (Walsham, 
1993, p.15). 
 
4. The language of science can be exact, 
formalisable and literal 
4. The languages of the human sciences are 
irreducibly equivocal (because of multiple, 
emergent meanings) and continually adapt 
themselves to changing circumstances 
 
5. Meanings are separate from facts 5. Meanings in the human sciences are what 
constitute the facts, for data consist of 
documents, intentional behaviour, social rules, 
human artefacts, etc., and these are inseparable 
from their meanings for agents 
 
 
Finally, it was mentioned earlier that methodological choice is inextricably linked to 
ontology and epistemology.  However, it needs to be made clear that ‘method’ is not 
necessarily linked.  Indeed it has been argued elsewhere that methods of data 
collection and analysis (survey, experiment, case study, etc) are, to some extent at 
least, independent of the underlying epistemology (Myers, 1997).  However, in the 
information systems community, links between paradigm and method can be  
confused:  
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“By the “interpretive approach,” this paper refers to such procedures 
as those associated with hermeneutics, phenomenology, and case 
studies. By the “positivist approach,” this paper refers to such 
procedures as those associated with inferential statistics, hypothesis 
testing, mathematical analysis, and experimental and quasi-
experimental design.” (Lee, 1991: 342). 
To return to the point made earlier, it is necessary to focus upon the link between 
methodology and paradigm because it is the way that methods are used, and 
sometimes combined, that gives an inkling of the paradigmatic assumptions of the 
inquirer.  With this in mind, although the methodology that follows next is 
‘typically’ interpretive, it is acknowledged that a similar methodology could have 
been constructed from a positivistic position (but it would have had different 
ontological and epistemological emphases).  Thus, the next section begins by 
explaining the consistency between the construction of the methodology and the 
Interpretivist views on ontology and epistemology. 
 
4.4 The Methodology 
The methods used in the conduct of this research are qualitative, case study and 
action research.  However, before this matter is explored in more detail, it is perhaps 
prudent to raise a point of clarification.  As mentioned in the last section, interpretive 
research is often equated with qualitative approaches and this connection is probably 
the most widespread.  However, this combination of philosophy and methodological 
choice is not the only possibility.  This is a popular misconception in information 
systems research.  There are examples of interpretive research that use quantitative 
methods (Kaplan and Duchon, 1988; Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991) and positivistic 
research based upon qualitative methods (Holland et al., 1994; Wastell et al., 2001).  
There is further confusion about the use of qualitative and quantitative data and this 
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is discussed in section 4.4.3.  The choice of the case study and then the action 
research method described in this chapter is therefore one that was deliberate.  This 
choice was heavily influenced by the nature of the investigation as it emerged. 
 
It is possible to claim, because of the use of case and action research, that this 
research answers the call for methodological pluralism (Gable, 1994; Mingers, 
2001).  Yet, this would be disingenuous.  Even though multiple methods have been 
used in studies before, such as action research combined with organisational 
ethnography (Lau, 1999), this was not my initial intention.  When the study began, 
the aim was to undertake case study research.  Additionally, there was no intention to 
use the case of T.Co.  Indeed, the study began some time before there was any 
contact with the company.  Moreover, the study was originally concerned with a 
particular packaged software application type, CRM software (Light, 2001b) – 
despite guidance that suggests an essential starting point for any research is deciding 
on and clarifying the subject for study (Mumford, 2001).  As  Braa and Vidgen 
(1999) assert, in-context information systems research, regardless of tradition, has 
unintended consequences, and a degree of uncertainty in respect of how the research 
project progresses.  As the study proceeded it became clear that there was utility in 
focussing upon packaged software rather than an application type (although 
interesting in its own right).   
 
Fortunately, in June 2000, the opportunity to work with T.Co arose.  The Managing 
Director was interested in a funded collaborative project that fell within the Teaching 
Company Scheme.  Without telling the story contained in the next chapter, the 
Managing Director wanted to improve the company’s approach to the use of 
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information systems.  By November 2000, a TCS programme had been awarded.  
The project involved three staff of the Information Systems Research Institute at the 
University of Salford offering ‘technology transfer’ opportunities to T.Co. over two 
years.  Early in the project, there was talk of using packages but there was also a 
strong history of the usage of custom development and it appeared this would 
continue.  In research terms the study began using participant observation, but very 
quickly a shift to action research was required.  This crystallised when the decision 
to implement packages was made and I was asked for specific input due to my 
research profile in the area.  Contact with the company for the purposes of this study 
ended in December 2002 and hence 2 years and 6 months have been spent ‘in the 
field’.   
 
Clearly, the methodology, the description of the methods used in the research 
(Bullock et al., 1988) was, as a result, emergent.  Moreover, it can be viewed as 
bricolage with myself as researcher, the bricoleur.  A bricoleur is a kind of 
professional do-it-yourself person (Lévi-Strauss, 1966).  The bricoleur produces a 
bricolage, that is, a pieced-together, close-knit set of practices that provide solutions 
to a problem in a concrete situation.  However, the job that is completed may not be 
the one initially undertaken and can therefore be viewed as an emergent construction 
(Weinstein and Weinstein, 1991).  As Nelson et al. (1992) describe, it is pragmatic 
and self-reflexive.  They argue that if new tools have to be invented, or pieced 
together, then the researcher will do this.  Furthermore, the choice of which research 
practices to employ depends very much upon context and is not set in advance.  
However, it has been argued that bricolage can be read as a sign of methodological 
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and theoretical impurity - a symptom of pathology that must be diagnosed, explained 
and somehow remedied (Schwandt, 2001). 
 
The process of research is dirty, how could this be argued against in the light of the 
thesis?  Yet, it is unhelpful to imply that it is a disease that needs curing.  Those that 
make criticisms of this kind are in denial of the realities of research - at least in 
information systems and other disciplines involving the study of social situations.  
They run the risk of focussing too much upon methodology at the expense of 
contribution.  As Pettigrew notes: 
“Contrary to the way the practice of research is often taught and 
written up, the activity of research is clearly a social process, not 
merely a rationally contrived act.  Further, is it more easily 
characterized in the language of muddling through, incrementalism, 
and political process than as a rational, foresightful, goal-directed 
activity”  (Pettigrew, 1985: 222). 
It is necessary to remember that the purpose of methodology is to allow others to see 
how conclusions have been reached, it is not an end in itself.  Methodology is no 
substitute for intellect (Paul, 2002). 
 
This study began with an intrinsic stance in that the aim was to develop a better 
understanding of the cases in question.  However, this rapidly became an 
instrumental case study whereby the cases became of secondary interest and merely 
played a supportive role in facilitating an understanding of packaged software 
selection processes (Stake, 1994).  As data collection progresses and new 
opportunities for research arise beyond the study reported here, there is little doubt 
that shifts back and forth between intrinsic and instrumental positions will occur.   
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In this study, the instrumental perspective has no doubt been directly fuelled by the 
shift towards action research.  The field study and consultancy modes of research, 
outlined by Stowell et al. (1997), clearly require a degree of instrumentalism.  Both 
require, to some extent, a focus upon issues over a better understanding of the case in 
question.  For instance, with the field study mode, it is argued that very rarely will an 
organisation allow time for a researcher to take up time of employees and other 
stakeholders with no good reason.  Furthermore, with the consultancy mode, a 
particular problem is the focus and the researcher will be ‘lucky’ if they learn 
something from this. 
 
This section now expands upon the detail of the methodology through a discussion 
of the theory of case study, action research and an overview of the data collection 
methods, theory development processes and the role of the researcher. 
 
4.4.1 Case Study Research 
A brief review of the literature highlights confusion regarding what case study 
research constitutes.  Case research has been categorised variously as qualitative 
research, ethnographic research and field work, for instance.  However, it is clear 
that the case study is not a data collection technique nor a philosophical stance.  Case 
research can be qualitative and quantitative in nature, it can employ a variety of data 
collection techniques such as interviews, focus groups and questionnaires.  Case 
study research ma also require the access of secondary data sources such as company 
reports and statistics.  As a form of research, case study is defined by interest in 
individual cases, not by the methods of inquiry used (Stake, 1994).   
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One definition of case study is:  
"..an empirical enquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context: when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used." (Yin, 1989: 23). 
Although Yin’s work is located in the positivistic paradigm the wording above is 
inclusive enough to incorporate interpretive case study work.  Interestingly his later 
definition becomes less inclusive incorporating positivistic terminology such as 
triangulation (Yin, 1994).  As Gummesson (1991) points out, the aim of case studies 
is not a superficial establishment of correlation, but to reach a fundamental 
understanding of structure and process.  Case research is generally concerned with 
questions of the how and why kind (Yin, 1994).  It describes real-life contexts where 
an intervention has occurred and where there will not be a single set of outcomes.   
 
This leads to the types of case studies that can be conducted for research purposes: 
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory (Gummesson, 1991).  Exploratory case 
studies are pilot studies that contain data that can be used to formulate more focussed 
research questions or find out more about an emerging area of interest.  Descriptive 
case studies aim to describe what happens in a given context in order to further 
understanding of the area under investigation.  Explanatory case studies offer 
different explanations for the same set of events with the aim of indicating how these 
may apply to other situations.  In interpretive terms – the data from the cases are 
used to offer generalisations in terms of rich insight - broad and diffuse implications 
(description) and the generation of theory (explanations based upon shared 
meanings) (Walsham, 1995b).  This study has also led to the (further) development 
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of a concept in the same way as ‘informate’ arose from Zuboff’s work (Zuboff, 
1987). 
 
Most criticisms of case research originate from those that believe in the assumptions 
of positivism and these centre on upon four issues - construct validity, internal 
validity, reliability and replicability and external validity (Numagami, 1998).  
Construct validity is concerned with how well the argument being made is supported 
by the evidence in the study.  Internal validity is the measure of how plausible the 
argument is in relation to competing explanations.  Reliability and replicability relate 
to the requirement that the same findings may be observed repeatedly if the same 
research procedures are followed.  External validity is concerned with the extent to 
which the findings of a study are generalizable to a wider population (Hedrick et al., 
1993; Graziano and Raulin, 1997). 
 
These criticisms become apparent in statements made by those critical and 
supportive of this type of research.  Yin (1989) states that case research has come 
under attack due to the lack of rigour associated with it, such as sloppy investigator 
behaviour - including the acceptance of equivocal evidence, and the introduction of 
bias.  MacNealy (1997) draws on several critiques of case research and adds that the 
method is often misunderstood and so is subject to poor design and enactment.  She 
also concurs with Yin (1989) in that many feel that the case study method offers a 
less rigorous method compared with those that are based upon 'hard' science.  She 
states that cases are often conducted by one person leading to the potential for bias 
and also that the results are not generalizable.  Miles (1979) expresses concerns with 
the rigour of case research suggesting that internal and external validity measures are 
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often developed on an intuitive basis or are simply not well developed.  It has been 
further argued that:   
"we continue to research cases much as we always have - flying by 
the seat of our pants with little systematic method to guide us." 
(Stoecker, 1991: 88-89). 
Yet, it has to be remembered that this is an interpretive study.  Thus, whilst some of 
these criticisms need careful consideration, others, such as those stemming from the 
positivistic paradigm, have no place as evaluation criteria.  Indeed, the case method 
has a lot to offer.  Advocates of case research argue that it enables the researcher to 
develop grounded theory that is relevant and practically useful (Eisenhardt, 1989), it 
is useful for observations over a period of time (Miles and Huberman, 1994), and it 
allows an investigator to retain the meaningful characteristics of real life events (Yin, 
1989). 
 
4.4.2 Action Research 
The birth of action research is attributed to Kurt Lewin and the Tavistock Institute 
(see (Rapoport, 1970)).  In the information systems community it has gained ground 
over the past twenty years with the dominant, though not exclusive, philosophical 
stance of interpretivism in evidence (Baskerville and Wood-Harper, 1996; Lau, 
1999).  Action research combines the generation of theory with changing the social 
system through the researcher acting on or in the social system.  The act is presented 
as the means of both changing the system and generating critical knowledge about it 
(Susman and Evered, 1978).  The aim is to gain learning and knowledge through 
making deliberate interventions in order to achieve some desirable change in the 
organisational setting (Braa and Vidgen, 1999).   
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Further more action research:     
“stems from the behavioural sciences based on the principle that the 
researcher is within the field of that research and becomes a partner in 
the action and process of change.” (Wood-Harper, 1985: 178) 
and: 
“aims to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in an n 
and to the goals of social science by joint collaboration within a 
mutually acceptable ethical framework.”  (Rapoport, 1970: 499). 
These views clearly distinguish action research from case study research.  With 
action research ‘deliberate interventions are made to achieve change’ whereas with 
case study research, even though participant observation techniques may be 
employed, the interventions are not intended to achieve change.  Moreover, 
interviewing and observing people in organisations without intervention is not action 
research and has been argued to be more readily described as case study research 
which frequently reports what practitioners say rather than what practitioners 
actually do (Avison et al., 1999)11.   
 
To the aims of contributing to the practical concerns of people and to the goals of 
social science, Susman and Evered (1978) add a third aim - to develop the self-help 
competencies of people facing problems.  This further distances case study research 
from action research although people may develop ‘self help’ competencies as a by-
product.  The interesting point about the addition by Susman and Evered is that this 
opens up action research as having the potential for those of the critical paradigm.  
Although, this work was not critical, sometimes there was the desire for, and 
possibility of, helping employees at T.Co. change the situation in their favour.   
 
                                                 
11 What people say they do and what they really do is discussed further in section 4.4.3. 
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Further guidance is provided by Baskerville (1999) who states that action research 
located in information systems:  
 
- Aims at an increased understanding of an immediate social situation, with 
emphasis on the complex and multivariate nature of this social setting in the 
information systems domain.  
- Simultaneously assists in practical problem solving and expands scientific 
knowledge.  This goal extends into two important process characteristics: First, 
there are highly interpretive assumptions being made about observation; second, 
the researcher intervenes in the problem setting.  
- Is performed collaboratively and enhances the competencies of the respective 
actors.  A process of participatory observation is implied by this goal. Enhanced 
competencies (an inevitable result of collaboration) is relative to the previous 
competencies and the degree to which this is a goal, and its balance between the 
actors, will depend upon the setting.  
- Is primarily applicable for the understanding of change processes in social 
systems. 
 
While action research appears to be an attractive option for information systems it 
has been suggested that there are practical difficulties of carrying out the research. 
Rapoport (1970) reports three dilemmas.   
 
Ethical dilemmas revolve around whether a client is acceptable to the researcher.  It 
is suggested that action research should neither allow the researcher to become 
captive of one organisation nor disregard the interest of specific clients.  This is also 
part of a broader issue of the place of ethics within the study.  For example, this 
study has been anonymised, an embargo will be placed on the thesis to protect the 
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company and the company was made completely aware that research was being 
carried out.   
 
Goal dilemmas consider the needs of researcher and suggest that practice needs may 
dominate.  In terms of this research, the needs of T.Co have dominated.  Fortunately, 
these needs have provided excellent insights in the area of investigation. 
 
Dilemmas of initiative suggest that the service oriented nature of action research 
places the client in the driving seat - they have a problem and need help with it.  This 
contrasts with the ethos of the academy where protections exist to take the 
immediate ebb and flow of practical pressures off the scholar so that they can 
conduct the research with minimal interference.  There are two considerations here – 
first, academic life has moved on as there are now many practical pressures that can 
interfere (Rapoport was writing in 1970!), and second, the initiative very much 
depends upon the mode of action research being undertaken – consultancy or field 
mode (Stowell et al., 1997).  In field study mode, the primary focus for the 
researcher is ‘the research’ with assistance to the organisation secondary.  
Conversely in consultancy mode the focus is upon improving an organisational 
situation with the learning from that situation being secondary.  The issues 
associated with each of these modes are shown in Table 4.3Table 4.3, were 
considered throughout the process of the research.  
 
The rigour of action research has also been subject to further critique because of the 
(too?) close connections with organisational activity.  It has also been suggested that 
action research may be viewed as little more than consultancy (McKay and Marshall, 
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2001).  Moreover, some may argue that, even where successful, causal connections 
and explanations cannot be safely made and that researchers may be questioned over 
a perceived lack of impartiality and a supposed lack of scientific rigour leading to 
data validity concerns (Baskerville and Wood-Harper, 1996).  Consequently, the 
application of principles for the conduct and evaluation of the research have been 
defined and applied (see section 4.5) 
 
4.4.3 Data Collection and Reporting 
The emergence of case study and action research as the two methods of the study 
allows for efficiency in the usage of data collection techniques   They fundamentally, 
do not differ too much because participant observation was part of the case study.  
However, before the approach to data collection and reporting is discussed, it is 
important to clarify the difference between qualitative and quantitative data.  It is 
argued that quantitative data takes the form of numbers or measurements and 
qualitative data the form of words (Punch, 2000).  To expand, qualitative data are 
argued to incorporate the use of words to describe situations, individuals or 
circumstances surrounding a phenomenon, whilst quantitative data uses numbers in 
the form of counts or measurements to give precision to observations (Remenyi and 
Williams, 1996).  However, the idea that numbers are only used for measurement 
purposes carries distinctly positivistic overtones, and presents numbers and measures 
as objective with no meaning.  Furthermore, qualitative studies may also involve 
other data such as observations of actions in order to facilitate understandings of 
socially constructed situations.  Qualitative data are therefore perhaps more usefully 
thought of as being concerned with meaning and quantitative data with that of 
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measurement.  This is why this study includes only qualitative data, even though 
numbers, such as software costs, may be used in analysis and for theory building. 
 
Table 4.3: Issues for Action Research in Field Study and Consultancy Modes 
 Issues for Field Study Mode Issues for Consultancy Mode 
Choosing the 
domain 
It needs to be appropriate to the 
research.  
 
Contact is likely to be initiated by 
researcher. 
There may be difficulty in recruiting 
collaborators. 
  
The domain needs to offer sufficient 
depth and complexity in order that 
insights can be obtained. 
  
Researcher recognition of mutual benefit 
and shared interest between themselves 
and the domain if any. 
The domain may choose you. 
 
Are the clients needs going to be met, is this 
suitable for research. 
 
Planning and 
implementing 
the study 
Focus upon and document the approach 
towards the study rather than predicting 
and testing outcomes 
 
Choose methods appropriate to the 
epistemological basis of the research. 
Client demands may make it difficult to 
follow the direction the researcher wishes. 
 
Develop potential strategies for action prior to 
the event to limit damage. 
 
Engaging 
collaborators 
Make them aware of the researcher’s 
intentions at the outset. That is to say the 
researcher’s prime interest is in learning 
about a particular aspect of research 
from which they, the collaborators, may 
benefit. The value of the research is 
dependent upon collaboration – 
researchers need to consider changes in 
personnel.   
They may be overly interested and you have to 
fit with how they want the work to progress 
which may detract from your work.   
 
The rigour of 
action 
research: 
Record data systematically over time.     
 
Knowing what to record and what not to 
is a problem for the action researcher. 
 
Research based upon consultancy activities 
may run into difficulties for example if there is 
no evidence for the assertions made about the 
work other than the consultants remembrance 
of it; the cycles of learning cannot be 
identified because at the time the action 
research process was not clearly conceived. 
False 
expectations 
Researchers need to manage 
expectations.  
 
The client may not be happy with the 
identification of the problem by the researcher 
as it emerges from the process of learning 
(need to let the client know this). 
 
Identifying 
useful lessons 
and bringing 
the study to a 
close 
It is difficult to identify lessons as 
actions arise. 
 
Documenting actions facilitates the 
development of lessons. 
The researcher recognises the point at 
which closure is reached. 
Clients may decide this. 
 
What about your research? 
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It is suggested that in an interpretive field study, primary or secondary sources of 
data may be used. Primary data may be collected by methods such as participant 
observation, interviews, tape recordings of meetings, unpublished written materials 
created independently of the researcher (such as memos, correspondence, minutes of 
meetings and reports).  Secondary source material includes previously published 
documents such as those by scholars or practitioners (Myers, 1997).  In this study, a 
wide range of data collection methods were employed and sources referred to 
including: 
 
- interviews which were mostly unstructured with a few being semi-structured, 
- participant and non-participant observation, 
- opportunistic meetings/conversations, 
- minutes of meetings, 
- reports/requirements documentation such as that prepared in-house, by 
consultants and by packaged software vendors, 
- email correspondence, 
- Company newsletters. 
 
The reader may find it surprising that tape recording was not used.  This was not 
undertaken for two reasons.  It was felt that tape recording would interfere too much 
with the job at hand.  At times, I was acting in a consultancy role as well as that of 
researcher.  Furthermore, tape recording might have hindered data collection due to 
the subjects’ perceptions of, and comfort with, tape recording.  Based on over two 
years of working with those in the organisation, this was the right strategy – the 
Managing Director in particular would never have agreed!  Tape recording is no 
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guarantee of getting more accurate data anyway.  Even when peoples’ activities are 
tape-recorded and transcribed, the reliability of the interpretation of transcripts may 
be gravely weakened by a failure to record apparently trivial pauses and overlaps 
(Silverman, 2000).  Thus, as I had several years of interviewing experience, and 
good access to the company, it was felt that better insights would be obtained by 
recording data by hand where appropriate, or salient points directly after ‘meetings’ 
where even note taking would have been problematic.  This approach also allowed 
for time to be spent observing what people did as well as finding out about what they 
said they did.  As Silverman states – decontextualized accounts of meanings are very 
limited guides to the complexities of human action (Silverman, 1998)12.  Watching, 
as a form of ‘recording’, was invaluable in this study. 
 
It is also suggested that reporting on the collection of field data should include 
details of the research sites chosen, the reasons for this choice, the number of people 
who were interviewed, and what hierarchical or professional positions they occupied 
(Walsham, 1995b).  To that end the beginning of this section details how and why 
the site was chosen – quite by accident is the flippant response, but obviously it 
would not of been chosen had T.Co. not decided to implement packaged software 
and had there not been a good chance of access in order to the undertake study13.  
The people who were interviewed and their positions are shown in Table 4.4. 
 
From June to November 2000 I visited the company 6 times.  From November 2000, 
when the TCS programme began, I visited most weeks, spending a half to one day 
                                                 
12 Silverman actually uses the term human-computer interaction, but I think that the assertion retains the flavour post 
modification.  Also, I acknowledge that interviews do offer the chance to observe what people do as well as what they say they 
do – non-verbal messages for example. 
13 I hasten to add, the decision of T.Co. to implement packaged software way in no way influenced by my desire to study them 
choosing, implementing and using it. 
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on site.  Documentary evidence and interviews were also used to obtain insights into 
the position at T.Co. before the study began.  These data stretch back to initial 
thinking regarding the client-tracking project in August 1999. 
 
The data are reported as follows.  The story begins by familiarising the reader with 
the company.  Then, a combination of thick and thin description are used to present 
three information systems projects at T.Co, which involve the selection of packaged 
software.  Thin description states ‘facts’ and thick description gives the context of an 
action, aims to brief the reader about the intentions and meanings that organised the 
action, traces the evolution and development of the action, and presents the action as 
a text that can then be interpreted (Denzin, 2001)14.  For example, data about 
company turnover, organisational structure and a timeline of events are provided, but 
these are put into context with information about the competitive environment,  and 
peoples’ reported feelings about the company and the various projects.  It is further 
suggested that the analysis strategy needs to be outlined (Walsham, 1995b).  This is 
undertaken in section 4.4.4. 
 
4.4.4 The Development of Theory 
Eisenhardt (1989) identifies three distinct uses of theory: as an initial guide to design 
and data collection; as part of an iterative process of data collection and analysis; and 
as a final product of the research.  In this study, theory is present in all three areas.   
                                                 
14 The process of thick and thin description, and deciding what is thick and what is thin, is an act of interpretation. 
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Table 4.4: Contact Points at T.Co. 2000-2002 
Contact(s) When Contacted 
Managing Director Throughout the study 
Academics  x 2 
(contributing to the TCS Programme) 
Throughout the study 
Business Development Managers 
(BDM) x 2  
(one left T.Co during the project) 
Throughout the study 
Commercial Director During the Client-tracking and migration 
projects. 
External Consultants x 3 During the Client-tracking and migration 
projects. 
External Software Vendors x 2 During the Client-tracking and migration 
projects. 
Finance Officer Manager Mostly during the migration project. 
Graduate Trainee Mostly during the client-tracking project. 
Human Resources Mostly during the client-tracking project. 
IT Manager (Initially the TCS 
Associate) 
Throughout the study. 
Managing Client Consultant Mostly during the client-tracking project 
(but some contact for the migration and 
OneSource Projects). 
Marketing Manager Mostly during the client-tracking project 
(but some contact for the migration and 
OneSource Projects). 
Non-Executive Director Throughout the study 
Operations Manager x 2 
(one left during the project) 
Mostly during the client-tracking project 
(but some contact for the migration and 
OneSource Projects). 
Research Manager Throughout the study 
Sales Manager Throughout the study 
Secretaries x 3 Throughout the study 
Several Client Consultants During the Client-tracking and migration 
projects. 
Sales Supervisor Mostly during the client-tracking project 
(but some contact for the migration and 
OneSource Projects). 
Telesales Representatives Mostly during the client-tracking project 
(but some contact for the migration and 
OneSource Projects). 
 
In order to ‘get on’ with the empirical work, it was necessary, for pragmatic reasons, 
to develop the conceptual framework (Figure 3.2) to facilitate the research.  I could 
not afford to undertake ‘walk in the park research’ as such and used theory at this 
stage in an instrumental fashion.  I further added, removed and refined the theory in 
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response to my increased consumption of the literature and later, in comparison to 
my empirical work.  Indeed, it has been suggested that literature reviews represent 
the foundation for research and that they facilitate theory development (Hart, 1998; 
Webster and Watson, 2002).  Finally, one of the outputs of the study was a set of 
concepts with plausible relationships – a theory as defined by Strauss and Corbin  
(1994).  However, the guiding conceptual framework could have obscured over 
viewpoints.  As Silverman (2000) states, theories provide the impetus for research by 
provoking enquiries about the unknown, but they can be self-confirming in that they 
instruct us to look at phenomena in particular ways.  Therefore the principles of the 
hermeneutic circle and dialogical reasoning were used to modify initial assumptions 
and theories (see section 4.5.1).  
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the processes by which theory was developed throughout the 
study when working in field study and consultancy modes.  In both cases reflection 
occurs in respect of action and theory and, is fed into and feeds from, action and 
theory as the study progresses.  Therefore, the research process involves reflection, 
learning and refinement in the light of new data.  
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Theory 
Action 
Reflection
Action      
Theory      
Reflection
Field Study Mode Consultancy Mode
 
Figure 4.1: Field Study and Consultancy Mode Theory-Action Cycles 
(Stowell et al., 1997: 194-196) 
 
In this study, and in contrast to the model put forward by Susman and Evered (1978), 
action research was acted in field study and consultancy mode in a similar fashion to 
that reported by McKay and Marshall (2001) who argue that action research may 
involve two interconnected and interacting cycles.  However, even by operating in 
both modes, a ‘best’ theory is not the result.  In the interpretive tradition, there are no 
correct and incorrect theories but there are interesting and less interesting ways to 
view the world (Walsham, 1993).   
 
It was therefore necessary to determine when I had a plausible story to tell that 
would be viewed as an interesting way to view the world.  Thus, throughout the 
process of theorising whilst undertaking the research, occurrences of theoretical 
shifts from the ideal model of package selection began to emerge.  For example, with 
the migration project it became clear very early on that a recommended vendor was 
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going to be the one that was chosen no matter what – this small finding immediately 
raised questions about the plausibility of the ideal model.  As more of these findings 
emerged, the theory was revised until it was felt that nothing further was being added 
and theoretical saturation had been reached (Eisenhardt, 1989; Strauss and Corbin, 
1994).  The iterations of theory development are more fully explained in section 
7.3.7 and illustrative examples are provided in Appendix B. 
 
4.4.5 Role of the researcher 
(Walsham, 1995b) identifies two roles for the researcher – that of outside observer 
and involved researcher.  From the interpretive perspective, neither of these can be 
viewed as objective because of the subjectivity involved in the interpretation of 
interpretations.  That is, I was always representing my view of other peoples’ views.  
However, there were varying degrees of engagement experienced throughout the 
study, as mentioned in the data collection section of this chapter.  Sometimes 
participation was undertaken, sometimes just observation.   
 
Forms of engagement has been conceptualised by Nandhakumar and Jones (1997).  
Their work suggests a classification of differing forms of engagement as shown in 
Figure 4.2. The paper suggests that although this classification is useful, the 
distinctions are may not be so clear cut.  For example, given the right conditions a 
researcher could be more ‘engaged’ in an interview than via consultancy work.   
However, they identify two broad groups of methods – those that are distant, such as 
analysis of published statistics, textual analysis and postal surveys through which 
there is no direct interaction between the researcher and the research phenomena or 
where interactions are strictly controlled.  At the other end are ‘engaged’ methods, 
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such as consultancy, action research and participant observation where the researcher 
is personally involved in the activities in the research context.  They suggest that 
interpretive information systems researchers might favour the use of engaged data-
gathering methods but their study indicates a paucity in this respect. 
 
Distance
Analysis of 
Published Data
Engagement
Interview 
(structured > semi > unstructured)
Survey
Action Research
Consultancy
Passive observation 
(and lab experiments)
Textual
Analysis
 
Figure 4.2: Forms of Engagement in Research 
(Nandhakumar and Jones, 1997: 113). 
 
In this study, various forms of engagement are evident, from the analysis of 
published data right through to consultancy led action research.  This, multi-
engagement approach that has emerged assisted in creating a fairly rich 
interpretation of the experiences of those at T.Co.  It is also important to point out 
that throughout the study, some form of engagement directly with those of T.Co was 
in place, even if it was not directly related to this research.  The role of the ‘outside 
observer’ was therefore really never fulfilled. 
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4.5 Principles for the Conduct and Evaluation of the Research 
For qualitative research, and especially that with an interpretive perspective, the need 
for evaluation is acute due to the criticisms that are in evidence throughout the 
information systems research community.  This section introduces the principles 
used to guide the conduct, and perform the evaluation of the study.  It begins with a 
description of the major part of the framework.  This is the set of principles for 
conducting and evaluating interpretive research offered by Klein and Myers (1999).  
These are then added to as some key principles do not appear to be explicitly 
covered within the Klein and Myers framework.  These are contribution to 
knowledge and methodological choices.  The principles are described here and then 
used to evaluate the study in section 7.3 of the concluding chapter.  These principles 
were also used to guide the progress of the study as I felt it was sensible to aim to 
conduct the research in cognisance of the evaluation criteria especially as they 
contained implicit guidance for the conduct of research. 
 
4.5.1 Principles for the Conduct and Evaluation of Interpretive Field 
Research 
The following principles as per Klein and Myers (1999: 72)15 have been used to 
guide the study and will be used in its evaluation: 
 
- The Fundamental Principle of the Hermeneutic Circle - This principle 
suggests that human understanding is achieved by iterating between considering 
the interdependent meaning of parts and the whole that they form. This principle 
of human understanding is fundamental to the other principles. 
 
                                                 
15 Note that the principle of suspicion is not used as Klein and Myers suggest this is only appropriate to research conducted 
from a critical perspective. 
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- The Principle of Contextualisation - Requires critical reflection of the social 
and historical background of the research setting, so that the intended audience 
can see how the current situation under investigation emerged.  
 
- The Principle of Interaction Between the Researchers and the Subjects - 
Requires critical reflection on how the research materials (or “data”) were 
socially constructed through the interaction between the researchers and 
participants.  
 
- The Principle of Abstraction and Generalisation - Requires relating the 
idiographic details revealed by the data interpretation through the application of 
principles one and two to theoretical, general concepts that describe the nature of 
human understanding and social action.  
 
- The Principle of Dialogical Reasoning - Requires sensitivity to possible 
contradictions between the theoretical preconceptions guiding the research 
design and actual findings (“the story which the data tell”) with subsequent 
cycles of revision.  
 
- The Principle of Multiple Interpretations - Requires sensitivity to possible 
differences in interpretations among the participants as are typically expressed in 
multiple narratives or stories of the same sequence of events under study. Similar 
to multiple witness accounts even if all tell it as they saw it.  
 
 119
4.5.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
Doing research implies that a contribution to existing knowledge should be made 
(Paul, 2002).  Hedrick et al. (1993) state that good research typically requires 
substantial up front work, which provides an understanding of the problem or issues.  
Not only does this provide a focus for the research, it also enables the selection of 
appropriate topics that have not already been investigated and it may facilitate the 
convergence of activities and interests (Webster and Watson, 2002).  Moreover, 
Campbell et al. (1982) state that good research is likely to be borne out of intuition 
rather than any logical analysis.  Hence, although the  literature was used initially to 
assist in scoping the study, as the research progressed, what were perceived as 
possible opportunities for obtaining interesting insights, were taken when they arose.  
More specifically, Myers (1997) argues that a good indicator of interpretive research 
is that it offers a contribution to the information systems community in respect of 
whether the author has developed new concepts, applied new concepts or applied a 
well known theory in a new or unique way.  He also suggests that a good marker is 
research that offers rich insights into the human, social and organisational aspects of 
information systems development and application or if it contradicts conventional 
wisdom.  Gill and Johnson (1991) also note that good projects will display symmetry 
of outcomes.  That is, whatever the result it will be useful.  The research was 
therefore, conducted with these points in mind. 
 
4.5.3 Appropriate Methodological Choices 
Lawler (1985) argues that research must be approached using a method relevant to 
the area under investigation.  At the heart of determining, an appropriate 
methodology therefore is the required outcome.  Does the research project aim to be 
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inductive or deductive?  Inductive studies aim to draw general conclusions from 
empirical observations whilst deductive studies are concerned with generating 
conclusions through a process of logical reasoning (Ghauri et al., 1995).  Therefore, 
does the research project want to produce theories or hypothesis (induction) or 
accept and reject hypotheses (deduction)?  An error in methodology is going to lead 
to the wrong type of outcome.  For example, a quantitative survey relying upon 
hypethetico-deductive methods (Miller, 1991; Sayer, 1992) would be inappropriate 
for a researcher wanting to generate frames of reference as as with theory building 
from case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Strauss and Corbin, 1994).  Although it is 
necessary to carefully consider which method or methods are appropriate for the area 
under investigation, caution should be exercised to ensure that this is not the focus of 
the research effort.  It has already been noted that an over zealous attitude in this area 
can adversely affect research outcomes.  Moreover, Buchanan et al. (1988) propose 
that a preoccupation with theoretical and epistemological aspects of research can be 
disabling and may result in research not even beginning.  The methodology should 
be a facilitator of the research process.  Several authors state that rarely do the 
rhetoric of research methods reflect the reality (Pettigrew, 1985; Paul, 2002). 
 
4.6 Summary and Conclusion 
Despite the fact that the social impacts of computing have been described as 
infinitely variable (Attewell and Rule, 1984), positivism, that aims to control and 
manipulate variables, is the dominant paradigm in information systems research.  
However, this chapter notes that other approaches such as critical perspectives and 
interpretivism that recognise and welcome infinite variability, are gaining ground in 
mainstream information systems research.  This interpretive field study uses case 
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study and action research methods to generate rich insight and theory regarding 
issues associated with packaged software selection.  In order that the insights and 
theory were allowed to emerge, the methodology itself was emergent and has been 
characterised as a form of bricolage.  This has involved numerous data collection 
techniques with accompanying degrees of formality and engagement.  The next 
chapter presents the story of T.Co. and the proceeding one offers an analysis of the 
situation in terms of rich insight and theoretical contribution. 
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5 Packaged Software  
Selection at T.Co 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents data from a field study of the selection, implementation and 
usage of a number of packaged software products at a Consultancy company – T.Co.  
The story is situated within a major information systems project, which includes a 
migration from an Apple Mac environment to a Windows environment and a 
complete overhaul of application support for the business.  The initial projected 
budget was £50,000 – the cost to date (4th Quarter 2002, including projected 
Goldmine implementation February 2003) is around £184,500 (this does not 
incorporate staff time, merely the costs associated with the software, hardware and 
external consulting).  Added to this, is a further combined cost of £77,500 per year to 
cover the various subscription fees, running, maintenance and support of the new 
infrastructure.  The chapter begins with an introduction to the company.  It then 
offers an interpretation of three concurrent and interrelated projects – the migration 
of applications from an Apple Mac to a Microsoft Windows operating environment, 
the purchase of OneSource for the Research Department and the purchase of 
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Goldmine to support client-tracking activities throughout the enterprise.  This 
chapter provides the basis for the next chapter, which offers an analysis of the 
package software selection experiences of T.Co. 
 
5.2 An Overview of T.Co 
T.Co is a UK based consultancy company that was formed in 1990 by the Managing 
Director.  The headquarters for the company is in Manchester, and in 1999, it has 
opened a second office in Reading.  In the June 2000, when this study began, the 
turnover of the company was £1.1 million.  At this time the company employed 19 
internal staff and a further 20 external consultants who aided service provision.  In 
the run up to 2000 the company was enjoying a rapidly increasing turnover and had 
plans for further growth.  New offices were scheduled to be opened in Leeds, Bristol 
and the West Midlands.  The role of T.Co is to provide clients with the skills to 
improve their performance in their current position and/or assist in the conduct of 
job-search campaigns.  These service offerings are discussed in detail in the next 
section. 
 
5.2.1 Service Offerings 
Originally, T.Co provided a service for senior managers who wanted to improve 
their expertise or change career direction.  The initial offering was a mail order 
curriculum vitae (CV) and accompanying letter preparation service.  However, by 
the end of the first year of business, there was a recession in the UK economy and as 
a result, a new market for T.Co services emerged.  Historically, T.Co had directed its 
offering at private clients.  With the onset of recession, the company found that blue-
chip companies were approaching them and wanting to purchase their services as 
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part of redundancy packages for their employees.  That is, a company might want to 
make a manager’s position redundant, and therefore to show they were a good 
employer, they would pay T.Co. (or another provider) to assist their employee in 
finding a new job.  Corporate customers are now the major source of T.Co business.  
Furthermore, as the company has evolved, so have the services that include: 
 
- Individual outplacement - working with individuals to find them employment; 
- Individual performance improvement - working with individuals to improve their 
management capabilities; 
- Group outplacement - working with groups to find them employment; 
- Group performance improvement - working with groups to improve their team 
working capabilities. 
 
These services comprise components such as interview skills training, team building, 
change management counselling, communication training and personalised research 
provision.  The components are variously packaged.  The Executive program is a six 
month long one-to-one programme were a consultant works closely with a client to 
improve their chances of finding suitable employment.  The Senior Executive 
programme comprises the same support but for an unlimited period and is usually 
targeted at senior clients.  The Director programme extends the Senior Executive 
programme, is tailored to the client and project managed by the Chief Executive.  A 
more recent addition is the ‘Rapid’ programme that captures the middle management 
sector where clients are provided with three month’s guidance and access to a 
multimedia job search product.  Finally, Group Outplacement targets blue-collar 
workers.  This involves the set up of an administrative and job search resource centre 
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at the sponsoring organisation’s premises.  Those clients using the performance 
improvement service are segmented in a similar fashion, and tap into the similar 
service components.  Most of T.Co’s business is in the areas of individual job search 
and performance improvement. 
 
5.2.2 Competing in the Environment 
In 2000, the UK market for outplacement services was valued at £80 million and 
T.Co had a very small share of this on a national basis.  However, in the North they 
enjoyed a 10 per cent share of that market.  The Managing Director stated that by 
2005 the target was for a 5 per cent share of the UK market.  The company’s two 
main competitors held 30 and 25 per cent market shares respectively.  In 2000, both 
had greater national coverage than T.Co, although by the end of 2002, this gap was 
reducing.   
 
T.Co’s strategic aim is to improve productivity and profitability whilst maintaining 
the high quality of service that their customers expect.  The market place is 
extremely competitive and in order to operate effectively in this environment, T.Co 
focuses upon personalised service, especially in respect of their search services.  For 
example, tailored client CV mailings are sent out to prospective employers.  The 
Research Manager believes that the ‘personal touch’ and the ‘can-do’ attitude that all 
clients receive throughout their time at T.Co is a major contributor to their widely 
reported 100 per cent success rate for clients.  Speed of client placement into work is 
a further component of the differentiation strategy.  As the Managing Director makes 
clear in a newsletter: 
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“The work our Research Department does for our clients is skilled, 
labour intensive and expensive.  But the investment is justified.  We 
know it gives our clients a real advantage – the chance to be in 
contact with perhaps hundreds of potential named employers very 
early in their job search.  It reduces the hard slog, generates 
interviews and allows much more time for personal networking and 
information gathering.  And, above all, it shortens job search times.” 
 
5.2.3 Organisational Paradigm and Structure 
The underlying paradigm of the organisation is strongly unitary.  Organisational 
goals reign supreme, are dictated by management, unconditionally accepted and 
worked to by employees.  There is definitely an ethos of a football team.  Managers 
are frequently heard, stood in the middle of departments, proclaiming: “how do we 
solve this problem”, “come on we have to pull together to reach this months target” 
and “this is what our clients expect”.  The company is organised in a hierarchical 
fashion with strong control and command structures a shown in Figure 5.1.   
 
Indeed, a key feature of the organisation is surveillance.  This is argued to be 
necessary by senior management in terms of service delivery – monitoring client 
progress for example.  Hand in hand with this however, is a desire to ensure that 
employees do what is necessary to ensure that the monitoring takes place and that 
there are clients coming through the door to monitor.  An extreme example of the 
surveillance culture in the organisation is the code of conduct for the use of 
computers at T.Co.  This states “the company may monitor all incoming and 
outgoing emails.. You should not assume that email is private” and “employees 
should be aware that all internet access is monitored”.  Additionally, the research log 
application (discussed later) exists solely to monitor staff performance. 
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Figure 5.1: The Organisation Structure of T.Co 
 
The organisation is led by a Board consisting of a Managing Director who sets and 
communicates company direction; a Chairman16 who regulates the direction of T.Co 
and identifies control and reporting systems; further non-executive Board members 
offering various skills and expertise, and regional Business Development Managers 
(BDMs) who ensure that regional offices have input at Board Level.   
 
The Sales and Marketing department, in conjunction with the BDMs, are 
responsible for generating and maintaining business for T.Co.  This involveds 
identifying prospective sponsors and managing the relationship with them should 
they purchase the services of T.Co. 
 
The Research Department assists clients in finding out about prospective 
employers.  They introduce new clients to the range of services available at T.Co 
                                                 
16 T.Co’s terminology rather than Chairperson. 
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(dependent upon the product they are subscribed to).  They also undertake research 
regarding prospective employers on behalf of clients. 
 
The External Consultants mentor the clients in their job search and/or performance 
improvement activities.  They deliver much of the T.Co product.  Consultants are 
self employed and some even work for T.Co competitors. 
 
5.2.4 A Process Map of T.Co 
Figure 5.2, illustrates the complexity associated with the ideal company business 
model.  Normally, the process would begin with obtaining market information about 
the potential sponsors.  These sponsors will then be approached and if this is 
successful, a client (or clients) would appear at T.Co.  The client then begins a 
process of mentoring for performance improvement or job search activities.  
Throughout this process of mentoring, it is necessary to keep the sponsor informed 
of progress made with the client, and the outcome of the process.  In the ideal model, 
the outcome is performance improved and employment gained.  There is of course 
the potential for other outcomes.  It is also important to note that clients may 
eventually become sponsors, sponsors may become clients and both may use T.Co’s 
services more than once.  This makes it important that the experiences they have 
with T.Co are good ones.  Note also, that this process is complicated further by the 
need to coordinate activities across functional departments and with external 
business partners such as the Consultants. 
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Figure 5.2: A Process Map of T.Co 
 
5.2.5 The information system Infrastructure 
An Apple Mac environment was in place in June 2000.  The infrastructure consisted 
of an Apple server supporting twelve Apple PCs at Manchester and three PCs at 
Reading via an ISDN line.  Two further PCs (for client use) and four staff laptops 
were also in place, but they were not connected to the network.  Internet access and 
email were available via a further ISDN link.  The applications in place were 
Microsoft Office 98 (office automation), Sage 4.1.  (Accounting) and a range of 
custom applications created in the Filemaker Pro 4.1 database environment.  These 
consisted of: 
 
- Targeted Mailing Programme (TMP) – This provides data for client research.  
Primary research entails the client passing over a brief devised from their 
consultant mentoring meetings to the research department.  This brief 
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incorporates details such as type of role and industry in which the client wishes 
to obtain employment.  The research department searches the TMP application 
(which has a repository of organisational data, for organisations that fit the brief).  
These data are collated into a ‘headline research report’ and passed back to the 
client.  The client amends this further and the secondary research is performed.  
This entails checking that the most up to date details (such as name of targeted 
person in employing organisation and their position) are contained in the TMP 
database.  If they are over three months old, these are updated by telephoning the 
organisation in question on behalf of the client.  When these data are complete, 
the clients’ CV(s) and covering letter(s) that have been prepared will be sent out.  
 
- Senior Search – This is a home-grown database of recruitment companies and 
head-hunters.  The database is used to identify possible employers for those on 
the Director and Senior Executive programmes. 
 
- Research Log – This maps the research activities from when the research team 
receives a brief through to the point where contacts are checked.  The log is used 
to create a spreadsheet for monitoring the efficiency of the team.  This is then 
transcribed onto the whiteboard in the Operations Managers office for 
performance management purposes. 
 
- New Clients – This holds the capability to record details about T.Co clients and 
their progress through the service to which they are subscribed.  These details 
include the client’s start date, the service they are subscribed to, how they found 
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a job, the success rate of the client in their approaches to prospective employers 
and where they eventually commenced work (much of these data are missing). 
 
- Prospects Labels – This contains functions to create labels for various 
departments.   
 
- Corporate Order Book – This is used to track invoicing processes and as the 
basis of a first contact with Corporate Clients by the sales team. 
 
- Corporate – This is the main application used by the Sales Team.  All corporate 
contacts are kept in this repository.  The application also contains histories of 
communications, such as meeting dates and directions to premises. 
 
- Order Book – This performs the same functions as the Corporate Order Book, 
but for private clients. 
 
Usage of the applications, by-department, is shown in Figure 5.3.  Obviously, these 
applications were all operating in the Apple Mac environment.  In addition, the 
Research Manager said “the company had very limited knowledge of information 
systems”.  Moreover, I was informed in an interview with the Commercial Director, 
that she had initially designed and built many of the Filemaker Pro applications.  
Furthermore, she was quite open about the fact that she did not have an information 
systems development background.  The applications had been further developed by 
the Research Manager, her previous incumbent and the Finance Officer.  All of these 
staff were self-taught.  The applications were flat file and stand alone leading to 
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duplication and inconsistencies in data entry throughout the organisation.  Despite 
this, the Managing Director had a vision for the company that relied very much upon 
competent execution of information system support.  It was suggested by the IT 
Manager, that “the company sees the development of product and services as 
continuous process, aligning supply and demand in a profitable manner and that this 
had considerable implications for their IT infrastructure.” 
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Figure 5.3:Applications by Department 
 
5.2.6 The Evolution of information system and Organisation 
When the company was first formed it operated only the mail order CV service.  
This required word processing software (part of Claris Works) to prepare CVs and  
covering letters.  There was also a basic ‘Head Hunting’ application (Senior Search).  
As the company’s services at that time were focussed upon individuals, these simple 
applications supported a very simple business model.  Interestingly the company’s 
 133
first infrastructure was Apple Mac based as the Managing Director had a history of 
working in the publishing industry where he said Apple Macs had dominated.  He 
claimed they were “better machines”.  However, this model has evolved dramatically 
over the past 12 years, as have the information systems. 
 
A BDM informed me that the first phase of the evolution was to add performance 
improvement services and this required collecting additional data about clients.  The 
Filemaker Pro applications were therefore modified to support sales and marketing 
activities such as producing mailing packages of company literature.  Data about 
client progress through the service were also collected.  T.Co then began to grow 
quickly and significantly.  Along with this grew expectations about information 
systems in the organisation.  In 1996, the question of moving from the Apple Mac 
and to a Windows environment was raised.  According to the IT Manager “This was 
the biggest investment decision to date that the company had made in respect of IT.” 
 
However, the Apple Mac environment remained, based upon external advice.  The 
company was informed by external consultants that Apple Mac cross platform 
capabilities had come a long way since they had first implemented them and that this 
would not be an issue.  By this time, T.Co had expanded to two sites (Manchester 
and Reading) and the network was expanded accordingly.  The expenditure for the 
1996 upgrade was £35,000.  The Research Manager reported that the infrastructure 
initially worked well with the support of a local IT vendor.  However, the company 
predominantly offered support to local schools and their services represented this.  
The company could not cope with the demands of a growing business such as T.Co.  
The Research Manager suggested that in reality, T.Co out grew the company almost 
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immediately with their needs becoming more sophisticated.  Furthermore, the 
Managing Director stated that “we did not realise the importance we would place 
upon our vendor at the time, quite simply because we didn’t have the knowledge or 
experience of working with IT to this extent.” 
 
The lack of available organisations that supported Apple Macs also became a 
limiting factor so T.Co became locked into the local company who were not 
proactive with future forecasting.  The Managing Director said that “T.Co required a 
partner who had the capability to contribute towards the IT strategic vision of an 
expanding company and what they actually had was a hardware provider.”  
 
However, Filemaker Pro was still perceived by various members of staff at T.Co as 
being an ideal product because as their needs evolved, so did the database, through 
the addition of fields and creation of new layouts.  In the requirements gathering 
process for the client-tracking project (discussed later), staff said: “we like Filemaker 
Pro because it does what we want” (Research Secretary), “I know how to use this 
now, it took some time to get used to it, but now it’s fine” (Sales Secretary) and 
“three clicks and I’ve got what I need, and 'S' is so good at doing the techie stuff I 
could get anything I wanted from the system” (Research Secretary). 
 
As a side effect, a culture of user led development emerged.  Many users were 
willing and able to offer feedback about the applications and even undertake hands 
on development tasks such as the creation of the new fields and layouts.  The 
advantages of user led development have also been interpreted as a disadvantage.  
The IT Manager stated that “Although Filemaker Pro is easy to adapt and minimal 
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skills are needed to develop the database, database disciplines are not existent and 
the Filemaker Pro databases are not documented.  A realistic comment is that they 
have run on and on without a driver.” 
 
In June 2002, T.Co had several pools of data that were duplicated and dirty.  At the 
same time, managers wanted to undertake more sophisticated analysis of those data 
however, the IT was not capable of facilitating this.  For example, the Sales Manager 
said “if we are going to expand, I need to have my finger on the pulse of the 
business!”  Instead, analysis involved many manual processes (such as collating hard 
copy documents and re-keying information) and it was reportedly labour intensive, 
and not as accurate as it could have been.  However, the company did have 11 years 
worth of data that they could call upon, although these were in various repositories.  
This was characterised as by a secretary as “a huge security blanket that they were 
reluctant to let go of.” 
 
Indeed, in 1996 when there had been the opportunity to switch from the Apple Mac 
based Filemaker Pro environment, the pull was so strong that it remained.  The IT 
Manager has since reflected upon the decision at the time and believes they made the 
right choice at that time.  She said that, given what she had learnt about the history of 
T.Co, the company would not have been capable of dealing with a migration project 
at that time especially as the move from the Apple Mac and to the Windows 
environment would have been technically difficult.  In 2000 however, she felt that 
things had changed at T.Co, but more importantly in relation to the technology. 
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Even in June 2000, however, what has been described by the IT Manager as “the 
marriage to the Macs” was still evident.  Emotions ran high in their defence and 
comments such as the Macs didn’t break down – ever”, from long serving members 
of staff in all departments were commonplace.  However, even in light of this, it was 
clear that the death of the Apple Mac environment was inevitable.  
 
5.2.7 The Motivation for Change 
Several issues motivated a need for change in the infrastructure at T.Co.  These can 
be characterised in terms of company growth and capabilities of the infrastructure to 
support this.  In the late 1990s the company defined a strategy that incorporated 
increased market penetration particularly through wider geographical coverage of 
that market.  Winning more customers in existing areas was also a target according 
to the Sales and Marketing Managers.  These plans brought with them the need to 
reconsider the capabilities of the current infrastructure.  It was clear that things could 
not continue as they were.  For example, Microsoft Word for Apple Mac was in use.  
This worked until a document was received from someone who had created or 
amended it in Microsoft Word for Windows.  The text would become corrupted and 
reformat itself, font size would alter and apostrophes would disappear.  
Consequently, time and effort had to be spent on reformatting the documents.  
Documents that had crossed platforms also suffered printing problems.  There were 
regular occurrences of documents viewed correctly on-screen, printing incorrectly.  
In one meeting, the Research Manager highlighted how this had lead to fire fighting: 
 “Because of the formatting problems brought about by the Macs, 
things are always a bit frantic around here.  I tend to be most 
responsive to who shouts loudest at the moment, which is probably 
not the best way of managing things”. 
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This is the point at which I joined T.Co.  At the first meeting to discuss a proposed 
project between T.Co and myself, the Managing Director asked me if we (he meant 
T.Co) should move from the Apple Mac environment and to PCs (more accurately – 
a Windows based environment).  He had already told me that there was a big 
attraction to ‘Macs’ at T.Co and therefore I thought it prudent to be non-committal at 
this stage.  I therefore mumbled something about pros and cons of Apple Macs, and 
that I was open minded on the issue.  In the same meeting, he asked me how much 
the ‘project’ would cost.  We had discussed the possibility of a CRM implementation 
although it was not termed as such at this point.  Based upon the data I had about the 
organisation and a similar recent implementation I had been involved with, I gave 
him an estimate for the CRM implementation, of £50,000.   
 
Between June and November, time was spent working upon the proposal, getting it 
accepted and appointing the graduate who would implement it (she is named as the 
IT Manager in the story).  By November however, the decision to migrate from the 
Apple Mac environment had been taken.  The Managing Director had sought the 
advice of an IT Director he knew and had taken it.  He was convinced that the Apple 
Mac environment was not the standard of the companies they dealt with, and this 
was the route of many operational problems.  Furthermore, the Apple Mac 
environment and its current support facilities were perceived as not being able to 
stand the growing business pressures, growing Client and Sponsor expectations, and 
it was ultimately preventing growth.  Problems with the applications had not been 
identified yet.  The platform was the enemy (although not in everybody’s eyes as 
shall be revealed later). 
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5.3 The Migration Project 
The migration project was initially geared toward shifting between an Apple Mac 
and Windows environment.  The breakdown of the software, hardware and services 
procured is shown in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1: Key Features of the Content of the Migration Project 
 
- Cabling infrastructure enhancement: Expanding the Head-office network to include the new 
office space, whilst enhancing the network with a flexible and expandable design.  
- Windows server core platforms and software: Replacing the existing Apple Mac server with 
industry standard, corporate class servers and applications for e-Mail, Diary management, File 
and Print facilities, Intranet and Internet facilities.  
- Desktop replacement: Replacing the existing Apple Mac desktop platforms with industry 
standard small footprint Windows based systems.  
- Desktop software upgrade: Changing the appropriate Office software and Database  
- Implementation of Virtual Private Network capability. 
- Implementation of technical and strategic services support contract. 
 
 
The total costs for the project were £135,000 with a further bill of £45,000 per year 
running, maintenance and support costs. 
 
5.3.1 The Migration Project: Finding the Vendor 
The migration project team included the IT Manager, the Managing Director, an 
External Consultant17, the Research Manager and myself.  The main consideration, 
when sourcing the IT solution, was to find a vendor that was able to suggest the 
hardware and solve the immediate problem and also a company that would offer 
advice and that could assist in the strategic evolution of information systems.  A 
good working relationship had to be created so a vendor had to be sourced that could 
work alongside the team at T.Co.  By early December 2000, the requirements of 
T.Co had been finalised.  These were: 
                                                 
17 Appointed via the IT Director the Managing Director taken the original advice from about the need to migrate. 
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- A partner who could assist them in upgrading their IT infrastructure, migrate the 
existing systems and data, and provide on-going support of their hardware and 
systems. 
- Vendors should have a proven record of accomplishment in delivering these 
services and be capable of providing support to each local office. 
- Assistance with the re-cabling of their Manchester office. 
- Provision and installation of new PC hardware. 
- Installation of a new IT infrastructure based upon Microsoft Windows including: 
a file and print server, e-mail (local and remote capability), diary management 
applications, database server, remote network access, secure internet access, 
virus protection and Wide Area Network links to Reading and Solihull. 
- Migration of data from Filemaker Pro applications in the Apple Mac 
environment to the Windows environment. 
 
The selection of vendor was really a foregone conclusion.  The external IT 
consultant knew a company from a previous role.  However, I suggested that the 
company should look at least at two others for comparability (to make my point I 
asked the team how many quotes they would get for work they wanted to carry out 
on their home and this seemed to get the message across).  I also suggested these 
could be used as bargaining tools with the recommended vendor.  In the end, two 
other vendors were invited to tender for the work.  The IT Manager told me, that at 
the vendor presentations,  it been agreed by the project team that each response had 
the potential to offer the final solution but they had strengths and weaknesses18.   
 
                                                 
18 I was unable to attend the meeting. 
 140
- Vendor 1, was a large international company that was independently owned, had 
many different resources available via many different geographical locations.  
The organisation offered a wide range of products and services and they claimed 
that ‘no project was too small or large’ for them to cope with.  A mid ranged 
company,  
 
- Vendor 2, (the recommended provider) had a similar organisational set up as 
T.Co and was located close to the headquarters.  They were also a growing 
company that offered internal services to remote users.  They could support 
customers remotely but were not large enough to offer the varied levels of 
support that Vendor 1 could.   
 
- Vendor 3, was sourced from the Internet with no prior recommendations and was 
described by the IT Manager as the ‘budget option’. 
 
The initial contact with each company, after receipt of the tenders, was made by the 
IT Manager and the external consultant on the vendors’ premises.  The IT Manager 
said that it offered a very different insight to how the organisations worked.  Vendor 
1 was late and it was obvious that no preparation had been made for the meeting.  
This immediately gave the impression that the project was indeed a trivial one for 
this large corporation.  A sales person was initially involved so answers to technical 
matters were not available immediately.  Moreover, the documentation regarding the 
project had to be chased, communications were often not answered and the account 
manager’s first contact with T.Co was on the day of selection.  The final solution had 
travelled through three of four different departments before finalisation.  Any new 
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area opened in the project introduced a new department, at a different location and 
with a different contact.  Costs were also high.  Vendors 2 and 3 were perceived as 
offering a more personal approach.  Initial meetings included senior management, 
both companies had a rich knowledge of T.Co and customer service appeared to be a 
priority for them.  A ‘beauty parade’19 was arranged for the three vendors to present 
their final designs, choice of solutions and meet the Managing Director of T.Co.  
Although the IT Manager and external consultant were involved in this process, the 
purchase decision was taken by the Managing Director. 
 
Vendor 1 was reported as presenting in a manner that the team expected.  The IT 
Manager said they offered a generic solution that did not completely address their 
requirements.  There was general agreement that Vendor 3 had presented in a 
professional manner, answered unpredictable questions from the team and was felt to 
give an overall good performance.  However, the IT Manager and External 
Consultant had reservations about their abilities in relation to support in cognisance 
of their site visit where they witnessed disorganised working and storage areas, and 
what appeared to be inadequate technical support.  The IT Manager said “my kids’ 
bedrooms were in better shape!” 
 
Vendor 2 also presented professionally, and critically, the Managing Director from 
the company attended.  According to the IT Manager, mutual respect between him 
and the Managing Director of T.Co was immediately evident.  Their proposal 
incorporated Virtual Private Network and ADSL technologies and was heralded by 
the Managing Director of T.Co as “a design for the future!”  The recommended 
vendor was the one that obtained the contract. 
                                                 
19 A term coined by the Managing Director. 
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5.3.2 Obtaining Approval 
The renewal of technology at T.Co was characterised as a “brave and foresighted 
decision of the board” by the IT Manager.  Clearly, it was going to involve the most 
significant information systems expenditure to date for the company.  However, even 
though the vendor had been chosen by the Managing Director, the release of the 
capital still had to be approved by the board.  Within T.Co, this required the IT 
Manager and External Consultant to create a business case for Board approval.  In 
summary, the case highlighted the costs of the Apple Mac environment and how 
these could be reduced by migrating to a Windows environment.  Staff were 
interviewed by the IT and Research Manager, and it was suggested that around 8.84 
per cent of the working week was spent dealing with ‘Mac problems’ (for any given 
staff member this might vary from 0 to 22.2% of their weekly workload).  A 
selection of the issues used for justifying the investment is shown in. Table 5.2. 
 
Cost immediately became a major factor as the proposed budget (the figure of 
£50,000 that had been provided for the CRM implementation) was instantly viewed 
as overspent by the Managing Director, due to the migration.  Even though I had not 
factored a migration into the figure I had provided originally, this was now taken by 
the Board to be the amount they were going to spend on the project, including the 
migration.  This resulted in a dialogue between the Board members and the IT Team, 
which consisted of cycles of cost justification.  Throughout this process, a paring 
down exercise was conducted but eventually, it was the original (more costly) 
specification that was implemented.  This was because equipment, such as servers, 
that had been ruled out of the plan at first, were reinstated when the Board members 
realised the business needed them. 
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Table 5.2: Migration Investment Justification20 
 
Problems Anticipated Benefits 
A
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n 
Documents that are saved in a Windows environment and 
then opened in an Apple Mac environment often degrade 
and need to be amended.  This may require clients to be 
contacted meaning that T.Co systems are seen as 
problematic.  The same is true of email traffic. 
 
Documents that have crossed platforms may also suffer 
printing problems.  Regular occurrences of documents 
viewing correctly on screen but printing improperly were 
cited.  
  
Cross platform glitches will be 
addressed.  
 
Image of T.Co is improved. 
 
Staffs working environment is 
improved. 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
The use of ‘Virtual PC’ on Apple Mac computers slows 
other applications down. 
 
Interoperability problems as detailed for Administration. 
 
Several applications research requires are only available 
on PC and therefore the staffs have to use the client PC 
that can prove problematic.  
 
 
Fewer interoperability problems 
will be evidenced.   
 
Access to applications will be 
improved. 
 
The migration will lead to a move 
from flat file to relational database 
architecture. 
Sa
le
s 
The management of manual diaries is labour intensive.  
There are nine in total that may need to be arranged in 
concert.  Double bookings occur which is bad for the 
company image. 
 
The ISDN line between Manchester and Theale is not 
robust leading to problems in communication.  Data are 
data not being backed up onto the server, putting T.Co in 
a dangerous position. 
 
An electronic diary will make diary 
management more efficient, 
effective and accurate. 
 
The new infrastructure will 
improve communications 
capabilities. 
Fi
na
nc
e 
The Sage package runs on via ‘Virtual PC’ meaning it is 
slow. 
Sage will operate in a Windows 
environment much faster. 
 
 
A further factor (apart from the misuse of the initial quotation) that contributed to an 
increase in the overall budget for the project (including the client-tracking project) 
was the rapid growth of the company.  Many new staff members, a number of 
satellite offices and extra remote workers were now present.  This had led to a 
constant reassessment and expansion of requirements in relation to software licences, 
maintenance agreements, equipment and training.  The contact (incorporating costs 
                                                 
20 Adapted from: Business Case for PC Environment Documentation: February 2001. 
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and specifications) was eventually signed 28 April 2001 and ‘go live’ was 29 May 
2001. 
 
5.3.3 The Migration of the Filemaker Pro Applications 
A major concern was the movement of the Filemaker Pro applications as they 
supported the key processes at T.Co.  There was some discussion amongst the 
project team about moving the Filemaker Pro applications to an Microsoft Access 
environment on a temporary basis until the client-tracking project was implemented.  
The rationale for this was due to the Managing Director’s and the Board’s desire to 
ferociously curtail costs at any opportunity.  Therefore, as Microsoft Office was 
being purchased, Access was essentially free of charge, in contrast to Filemaker Pro.  
Although licences had been purchased for Filemaker Pro in the Apple Mac 
environment, new ones would need to be purchased for the Windows environment.  
Furthermore, the project team were aware that eventually, the Filemaker Pro 
applications were expected to be replaced by the new client-tracking system and 
therefore it seemed a prime opportunity to cut costs.  Moreover, during the 
migration, it was suggested that the existing applications could have been modified 
slightly to improve their structure and decrease duplication through the normalisation 
and merger of several of the applications.  This would also have made the future 
migration of the ‘Filemaker Pro’ data to the client-tracking system much easier.  
However, this was discounted by the Managing Director as too risky.  He said “there 
are times to spend and times not to spend!  Filemaker Pro is core to our business and 
it cannot afford to fail.  In my opinion, a move to Access would increase our chances 
of failure. 
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The Managing Director perceived that a move to Access might make the application 
stop working and also that it would require more training.  He felt that given the 
major changes the company would experience with the migration, paying for 
licences that would be discarded later was “a necessary evil”21.  
 
Therefore, several Filemaker Pro licences for the Windows environment were 
purchased.  Staff were allocated time to test migrated data from the Apple Mac 
version of Filemaker Pro to the Windows version.  A programme of testing was 
developed for each area, where different forms of data entry and extraction were 
performed using the migrated data.  The IT Manager noted that the testing procedure 
had offered a double benefit as staff became accustomed to the new system as they 
tested.  Much to the surprise of the team, the migration between the environments 
was uneventful – the Filemaker Pro database package had versions for Apple Mac 
and PC and the conversion was simple. 
 
5.3.4 The Shift from Microsoft Office (Apple Mac) to Microsoft Office 
(Windows) 
The migration project offers the first opportunity to consider the packaged software 
experiences of T.Co in relation to the Microsoft Office conversion.  Effectively, 
there was no selection process.  The Office package had been used in the Apple Mac 
environment and it was perceived as a straight swap.  Therefore, no formal 
requirements gathering or evaluation of potential packages was undertaken.  Overall, 
the process was initially uneventful (especially at the headquarters) and staff 
welcomed the move to the Microsoft Office in the Windows environment.  For many 
                                                 
21 It has never clear whether the Managing Director really meant this or if he was also ‘attached’ to the Filemaker Pro 
environment. 
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staff, this was a return to familiarity.  Most staff that had joined T.Co from other 
organisations that had used Windows before and it had been necessary for them to 
learn how to use the Apple Mac environment.  There were some staff who had only 
ever used Apple Macs computers and this was a major change for them.  Therefore, 
a good deal of time was assigned to the task of training.  A Non-Executive Director 
claimed that “No matter what technology was invested in, if people did not know 
how to use the equipment the project would be a failure.”   
 
The IT Manager said that all staff, in all locations and at all levels, would be trained 
to a common standard by the same trainer.  To facilitate this, a training room was 
built at the company headquarters and sessions were arranged.  The IT Manager also 
reported at the time that not only did the exercise achieve the training objectives but 
also a dialogue was opened up on the new system.  She said that staff from all levels 
of the company had sat together for a number of days and aired their views and fears 
(these mostly centred on the move away from the Apple Macs by those that had 
known nothing else). 
 
5.3.5 Issues Associated with the Microsoft Office Package 
There were three key issues associated with the move from Microsoft Office in the 
Apple Mac environment and to the Windows environment. 
 
The migration involved major reformatting work because of the switch from Word 
for Apple Mac to Word for Windows.  This required all documents to be saved in 
.doc format (Apple Mac used a different file extension).  Furthermore, the 
opportunity to reformat the corrupted documents was taken at this point.  Although 
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this was a time consuming exercise, staff were willing to engage in this as they could 
see the time that they would save in the new environment. 
 
Originally, the company only had one external email mailbox.  E-mails that came 
into the company arrived in that mailbox and were then either printed out and handed 
to the correct individuals or e-mailed internally to the recipient.  Moreover, before 
the migration, the Sales team managed eight paper diaries.  One diary co-ordinated 
in-house resources of room, projector and client PC availability and the remaining 
seven were used to plan the seven BDMs’ appointments throughout the UK.  
Additionally, the manual transcription of diary entries onto a sheet of paper had to be 
completed at the end of each day.  This was faxed to each BDM every evening in 
time for use the next day.  The diary was also duplicated for those at the various sites 
of the company.  This meant faxing a weekly diary view and telephone conversations 
as necessary to update the diaries in the light of new appointments, postponements 
and cancellations.  In addition, as each diary was A3 size, the sheer physical 
movement of these was problematic and they took up valuable office space.  
Microsoft Outlook was implemented and this (combined with the new infrastructure) 
gave staff individual external email accounts.  The package also offered electronic 
diary management capabilities.  A further package was implemented which allowed 
Outlook to generate diaries for rooms and equipment availability.  The benefits that 
these applications brought were highly visible to all and they were instantly agreed 
as a resounding success.  
 
The BDMs were expected to use the electronic diary via the Virtual Private Network.  
Vendor 2 also accessed their email in this way and informed T.Co that the switch 
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over would be simple.  However, the key difference was, as the IT Manager pointed 
out, that the users from each company were “worlds apart.”  The BDMs at T.Co 
were novices in remote working.  Thus, the use of email brought with it a steep 
learning curve.  The BDMs did not have any knowledge about how to make remote 
working, work for them and others (they had never used Outlook before).  For 
example, despite extensive training, they did not realise that they needed to 
synchronise their email and other Outlook folders regularly (to stop the activity 
taking a long time).  Another example is related to the Apple Mac environment.  
Some members of staff had saved Word files in Rich Text Format (RTF), in order to 
the address problems of compatibility.  It was discovered that any document that was 
saved in RTF and sent to multiple users was quadrupled in size.  After a month’s 
usage by the remote users, Outlook came to a to a halt because the BDMs were 
attempting to download several mega-bites of data at home via a 56k modem 
connection.  Users were also not logging out of the secure connection environment 
and this meant they were taking up bandwidth even if they were not at their laptops.  
The BDMs relied heavily upon access to their diaries, were frustrated by the 
problems they were encountering and blamed the infrastructure.  Comments such as 
those shown below were taken from, and are typical of, those made around the time 
in meetings and in the offices: 
 
“this system was supposed to save time, not complicate matters” 
(BDM 1) 
 
“you just can’t trust the technology, this needs sorting and it needs 
sorting now” (BDM 2) 
 
“I knew this would happen, bring back the Macs!” (BDM 3) 
 
It was not until the IT provider looked into the situation that the problem was 
identified and remedied.  The BDMs never acknowledged they had a hand in the 
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problem.  It was to do with the technology as far as they were concerned.  Only 
seven staff members where involved in this access problem, but they were all senior 
managers and they were very vocal in their criticisms which fuelled a negative view 
of the whole migration project for a short time.  I heard one of the secretaries, for 
example, sympathising with one of the BDMs22 “I know, the whole thing’s a fiasco, 
I much preferred the Macs”. 
 
However, for most people there was evidence to suggest that the migration had been 
perceived more positively.  Post migration I asked various members of staff how 
they felt about the new system and they were generally comfortable with it as the 
responses below suggest: 
 
“it’s great, no more reformatting of word documents” (Research 
Secretary) 
 
“it’s taken me a while to get used to Windows, but at least I don’t 
have to do all the reformatting like before” (Research Secretary) 
 
“I have my own email account now which is useful” (Supervisor) 
 
“It’s good to be working with Windows as I’m learning something 
that’s more common than the Macs were, although I liked them too – 
especially the I Macs!” (IT Support Officer) 
 
5.4 The OneSource Project 
In March 2000, the Managing Director developed a request for proposals.  The 
proposal suggested that T.Co needed assistance in improving their research 
capabilities in respect of the ‘market intelligence’ that was obtained for usage by 
                                                 
22 I was not sure whether she was sympathising because he was a BDM or because she agreed.  Unfortunately, as I didn’t know 
her that well, I did not feel able to ask her. 
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clients in job search campaigns.  The rationale at the time was that demands upon the 
research department were increasing due to: 
- An increasing number of clients using its services 
- A desire by management to improve the interview ‘hit’ rate thereby increasing 
the chance of client success whilst, at the same time, reducing the number of 
organisations that need to be approached. 
- The need to keep abreast of best professional practice in information 
management. 
- The need to keep abreast of latest technological developments, e.g. the Internet. 
- Servicing more offices – the forecasted growth was 2 to 5 within the next four 
years. 
 
T.Co were seeking consultancy advice, guidance in respect of how they could 
benchmark against best practice, and cost effectively achieve best practice.  
Specifically, they were interested in the information that would be required to 
achieve this and asked: 
 
- What information do we need to look for? 
- Where do we look for it? 
- How do we look for it? 
- How do we store it and re-use it? 
- How do we transmit it to other offices? 
 
In June 2000, this project had not started.  When I began working with T.Co, the 
Managing Director asked an external consultancy group and myself to tender for the 
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work.  I referred the work to a group of colleagues, but in the end, the Managing 
Director decided to wait and see what the forthcoming TCS programme would 
deliver.   
5.4.1 The Selection of the OneSource Product 
By January 2001, a case had been prepared to justify investment in a product called 
OneSource.  The Research Manager had decided that the department needed a new 
business intelligence database and, that she really knew what was needed, therefore 
there was little point in waiting to see the outcomes of the TCS programme.  The 
Research Manager had identified the package, as she had worked with this and other 
similar packages, in a previous role.  OneSource is an online business browser which 
is linked to a business intelligence database.  The database contains over 400,000 
UK company profiles such as turnover, staff positions and premises addresses.  It 
also contains news items, business and trade articles, research reports, industrial 
intelligence and financial data.  The primary idea was that the browser would be 
used to identify prospective companies and contacts that clients could seek work 
with.  OneSource was intended to replace the home-grown equivalent – the TMP 
application.  The TMP application required manual updating by staff at T.Co, data 
quality was weak and it only held details of around 27,000 organisations.  
OneSource was trialed by the Research Manager and the positive outcomes of this 
were fed into the justification document.  The Research Manager stated “OneSource 
offers a competitive advantage in terms of quality of Research and level of service to 
our clients.  OneSource adds a professionalism and efficiency that should turn a Gold 
Service into a Platinum one.” 
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Her report also recommended the extended usage of OneSource throughout T.Co and 
the purchase of additional application.  These recommendations are shown in Table 
5.3. 
Table 5.3: Benefits and Recommendations for the Purchase of OneSource 
 
Benefits to T.Co: 
 
- Company information is swiftly collated and can be exported to a number of applications 
- OneSource will remove time consuming and labour intensive tasks in the research 
department 
- The application negates the need for further personnel support for the research manager 
- The application will be used by others releasing the research manager for value adding work. 
- The sales team could use the application to identify potential sponsors. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
- That we subscribe to a ten-licence version of OneSource at £20k pa. 
- That it becomes the major source of information for the Research Department 
- That all reports are customised as “T.Co Documents” 
- That it is installed in the client library at Manchester, Theale and the Midlands. 
- One primary researcher is located at each office so that each office does its own standard 
primary research with secondary research continuing to be carried out at Manchester 
- That consultants are trained in its use. 
- That the Sales and Telemarketing Department are trained in its use to improve existing 
standards and intelligence of sales information  
- That we replace the T.Co Senior Search database with Executive Grapevine CD-Rom (at a 
cost of £3,500 per year, plus £600 per satellite office). 
 
 
The decision to purchase and implement OneSource was agreed with minimal 
questioning by the Board.  Interestingly, I later found out that the Research Manager 
had shared a two-hour train journey with the Managing Director and it was during 
this time that she was able to sell the application to him.  The TMP application had 
contained key functionality that OneSource did not.  It was therefore decided that, 
until the client-tracking package23 was implemented, it would be necessary to retain 
certain aspects of the TMP application and establish a link between this and 
OneSource.  Essentially, OneSource was to be used as a searchable database.  Once 
searches had been performed to identify potential employers, their details would be 
                                                 
23 It was expected that the client-tracking package would replace the TMP application in its entirety. 
 
 153
exported to a revised TMP application.  The TMP application would then be used to 
guide secondary research and the generation of mail shots to the employees.   
 
In order to refine the TMP application, and establish the link with One Source, a 
requirements gathering process was initiated involving a member of the TCS 
academic team, the IT Manager and the Research Manager.  This began in 
September 2001 with prototyping, testing and refinement following on and carried 
out up to January 2002.  Awareness sessions were then held to obtain feedback from 
consultants, sales and research staff.  This was fed into the process and the new 
application was released April 2002. 
 
The new application and OneSource both appeared to be received warmly by the 
staff who used them and they were quickly subsumed into the everyday working 
lives of those who interacted with them.  The Research Manager was particularly 
delighted as she felt her life was now going to be much easier.  She said “I’m so 
chuffed we got it, no more having to update TMP manually!” 
 
Furthermore, access for staff at satellite offices was appreciated by them, as it had 
resulted in quicker response times for clients and in searching for potential sponsors.  
They no longer had to wait for headquarters research staff to undertaken searches on 
their behalf as the information could be accessed via the internet.  For example, one 
Telesales representative stated “It was a really good idea of 'S'’s to recommend that 
we use OneSource too – it gives us more companies to go at.” 
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The IT Manager was similarly happy, but for different reasons.  She said that the 
purchase of OneSource was a small step in making her life simpler, and it would 
become more so when the TMP application was also finally replaced with Goldmine 
(the client-tracking application).  She claimed that when it was in place, she could 
get on with more strategic work and let the day-to-day stuff deal with itself.  In a 
meeting late November 2002, I asked the IT Manager how the application was 
bedding in and she said it was still fine although she pointed out that staff were 
forgetting what it was like before.  She said the sales staff were now becoming more 
demanding and were beginning to complain that overseas and public sector 
organisation data was not available in the database.  I asked the same Telesales 
Representative as before about her feelings on OneSource at this point.  She said, 
“Yes, I’m still happy, although it would be nice to have more global data”.  
Interestingly, they had never had this before, but now it had become a priority. 
 
I did ask if the package was to be rolled out to consultants as initially intended, but I 
was told by the Research Manager that this had been put on hold as there were only a 
limited number of licenses available.  I therefore asked why more were not 
purchased and she smiled and told me it just was not an option at the moment.  As I 
suspected, I was told by another source, the real reasoning behind this was that the 
consultants were not inclined to undertake work that had always been done for them 
(the searches), even though it might have improved client experiences.  It was 
explained to me that T.Co had decided not to push this as it was more important to 
keep the consultants engaged in the client-tracking project.     
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5.5 The Client-tracking Project 
For the purposes of this study, the story begins in August 1999 and ends December 
200224.  It is concerned with the activities surrounding a project that has been 
variously defined as the job search times project, the client monitoring system, the 
CRM system and the client-tracking project.  However, for simplicity it is easiest to 
think of it as that concerned with using IT to support the monitoring of client 
progress at T.Co. 
 
5.5.1 The ‘Job Search Times’ Project 
The client-tracking project at T.Co can be traced back at least as far as August 1999 
when senior management at T.Co discussed a ‘Job Search Times Project’25.  In 
September that year, a meeting was held involving the Managing Director, the 
Commercial Director and the Operations Manager to discuss this further.  As a result 
of this meeting a requirements gathering process was initiated.  The requirements 
gathering process was conducted by the Operations Manager and the Managing 
Consultant.  They began by mapping out a model client journey by brainstorming the 
key steps.  This initial model is shown below: 
 
- Date of first meeting (between client and consultant) 
- Date of approval of CV 
- Date of first research brief received (by research department) 
- Date of headline research returned to client (by research department) 
- Date of headline research approved by client (and given to research department) 
- Date of first TMP sent out (by research department) 
                                                 
24 The project is still continuing and is anticipated to be complete by early in 2003. 
25 Job Search Times Project Memo – September 1999 
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- Dates of interview clinics (with consultant) 
- Date of second TMP sent out (by research department) 
- Frequency of meetings between consultants and clients 
 
The model was then validated and refined through discussions with consultants. 
 
Table 5.4 shows the model in February 2000.  The idea was to use this to develop a 
set of requirements for a new ‘Client Monitoring’ system.  The requirements were to 
highlight client overspends by region and to allow for the development, and 
implementation of, performance metrics in respect of consultant performance.  That 
is, data which could tell senior managers at T.Co how long clients were taking to get 
through each stage and into a new job.  The project was guided by the Managing 
Director’s assertion “If you can’t measure it, you can’t improve it” (Report: Useful 
Statistics for Outplacement, T.Co). 
 
Furthermore, a senior consultant concurred, stating that sponsor organisations 
needed realistic measures of job search effectiveness, clients needed realistic and 
measurable targets and consultants needed to know how they were doing at each 
stage.  He also said that he could use the system to work out what he was earning on 
an hourly basis. 
 
5.5.2 The Sales and Marketing Wish List 
In April 2000, the Sales Manager and two supervisors were involved in a further 
requirements gathering exercise.  The purpose of this was to create a ‘wish list’ of 
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support mechanisms that would assist in reducing workloads.  The wish list was as 
follows: 
 
- The implementation of an enterprise-wide electronic diary 
- Tweaks to the Corporate Filemaker Pro Database to allow improved views of 
existing data, the addition of triggers to generate sales appointment letters 
automatically from data entered, the ability to track the success of a mail shot 
and one button marketing pack creation and printing. 
- Tweaks to the New Client Filemaker Pro Database including the provision of 
extra reference information so that enquiries could be dealt with more efficiently 
and the addition of a trigger to prompt contact of successfully placed clients 3 
months after placement 
 
Some of the requests were implemented and some were left until the ‘new’ system 
was put in place. 
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Table 5.4: Client Journey: Model I 
Week Client 
Consultant 
Meeting 
Progress 
0 1st Meeting 
(extended 
session) 
Data gathered to begin drafting CV 
Finalise CV ready to be proffered 
Discuss responding to adverts 
Discuss speculative Approaches  
Research Brief completed (1 day turnaround) 
Complete draft speculative and recruitment consultant letters 
Compete Jobline 500 brief if required or demonstrate use to client 
Put structure into campaign – home office, methods of communication, job 
search newspapers, and library research. 
1 2nd Meeting CV approved 
Headline research approved 
Letters approved 
Review client networking list 
Utilise Jobline 500 
Respond to advertised positions 
Conduct internet job site familiarisation 
Place on executive register at Job Centre as appropriate 
2 3rd Meeting 1st TMP mail shot 
CV sent to recruitment consultants 
CV sent to network of former T.Co clients from same business sector 
CV posted on T.Co website for access by HR personnel 
CV sent to network of HR personnel 
 4th Meeting Go through 100 POC model 
Review results of 1st TMP 
Complete research brief to 2nd TMP as necessary 
Book interview training as appropriate 
5  2nd TMP mail shot 
7  5th Meeting Go through 100 POC model 
Review results of 2nd TMP 
Complete research brief for 3rd TMP as necessary 
Book interview training as appropriate 
8  Conduct Interview training 
13 Major Review Collation of client campaign statistics 
Review interviews attended to date 
Review replies and respond as appropriate 
 
16  Average success time in 1999. 
Laggard clients – establish 1-2 month job placement at no extra cost to 
sponsor. 
 
5.5.3 The ‘Client-tracking’ Project 
By November 2000, when the TCS programme began, the Managing Director had 
decided that the company needed to migrate to the Windows environment and 
therefore all projects other than this were mostly put on hold.  However, in 
November, the IT Manager and the academic team began documenting the processes 
at T.Co in preparation for a more detailed requirements gathering process for the 
client-tracking project.  This led to a basic process map that was used to identify how 
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existing applications were being used.  This process map was also used to guide data 
requirements gathering processes whereby users of the various applications and 
operators of the processes were interviewed about the status quo.  Also: 
 
- Many users had detailed their requirements by documenting the processes and 
procedures they worked with.   
- Requirements were solicited from the operations manager.   
- Various other process maps were also produced which had much greater detail26.   
 
5.5.4 The Consultants’ Wish List 
In January 2001, following the internal requirements gathering process, a meeting 
was arranged to elicit the requirements of the Consultants who worked for T.Co.  
This involved the IT Manager, the Operations Manager, a non-executive director, the 
Managing Director, the Sales Manager, the Research Manager, the Finance officer, 
the Managing Consultant (the spokesperson for the consultants) and myself.  At the 
meeting, the managing consultant presented a further ‘wish list’ and a number of 
questions.  The initial questions were: 
 
- Why do we need a computerised tracking system? 
- For whose benefit is it? 
- What is the primary aim of the system? 
- If it is primarily for the marketing people, how much extra work is required of 
the consultants to make it useful? 
 
                                                 
26 Requirements documentation (Documents 10-14). 
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They concluded their list of questions with the statement: 
“There is some potential benefit for consultants and clients if we can 
collect quantitative data on the outcome of mailing shots, the routes to 
new jobs, and subsequent follow up of clients when they leave us; 
however, the benefit must make the extra work worth while.”  (Digest 
of “Wish List” of T.Co Northern 1:1 Consultants - Doc 19) 
The non-executive director was quick to respond admitting that originally the project 
had been viewed as a cost reduction exercise.  However, he went on to say that: 
“….following consultation, we have realised that we could not expect 
you to buy into this.  Really the project is about improving client 
satisfaction.  We don’t want you to view the project as a system for 
monitoring and controlling you.  We know you wouldn’t buy into it 
on these grounds – it has to work for you, as well as us”. 
He then went on to argue that T.Co did need the system due to their rapid expansion.  
He said that without the system they would not be efficient and would therefore not 
be able to compete.  He further built up his argument by reporting that on 12 
January, they had 100 clients on the books and they expected this number to increase 
to 150 when the Midlands office took off.  The operations manager also contributed 
at this point.  He said that “Consultants get pestered by clients for details about the 
progress of their service, e.g. mail shots.  Consultants feel it’s not their job”.  The 
non-executive took over again and said really the system was about consultants 
tracking T.Co and ensuring that they did what they were supposed to.  The 
consultants were not approached again regarding their requirements. 
 
5.5.5 The Client-tracking Project Begins Proper 
A new Operations Manager was appointed in June 2001.  His role, according to the 
Managing Director and the company newsletter, was to “implement leading edge 
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systems and communications across the T.Co branch network” and “provide the 
technology to underpin the company’s rapid expansion”. 
 
The new Operations Manager had extensive experience of implementing enterprise 
wide information systems projects in blue-chip companies.  This manager came to 
the project with good ideas about the way forward and quickly became a respected 
part of the team.  Several members of staff viewed him as a breath of fresh air.  He 
had been told, by the Managing Director, that the new client-tracking system had to 
be in place by February 2002 and that this was his responsibility.  When the project 
was launched, it was widely agreed that the implementation should begin in the 
research department, which was considered the most complex business function.  As 
a result, end-users were made aware that a new software installation was planned for 
the future and they viewed this as a panacea to their problems.  Quickly after it was 
publicised the IT Manager told me in a telephone conversation that staff were saying 
things like ‘the client-tracking system will take care of that’ and ‘when the client-
tracking system comes, my head will stop spinning’.  However, the IT Manager was 
aware that whichever product was eventually selected would entail a trade-off 
between an ideal system and the constraints of a standardised package and so in an 
attempt to manage user expectations, she was keen to point this out on many 
occasions.   
 
During the initial meetings (comprising the IT Manager, Operations Manager, 
Graduate Trainee, Research Manager and two academics), the academics advised the 
other members of the Project Management Team of the importance of eliciting and 
articulating user requirements to enable a more informed evaluation of packaged 
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software products and help narrow down the options.  Whilst team members were 
accepting of this suggestion, minimal effort was put into consulting end-users.  
However, in order to aid their own understanding of user requirements, the Graduate 
Trainee and IT Manager conducted a further analysis of the client journey.  During 
this same period, a focus day with end-users was scheduled on a number of 
occasions.  It was hoped that this would provide feedback on the project team’s 
understanding of user requirements and offer suggestions on future direction.   The 
focus day never happened as staff were deemed to be too busy by their managers: 
“we’d love to get people involved, but we just done have the time” (Supervisor), 
“our staff are just too busy” (Sales Manager) or themselves “it’s the wrong time of 
the month for me” (Finance Officer). 
 
In addition, much of the previous requirements gathering processes were brought 
into use with the idea of creating a ‘definitive’ requirements document that could be 
used to assess various packaged software products, by now the favoured option over 
developing the Filemaker Pro applications any further.  Various members of the 
project team (especially the academics) had advised the Managing Director that 
custom development would be costly, although not impossible, in the light of the 
emerging requirements.  The accuracy of this document was later verified by two 
end-users.  The main concern of most of the project team seemed to lie with ensuring 
the (financial) support of senior management.  This was confirmed with much of the 
documentation that was produced that appealed to the interests of senior 
management.  These documents included statements declaring “Our aim is to 
introduce a flexible system that will streamline and improve our current business 
processes and speed up the client journey thus becoming more cost effective.”  
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Similarly, the client-tracking project was claimed to enable “T.Co to continue to 
provide a business class service and grow effectively in the future, whilst 
maintaining efficiency in all areas.”   
 
By November 2001, the operations manager had left, but a statement of requirements 
had been prepared.  The main thrust of the requirements at this stage were: 
 
“T.Co are looking for an ‘Off the Shelf’ product that has excellent 
after Sales Support because of the geographical spread of the users.  
In addition, the remote users should be able to access the Client-
tracking System effectively using a 54k modem, so having Intranet 
and Internet capability.  The application should be compatible with 
our current infrastructure and be able to relate to the in-house 
Filemaker Pro Database and Sage financial database. 
 
The Client-tracking is a Workflow application that will enable the 
monitoring of the journey of a client as they travel through T.Co.  
Different activities will be triggered at certain stages thus creating an 
effective and efficient journey reducing time-spans and streamlining 
processes. 
 
Data that is collected throughout both stages of the journey can then 
be used in an intelligent manner for business decisions and business 
procedures at all levels.  The application should have excellent action 
reporting capabilities, with the ability to present business knowledge, 
performance statistics, Key Performance Indicators that is user 
friendly and offered via a digital dashboard.”  (T.Co Statement of 
Requirements, Document 38). 
 
5.5.6 Product Identification and Selection 
Once the requirements process had been ‘finalised’, research was conducted into a 
variety of packaged software products so that a number of potential vendors could be 
short-listed.  By December 2001, four potential products, from four vendors, had 
been identified via a charitable organisation, which assisted small companies in this 
kind of activity.  This was a difficult task as the IT Manager told me they had been 
inundated with calls from vendors following their expression of interest.  Each 
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vendor was sent the requirements document and process maps along with the 
invitation to tender for the work.  Immediately, the provider of Siebel (vendor D) 
responded stating that they could not meet the company’s requirements.  This was 
interesting as the package was a market leader and was very sophisticated.  Further 
probing about the reasons why they could not meet the company’s requirements 
revealed it was more to do with the product being ‘too big’ and too costly – Vendor 
D had basically said ‘you couldn’t afford us’ to the IT Manager.  However, initial 
negotiations were set up with the three other vendors and the project management 
team.   
 
The vendors included: Vendor A who supplied a Sage product; Vendor B who 
supplied Goldmine; and, Vendor C who supplied a product called Commence.  
Communications with Vendor A were problematic from the outset (reportedly a poor 
response on their part) and the product seemed comparatively expensive to other 
packages.  Consequently, this company never went beyond initial negotiations with 
the project management team.  Vendor C presented at T.Co and whilst the product 
was seen as flexible and within budget, it was not perceived as containing the most 
basic functionality that the company required and this avenue was therefore not 
progressed any further.  Vendor B, who sold the Goldmine product, had a number of 
meetings with the project management team before demonstrating the product and 
discussing its capabilities with the Managing Director.  Despite having carried out 
fairly detailed discussions on the nature of the company requirements and having 
viewed the supporting documentation, this presentation was unsuccessful in that the 
salesperson simply demonstrated the standard product and paid no attention to the 
needs of T.Co.  The Managing Director concluded: “Goldmine isn’t for us.” 
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Following this, the Board expressed their discontent and noted their concerns about 
the value of a CRM package.  They demanded more research into the possibilities of 
further developing their existing Filemaker Pro applications.  The project 
management team were therefore forced to investigate the potential for custom 
development even though they did not agree with this strategy.  In January 2002, the 
IT Manager reported: 
 
“Filemaker Pro is currently being evaluated as a viable option, as little 
work has previously been conducted to fully explore its full 
capabilities.”  (Client-tracking Update Memo - Document 41) 
 
and 
 
“Filemaker Pro developers have been contacted directly to gain an 
appreciation of what the software is capable of.  Recently, it has been 
established that there is a link to Sage, Outlook can be integrated and 
alerts and prompts can become automated.  The next process is to 
create a list of critical specification that T.Co require from the Client-
tracking System.  This list will then be sent to our Filemaker Pro 
contacts so they can offer detailed feedback.  A number of site visits 
will also be arranged so that SF and MG can gain a further insight 
into how developers can help T.Co.”  (Client-tracking Update Memo 
- Document 41) 
 
However, the project team believed that a package was the best way forward and 
therefore had continued their search for a suitable vendor.  The IT Manager was then 
approached by another vendor of the Goldmine product – Vendor E.  A presentation 
was arranged, but this did not include the Managing Director.  The project team were 
impressed by the level of personalisation that Vendor E had incorporated into the 
demonstration and further guidance about T.Co requirements were given by the team 
to the vendor throughout this.  A further Vendor E product presentation was then 
arranged, but with the Managing Director involved.  At the next presentation, this 
vendor made extensive use of the background information that they had accumulated 
and as a result further personalised much of the product terminology for their 
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presentation.  This was well received by the Board.  The Managing Director took 
control in this meeting and wrote a list of business functions on the board.   
 
- Can it tell us where a client is in the process? 
- Can we obtain management information about client progress that we can use to 
deal with sponsors? 
- Can we obtain performance metrics to manage the process? 
 
He then asked the vendors if the Goldmine application could support these queries – 
he ticked off each one as they responded.  The application was reported as being able 
to do everything T.Co wanted.  The Managing Director was delighted with the 
presentation and the responses to his questions.  He immediately shifted position 
from his initial suspicion of the product to completely embracing it.  He said “This 
system can do all we need, and more!” 
 
All ideas of entering into custom development were brushed aside as quickly as they 
had appeared.  The Managing Director also now changed his mind and stated that 
rather than install the CRM package in the research department with the possibility 
of future implementation across the other business functions; the system was to be 
installed incrementally throughout the whole organisation.  However, although the 
actions of the Managing Director were interpreted in a similar fashion by the IT 
manager (in my discussions with her), it was reported somewhat differently at a 
meeting and in an executive summary she had prepared for this.   
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She wrote: 
 
“After a disastrous first demonstration from a selected vendor the 
project took a sideward step.  There was hesitation in the decision of 
investing funds and resources into a new application or developing 
the current information system.  The question to ‘build or buy’ an 
application really needed to be resolved so an investigation exercise 
was undertook to really understand the capabilities of Filemaker Pro.  
The investigation involved discussions and meeting with software 
developers throughout the UK.  To finally ‘close’ the option the 
conclusion was that Filemaker Pro would not support the growth and 
geographical spread that T.Co aim for long-term.  The option to buy 
and simply customise a product that will expand with T.Co was the 
favourable option.  An excellent demonstration of Goldmine 
introduced a totally new holistic assessment of T.Co information 
systems and the observation that business functions do not exist in 
isolation became apparent.”  (Client-tracking Meeting Executive 
Summary - doc 46) 
 
Following the successful sales pitch, senior management resistance to cost also 
seemed no longer relevant as the number of user licences increased and the costs 
were revised to £50,000, over double the original pared down estimates (following 
the Migration project budget realignment the project team had been told they had to 
bring the client-tracking project in at £25,000).  However, requirements analysis had 
not been undertaken in any detail in respect of the processes requiring support in 
areas such as finance and sales and marketing, nor had those users been consulted. 
 
5.5.7 Phase 1 of Implementation Planning 
Interestingly, with the change in the roll out of the package from the research 
department to the rest of the enterprise – the starting point was altered too.  The 
vendors felt that as the research department (and Client-tracking functionality) was 
the most complicated business function, this would be best left until last and they 
proposed a different phasing of the implementation process (Vendor E workflow 
document).  This is shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Phase 1: Sales and Marketing
Part a: Manchester
Workflow day – 1 Day
Workflow document – 1 Day
Database design – 1 Day
Data import – 1 Day
Install and Configuration – 2 Days
Word Templates – 1 Day
Crystal Reports – 1 Day
Synchronisation (Laptops) – 2 Days
End User Training – 3 Days
Advanced User Training – 1 Day
Administrator Training – 2 Days
Part b: Birmingham and Reading
Install and set up – 3 Days
Phase 2: Finance
Configuration – 0.5 Day
User Training – O.5 Day
Phase 3: Research
Configuration – 1 Day
User Training – 1 Day
Phase 4: Client Tracking
Workflow – 1 Day
Configuration – 1 Day
User Training – 1 Day
Crystal Reports Training – 2 Days
 
Figure 5.4:The Client-tracking Implementation Plan 
 
It can be seen that Sales and Marketing were pushed to the front of the 
implementation as this was proposed as having the ‘best fit’ with the packaged 
software on offer.  Interestingly, out of the costs for each phase, this was the most 
expensive, taking up nearly 60 per cent of the budget, the remaining phases 
accounting for 8, 12 and 20 percent respectively.  Furthermore, the managing 
director quickly took credit and deemed it “an implementation strategy that allowed 
for risk management.”  The IT manager affirmed this in an executive summary later: 
“An intelligent decision was made in how the project was approached 
in an incremental manner dealing with individual functions and 
gathering expertise and skills along the journey and then applying that 
knowledge at the next stage.”  (Client-tracking Meeting Executive 
Summary - doc 46) 
The process of implementation was set to begin 27 May 2002.  From this point and 
up to the 26 June (when phase 1 as described above would begin), the company took 
time to plan.  Key to this was the involvement of users, the IT Manager reported 
“Organisational change will be managed as a high priority and emphasis will be 
placed upon bringing the users fully into the project” (Client-tracking Meeting 
Executive Summary - doc 46). 
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It was communicated to certain users that they would be involved in the workflow 
days and that this needed to be prepared for.  It was decided by the Managing 
Director that ‘key people’ from each of the business functions would assist by 
offering requirements and outlining procedures.  The aim was to produce a portfolio 
for each of the four phases to include current processes, wish lists, templates and 
reports.  The IT Manager told those involved that they had already received 
substantial advice from the vendor consultant and account managers.  They were 
described as very approachable and she said they had offered excellent guidance so 
far.  The planning process was ongoing when the first workflow day took place, 
more users got involved, and the project stalled. 
 
5.5.8 The Workflow Day 
The first workflow day was held, as planned, on 26 June.  Each member of the 
project steering committee (the ‘key people’) was charged with voicing the opinions 
and requirements of their respective teams.  The steering committee had rapidly 
evolved from the initial project team in the light of the re-scoping of the project.  The 
Sales Manager, Marketing Manager and Human Resources Manager and Finance 
Officer were now included.  The steering committee agreed that all T.Co personnel 
needed to have the opportunity to be included in the project to ensure minimum 
resistance to change27.  The day was organised to begin with an initial full committee 
meeting and then sub meetings for the various phases which would include the 
various members of the steering committee as necessary.  The Consultant from 
Vendor E began the meeting with an introduction to his company and the package 
and outlining the purpose of the day as getting an overall specification for T.Co.  He 
                                                 
27 Note that I, and the other academic involved in the project did not agree with this rationale.  If users were to be included, we 
felt it should be so that they brought something to the process. 
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was quick to point out within the first 20 minutes that although the package was 
highly customisable “sometimes the organisation has to bend toward the product as 
well” and “ you may transfer work practices from other organisations”.  The meeting 
then moved on to looking at the product.  The Consultant said that it was the groups 
decision as to how they wanted to work with the product and pressed the point that if 
“you don’t say it, you don’t get it”. 
 
The Consultant asked for the committee’s requirements.  This led to around twenty 
minutes of various members of the steering committee articulating their requirements 
in a rather un-orderly fashion.  I intervened at this stage and suggested it might be a 
good idea to start at the beginning of the process.  This meant starting with the 
generation of sales.  The discussion then proceeded with various staff illustrating the 
journey.  The Consultant would then configure the package in front of the staff (a 
projector had been linked to his laptop).  As this progressed, T.Co staff refined and 
generated further requirements as they began to see what the application was capable 
of.  Where requirements could not be solved by configuration, the Consultant made 
notes to investigate this further.  It was very clear that the Consultant had not 
familiarised himself with the documentation sent to his company, as part of the 
tendering process as he had no concept of the basic workings of T.Co in terms of 
processes or terminology.  For example, the nature of the business, the role of 
consultants, the nature of sponsors and of clients had to be explained to him by 
various members of the committee which frustrated them.  At a coffee break, I asked 
the Research Manager, Sales Manager and Human Resources Manager how they 
thought things were going.  As the quotes below demonstrate, they were worried 
about he capabilities of the Consultant and the package. 
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“He hasn’t read the documentation [T.Co’s requirements 
specification], he could have least have done that.” (Research 
Manager) 
 
“I hope this is going to get better, it’s a bit of a waste of time at the 
moment.  Is Goldmine going to do what we want?” (Sales Manager) 
 
“I’ve only just joined the company and I know more than he does, 
he’s just not prepared.” (Human Resources Manager) 
 
Table 5.5 details some of the ‘highlights’ from the meeting. 
Table 5.5: Highlights from Workflow Day 1. 
The Sales Manager wanted to be able to convert a client into a sponsor – it was discovered that 
Goldmine could not do this.  A new record had to be created and this meant that the history 
regarding the sponsor (as a client) would be lost.  She did ask if Goldmine would ever be able to 
do this and the consultant said, yes, if enough customers asked for it. 
 
The Research Manager virtually swooned when she was offered the pipeline functionality in 
Goldmine for client-tracking purposes.  However, it was not possible to construct individual 
pipelines that reflected an individual clients progress.  Nor was it possible to create various 
standard pipelines which reflected various T.Co products and the points at which clients would 
normally be expected to have done things by as shown earlier in  
 
Every member of the team got involved in some form of selling of the package in terms of trying 
to make it more appealing to T.Co.  In effect, we helped the Consultant sell his product to us.  For 
example, there were many occasions where staff agreed to change ways that they worked because 
the system could not facilitate the processes as they stood at T.Co at present.   
 
The Sales Manager wanted reminders to be set automatically for follow up actions.  That is for 
example, if a brochure was sent to a potential sponsor – a reminder would be set to follow up with 
a telephone call 7 days later.  The Consultants initial position was that this was not possible, but I 
knew from a previous implementation that I had been involved with that it was.  I asked the 
Consultant about this and he said it would take more time to configure the software – but agreed 
to do it. 
 
The Consultant interpreted the staff being very specific about their requirements as ‘naval 
gazing’, stating that they were getting ‘into the detail’.  He also took a ‘U’ turn in that he said the 
purpose of the day was to focus upon Sales, not other areas of T.Co. 
 
 
By the end of the day, staff still felt very uneasy about the selection of Goldmine and 
these concerns were reported to the Managing Director.  An email exchange also 
took place a few days after.  The Managing Director had contacted Vendor E to 
express his concerns and had been advised to wait for the workflow document to be 
delivered.  The Managing Director had also asked the IT Manager to write to the 
 172
Consultant at Vendor E outlining the issues.  Before the letter was sent it was passed 
by the Managing Director who watered it down and sent it as an email himself.  The 
email stated that he was disappointed as he thought that he had determined that 
Goldmine was the right product.  Furthermore, he had assumed the workflow day 
would be about aligning T.Co processes with those embedded within Goldmine, 
rather than working out if Goldmine was the right product; and that he would wait 
for the documentation to be delivered before deciding whether to proceed.  He then 
sent a further email to the members of the steering committee.  In this email, the 
Managing Director made several points: 
 
- He felt the problems had been caused by the attitude of the consultant. 
- He was convinced that Sage and Goldmine would work together. 
- Data cleansing was a necessity 
- The consultant was the only project manager Vendor E had so they would have 
to work with him 
- He suspected that the salesperson that came before had raised ‘our’ expectations; 
possibly, to unreasonable levels and that the Consultant had possibly moved too 
far the other way. 
 
I responded in broad agreement with the Managing Director although I added four 
points: 
 
 
- Data cleansing was not just about inaccurate data entry; it was mostly because 
they had eight pools of overlapping data. 
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- The Consultant did not get up to speed with how T.Co does business so he could 
not show the benefits of Goldmine in T.Co terms. 
- Because of this, his focus upon getting T.Co to bend to match the software 
aggravated the situation as staff felt they had to change to something that was 
inferior.  I pointed out that the staff had been very positive about learning new 
ways and working with the package to start with. 
- In order to find out about the package, the team had found it necessary to report 
their requirements but the Consultant had interpreted this as getting into too 
much detail.  I stated that this was very important to ensure that T.Co got the 
most from the finite functionality available.  I also pointed out that, when 
pushed, the Consultant revealed functionality that he said was not available and 
suggested that Vendor E may want to implement the most basic model of the 
package with minimal configuration. 
 
The IT Manager also responded to the email reinforcing the need for the data clean 
up and the ability of T.Co to develop a good working relationship with the 
Consultant and Vendor E.  This exchange was followed by a meeting of the project 
steering committee, with the Managing Director, on the 5th of July.   The purpose 
was to determine the best way forward.  The main thrust of this meeting was the 
Managing Director got people to confirm that Goldmine could ‘broadly’ do what 
T.Co required.  For example, at one point the Managing Director said “…we know 
there are problems with Goldmine, but can it do most of what we want – yes or no?” 
 
The Managing Director really wanted a yes or no answer.  The majority of the 
committee therefore acquiesced.  On this basis, the decision to proceed with 
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Goldmine was made.  However, this was not communicated to Vendor E, the 
Managing Director wanted to be completely sure Goldmine was the right product 
and wished to wait for the workflow document to arrive. 
 
5.5.9 Phase 2 of Implementation Planning 
 It had become clear in Phase 1 of the implementation planning process that the 
company needed to plan for a data cleansing exercise and the implementation of data 
entry standards.  The need for clean data and the maintenance of clean data 
throughout T.Co was argued to be due to the implementation of Goldmine.  One 
document28 states “in preparation for the Goldmine project, our existing data will 
have to be cleansed and constraints put in place to prevent data becoming ‘dirty’ 
again”. 
 
It was argued that the new system would create a single store of data with all 
departments sharing this, meaning that everyone needed to keep to the same “rules”.  
The document itself was aimed at identifying and eliminating areas of ambiguity in 
T.Co data entry.  However, the team did offer the document up for consultation.  A 
selection of the proposed data entry standards is shown below (underlined words 
show the research departments preferences): 
 
- LTD, Ltd Limited 
- PLC, plc. Plc (this is still an area of uncertainty) 
- Road or Rd, Street or St, Avenue or Ave. 
- Mgr, Manager 
 
                                                 
28 Goldmine Data Quality - document 48.  Authorship: IT Manager, Research Manager, Graduate Trainee and Sale Manager.  
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A particularly interesting one was the use of salutations “Dear Sirs or Dear Sir – 
there are many women in senior roles, especially HR, will this greeting insult/annoy 
them?”  The consultation document ended with the following: 
“The database is going to be used by YOU, therefore your comments 
and opinions are extremely important.  Please reply via email to (C) 
& (M) by Wednesday 17 July and we will draw up a formal data 
entry procedures document by Friday 26 July.  This document will 
then be the official record of T.Co’s data entry standards and will be 
strictly enforced by the ‘data stewards’.  Clean data are exceptionally 
important and we appreciate your co-operation.” (doc 48) 
However, data cleansing had not been factored into the timings of the plan by the 
vendors, yet it had to be carefully planned, as it had to happen quickly.  The data 
cleansing activities would result in a total system shut down for Sales and 
Marketing.  Therefore, I agreed with the IT Manager that data cleansing would 
happen from a Friday to a Monday with staff working over the weekend.  Moreover, 
user testing had not been included in the plan as the assumption had been made that 
the data would transfer neatly in a day.  Therefore, plans for user testing also had to 
be incorporated into the plan.  In addition, I suggested that testing could not happen 
until training had been provided and therefore further changes had to be made to the 
schedule.  It was however decided that training would not happen before testing.  I 
also suggested that the ‘go live’ date might be a useful one to highlight.  A 
comparison of the vendor and T.Co implementation plans are shown in Table 5.6. 
 
 
 176
Table 5.6: A Comparison of Vendor E and T.Co’s Implementation Plans 
Vendor Plan T.Co Plan 
Sales and Marketing (a) Sales and Marketing (a) 
Sept 
30 
 
 
Oct 
21 
23 
24 
28 
29 
31 
 
 
 
Nov 
4 
7 
 
Workflow Document to T.Co 
 
 
 
T.Co Agrees Workflow  
Configuration of Goldmine 
Installation of Goldmine 
Data Import 
End User Training 
Advanced Training 
 
 
 
Admin 1 Training 
Admin 2 Training 
 
Sept 
30 
 
 
Oct 
21 
23 
24 
25 
28 
29 
30 
31 
 
Nov 
4 
7 
13 
14 
 
Workflow Document to T.Co 
 
 
 
T.Co Agrees Workflow  
Configuration of Goldmine 
Installation of Goldmine 
Data Cleansing 
Data Import 
End User Training 
‘Go Live’ 
Advanced Training 
 
Admin 1 Training 
Admin 2 Training 
Crystal Reports Training 
Crystal Reports Training 
 
Sales and Marketing (b) Sales and Marketing (b) 
Nov 
25 
26 
 
Dec 
2 
3 
4 
 
 
Installation of Goldmine (Laptops) 
Installation of Goldmine (Reading) 
 
 
End User Training 
End User Training 
End User Training 
 
Nov 
25 
26 
 
Dec 
2 
3 
4 
 
 
Installation of Goldmine (Laptops) 
Installation of Goldmine (Reading) 
 
 
End User Training 
End User Training 
End User Training 
 
Research 
Dec  
5 
9 
10 
 
 
Configuration of Goldmine 
End User Training 
Advanced Training 
Client-tracking 
Dec 
11 
12 
16 
 
 
Development of Crystal Reports 
Development of Crystal Reports 
End User Training 
Finance 
After Christmas 
 
 
 
Research and Client-tracking had yet to be 
reviewed. 
 
 
5.5.10 Signing Off the Workflow Document 
The first workflow document arrived mid July and it did not meet with the 
expectations of the members of the steering committee despite the workflow day.  
The Research Manager said “it does not provide us with enough detail about the 
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proposed system for us to sign this off”.  The IT Manager was similarly unconvinced 
stating that “it’s not clear what we are buying at this stage, it’s going to need more 
work”, and when I asked the Sales Manager what she thought, she said “I have been 
busy, and there’s a lot to get through, it looks okay but how can we be sure?” 
 
Further meetings were then held within T.Co (but not involving the vendor), to 
‘double confirm’ that Goldmine was the right product.  Another meeting was then 
held mid August with the Sales Person, Account Manager, Managing Director and 
Consultant of Vendor E, to determine if T.Co could work with them and how 
Goldmine could be made to work for the company.  The IT Manager informed me 
that  it was agreed at this meeting that T.Co and Vendor E could work together.  She 
said the Managing Director had pulled off his favourite ‘one-time party trick’, which 
he did with all vendors, whereby he threatened to withdraw from the deal if he didn’t 
get what he wanted.  In this case, a commitment from Vendor E to deliver the system 
they had promised in the sales pitch. 
 
Regarding functionality, the IT Manager and the Graduate Trainee had been charged 
with the responsibility of working through T.Co requirements with the Consultant 
the morning before the afternoon meeting.  However, when the meeting was held, 
the Managing Director stated he had different, simpler requirements and outlined 
these.  Essentially, he did not want the system to have ‘triggers’ which prompted or 
launched activities.  Instead, he wanted the package to be able to generate exception 
reports that would highlight those areas where deadlines had not been met.  For 
example, staff would not be prompted to chase a missing CV ‘by’ the package – 
instead an exception report would be printed out and given to the consultant to 
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highlight which clients they were working with that had CVs outstanding.  In the 
first workflow day and the workflow document, the original ‘trigger’ based 
requirements had been ‘bent’ around a piece of sales functionality for pipeline 
management.  The Managing Director’s interventions freed up this piece of 
functionality for sales.  This change was reflected in a second workflow document 
that arrived at T.Co at the end of September.  The agreement of the workflow 
document was re-scheduled for 21 October 2002 but a further internal meeting was 
arranged for 27 September 2002 in order to ensure that T.Co requirements were 
incorporated into a further revised workflow document, as this was still not meeting 
the requirements of the steering committee.   
 
By 8 October the purchase of the package had been postponed to the beginning of 
December and by November, this had moved to February 2003.  Late in November, I 
interviewed the IT Manager about the progress of the requirements gathering process 
and the workflow document.  She said that it had not been agreed and it was 
becoming difficult to keep staff involved because of the postponements and false 
starts.  However, the Research Manager was keen to get the package implemented 
and she still felt that the new workflow document needed further attention.  
Specifically, she wanted to see screenshots of the package and more detail about 
functionality.  The IT Manager said “This isn’t over, I expect the workflow 
document to be double the size it is now – just you see.” 
 
5.6 Summary Review 
This case describes the contexts of three projects that offer insights into a variety of  
issues associated with packaged software but especially those associated with 
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selection activities.  By necessity, I have had to tell the three stories within 
themselves in order to keep things clear.  However, in summary it is useful to bring 
together the highlights from the three stories and illustrate the overlaps amongst 
them (Figure 5.5).  The next chapter presents the analysis and findings from the data. 
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Figure 5.5: Summary Timeline of Events at T.Co. 
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6 An Analysis of Packaged 
Software Selection Processes 
at T.Co 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of the findings of the field study.  The aim of the 
analysis is twofold.  First, it demonstrates the problems associated with rationalistic 
theories of the packaged software selection process.  Second, by doing this, it is 
possible to gain insights that offer a useful basis for developing an alternative theory 
of packaged software selection.  In order to do this, the conceptual framework 
presented at the end of chapter 3 is used to structure the analysis - see the copy in  
Figure 6.1. 
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the reasons why the various packages were 
chosen by those at T.Co.  The various processes of selection that were enacted are 
then considered, using the ideal model of selection as a guide.  This involves 
examining the user requirements gathering processes, the processes of package 
evaluation and the final selection decisions.  The implementation and post 
implementation issues arising from the cases in relation to the respective selection 
 182
processes are then discussed.  Those issues associated with the market environment 
are raised as necessary throughout. 
 
It is important to note at this point that the analysis presented here is not meant to be 
an exhaustive interpretation of the complexities of packaged software selection; 
other studies would no doubt reveal different things.  However, the data are 
sufficient to demonstrate the problems of rationalistic theories of selection reported 
in the literature and provide a basis for the development of an alternative theory.   
Reasons 
for 
Packaged 
Software 
Selection
Implementation 
and Usage
The Organisational Environment
The Market Environment
Competition - Product Development - Actors - Globalisation
Leads
to
Leads
toRequirements 
Gathering Evaluation
Final selection of 
on the basis of the 
evaluation process
An Idealised Model of Packaged Software Selection
Leads
to
Leads
to
Figure 6.1: The Conceptual Framework 
 
 
6.2 Reasons for Packaged Software Selection 
In this section, I draw from the cases the reasons why packages were chosen over 
custom development.  These reasons relate to the: 
 
- desire to standardise and attain ‘best practices’; 
- need to ‘deal with’ legacy information systems problems  
- need to ‘deal with’ an applications backlog; 
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- role of selling; 
- cost;  
- wish to ‘buy into’ a tried and tested solution with accompanying readily available 
knowledge and skills base; 
- possibility of outsourcing maintenance and development; 
- implementation of organisational change; 
- role of bravado.  
 
The forthcoming analysis demonstrates the complexity of decision making in 
relation to packaged software adoption, particularly with regard to how reasons can 
be variously interpreted as ‘irrational’ and ‘rational’ because of the diversity of 
perspectives involved.  It also infers that reasons for adoption might emerge and 
change before, during and after the selection process is enacted. 
 
6.2.1 Standardisation and Best Practices 
T.Co clearly had ambitions of standardisation in relation to the various packages 
they implemented.  This standardisation fell into two categories, buying into a 
standard that allowed them to more readily work with others and buying into 
standard ways of working. 
 
The first form of standardisation, to facilitate working with others, is emphasised 
early in the migration project.  The problems encountered with running the Mac 
version of Office and Email are clear.  Staff could not readily work using electronic 
means with sponsors, clients and each other.  For example, access to email was 
limited to only a few members of staff.  More importantly, electronic documents 
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often became corrupted as they were transferred between the Apple Mac and 
Microsoft environments even though this was usually between the same package.  
For example, a CV created in Word for Apple Mac being sent to, or received from, 
someone who used Word for Windows.  Personnel at T.Co made it very clear that 
they needed to adopt the industry standard packages but, critically, they had to use 
them on the industry standard platform (Windows).  The Managing Director had 
previously been unsure of moving to the Windows platform, but his reasoning 
changed when an external IT Director, who he saw as an ‘expert’, told him it was a 
“no brainer”.  Essentially, the perception of the IT Director was that there was no 
alternative and this was then shared by the Managing Director. 
 
Various T.Co personnel also wanted to adhere to what they saw as standard ways of 
working.  Again, in the migration project, the move to the Windows version of the 
Sage application allowed them to have one invoicing system where previously they 
had used three.  The Managing Director was quoted as saying “ it’s ridiculous, we 
must be the only company in the UK with three invoicing systems, Sage gives us the 
opportunity for one – the industry standard”.  Broadly speaking, the Managing 
Director saw Sage as the most efficient choice to make.   
 
More dramatically however, the exploitation of standard ways of working became a 
significant aspect of the client-tracking project.  At the workflow day for example, 
the Human Resources Manager made the point that T.Co did not want to ‘reinvent 
the wheel’ and suggested that there must be generic codes for sales and marketing 
purposes the other people had used.  She really did want to see other organisations’ 
configured packages and use them where appropriate.  Again, as with the Sage 
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application, it can be seen that there was a desire to make a decision base upon the 
criterion of efficiency.   
 
Personnel at T.Co aimed to implement packaged software in order to improve 
communication throughout the organisation in a similar fashion to those cases 
reported in the literature (Holland and Light, 1999a; Ross, 1999).  The T.Co case 
also adds further detail to this idea in that a reason for the purchase of packaged 
software was to improve communication capabilities with those external to the 
formal organisational boundary, particularly clients and sponsors.  Indeed this was a 
major reason for the migration project involving the move to the standards of the 
Windows environment and mainstream applications such as Microsoft Office.  
Therefore, not only were the decisions made on the grounds of efficiency, the 
decisions were supposed to have positive implications for the effectiveness of T.Co. 
 
Moreover, the Managing Director and one of the Non-Executive Directors took this 
further, believing that the client-tracking system would allow them to exploit state of 
the art technologies and benefit from industry-wide standards of efficiency if they 
bent a little towards the package.  The last comment indicates a desire for more than 
standards for communications purposes – T.Co were interested in standards that 
were perceived as ‘best in class’.  Yet, they felt that it was their processes that were 
the best in the sector, as they were more personalised.  Therefore, although they 
might have been perceived as more efficient, T.Co has decided not to use some of 
the functionality of the Goldmine package as it would have, as the Managing 
Director put it, “watered down the client experience”.  Further probing revealed that 
really the ‘best in class’ to which they aspired, was in relation to common data 
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standards, and non-value adding administrative processes where they felt they were 
inefficient due to the way they had evolved their Filemaker Pro applications - the 
TMP associated processes, for example. 
 
The case of client-tracking adds insights into the argument that best practices may be 
inscribed into packaged software (PriceWaterhouse, 1996; KPMG, 1998).  For 
personnel at T.Co the so-called best practices embedded in the package they wanted 
to attain related to non-value adding processes.  Indeed, the package had the 
potential to erode their differentiation strategy of personal service, but they were 
very keen to ensure that any automation that did occur had no impact upon this even 
though it may have been viewed by other organisations as best practice.  This adds to 
the way in which the idea of best practices is treated in the literature as it highlights 
that this is subject to interpretation.  Therefore, because the benefits of best practices 
may be context specific, any so-called best practices embedded in packaged software 
would need to be evaluated rather than unconditionally accepted as universally 
advantageous as was done in for the music industry at ‘Global Entertainment’ (Light 
et al., 2000). 
 
In summary, T.Co’s experiences in respect of standardisation suggest that the utility 
of ‘best practices’ is subject to interpretation.  Even where the standard nature of 
packaged software is purported to have benefits (such as increased efficiency), this 
may not necessarily be desired by organisations who may perceive their practices 
more favourably.  Moreover, it becomes clearer that prior to the enactment of the 
selection process, vendor sales pitches which espouse the benefits of ‘best practices’ 
and standardisation, and such recommendations as those via colleagues or business 
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communities, may seem to offer a rational basis for proceeding with packaged 
software selection.  However, it might not be until the process is enacted that the 
those in the consumer organisation realise that it would be inappropriate (and 
potentially hitherto perceived as irrational) for them to totally adhere to the standards 
and ‘best practices’ embodied in the software. 
 
6.2.2 The T.Co Legacy Information Systems 
T.Co had typical legacy information systems problems.  The applications in place 
had evolved incrementally and in an unmanaged fashion.  The applications had also 
been created by staff who had received no formal training in systems analysis, design 
and development.  The result was a set of flat file databases that supported 
fragmented applications which duplicated data.  Additionally, due to the nature of 
the applications and a lack of discipline in relation to data entry, much of the data the 
applications contained, and worked from, was inaccurate and formatted in a variety 
of different ways.  Internally, the applications inhibited working across departments.  
Externally, this situation was amplified due to interoperability problems arising from 
the Apple Mac infrastructure.  One aspect of the rationale for all of the packaged 
software purchase decisions relates back to these problems.   
 
The Windows environment (a packaged operating system), the Microsoft Office and 
the Outlook applications were implemented to help overcome interoperability 
problems internally and externally.  Despite these problems, there were, and still is in 
some areas, a great deal of attachment to the Apple Mac environment and the 
associated applications.  For instance, when problems arose throughout the migration 
project and in the subsequent bedding in period, staff were quick to blame the 
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Windows environment and hark back to the halcyon days of the Apple Macs.  
Interestingly, many staff held the (obviously problematic), existing situation to be 
something to which the new windows environment and packages had to aspire.  The 
IT Manager summed it up very well when she said that people were viewing the 
Apple Macs with ‘rose tinted spectacles’. 
 
T.Co’s experiences suggest that the reasons for packaged software selection may not 
be universally agreed upon.  For example, some would have preferred to stay with 
the Apple Mac environment.  Additionally, it is shown that some arguments may be 
overruled essentially because they are seen as insignificant or irrational by others (in 
this case – senior management). 
 
6.2.3 The Applications Backlog at T.Co 
The capabilities to develop applications to support the expanding business and 
demanding functionality requirements were absent at T.Co. This can be seen as a 
form of applications backlog although those at T.Co might not have termed it as 
such.  Essentially, the backlog comprised the various requirements although it was 
not located in any one place as, at the beginning of the project, there was no formal 
information systems function.  Despite aspects of the literature relating to packaged 
software offering reasons for its uptake as resolving the applications backlog through 
reductions in development speed (Heikkila et al., 1991; PriceWaterhouse, 1996; 
Robson, 1997; Butler, 1999; Li, 1999), the T.Co case offers food for thought.   
 
Certainly, this argument is borne out with the implementation of the Windows 
operating system, Microsoft Office, Outlook and OneSource applications.  
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Obviously, it would have been foolish for T.Co to attempt to build these applications 
themselves and it would definitely have taken them longer to do this than purchase 
them.  Indeed, for OneSource it would have been nearly impossible as they were 
buying data as well as functionality.  However, the client-tracking project reveals a 
situation that is less than clear cut.  The idea of using a package for the client-
tracking project was seriously raised and pursued from June 2001.  However, it is 
important to note that a great deal of requirements gathering work had also been 
undertaken from as early as August 1999, although the company were not clear at 
this time about the buy – build decision.  At the time data collection stopped (Early 
December 2002), the ‘sign off’ of the vendor’s workflow document detailing the 
agreed configured package, selected in January 2002, had not happened and it does 
not look as though this will now happen until early in 2003.   The applications 
backlog remains. 
 
Clearly, some of the time taken to implement the client-tracking project may be 
attributable to the capabilities of the project team and other factors other than the 
package.  However, this is the problem of certain previous views of packaged 
software selection.  These views tend not to account for differences amongst 
implementation contexts and instead rely solely on the idea that because packaged 
software is built for mass markets, the economies of scale are bound to be achieved 
(Welke, 1981; Chau, 1994; Chau, 1995; KPMG, 1998).  Yet, unlike products such as 
motor cars or kettles – where it would be undoubtedly more expensive to build to 
order, software may require much more effort to implement once it has been built.  
Indeed, it is highly plausible to assert that, in many cases, the only economies of 
scale that would readily be achievable are those of the packaged software vendor. 
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Thus, it does not matter if T.Co are lacking capabilities or if the requirements 
process has taken so long because they have high levels of information systems 
maturity which compel the project team to undertake a thorough job.  The significant 
point is that, for whatever reason, the selection process is taking considerable time, 
even with requirements gathering work spanning well over two years.  It is 
impossible to ascertain whether T.Co could have commissioned a custom developed 
application in this time and at what cost.  Yet, the data presented here certainly raise 
questions about universally favourable implementation timescales for packaged 
software over custom development so frequently reported in the literature (cf. 
Heikkila et al., 1991; PriceWaterhouse, 1996; Li, 1999). 
 
6.2.4 Forms of Selling 
Two streams of selling activities are present in the T.Co case: the sale of the idea of a 
move from custom development to packages and that of choosing between various 
products and services.  The analysis demonstrates the influence of the market and the 
agendas of non-market participants upon the reasons for packaged software 
adoption. 
 
There was no sales activity in relation to migration, with regard to the move from 
custom to packaged software, due to the nature of the project.  However, selling 
activity was clear in the external consultant’s initial advice to the Managing Director 
about a suitable vendor, and then the various sales pitches that followed from others.  
In respect of OneSource, the ‘sale’ of the (partial) move from custom development to 
a particular product was enacted solely via the Research Manager.  In both of these 
projects – various acts of selling are present.  However, the role of acts of selling are 
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most strongly represented in the client-tracking project and thus, this shall now be 
focussed upon in greater detail.   
 
The more usual selling activities associated with packaged software were clearly 
evident.  Various channels were used by T.Co to identify potential ‘client-tracking’ 
products – this included the Internet and the trade press.  Significantly, the use of a 
charitable ‘dating agency’ by T.Co led to an onslaught of approaches by 
organisations attempting to sell their product.  These acts of selling clearly 
demonstrate how the process is far from one sided, and completely in the control of 
the consumer organisation, as the ideal model suggests.  Various vendors attempted 
to convince those involved in the selection of the packages at T.Co that their product 
was the one that should be chosen.  It was not simply a matter of personnel 
stipulating requirements and then choosing a product that most readily fitted with 
these.  Additionally, the case of client-tracking further illustrates how the process of 
selection may not conform with the ideal model.  Vendor D advised T.Co that their 
product would be too costly for them to implement.  Although Vendor D’s product 
would have met the requirements of T.Co, the vendor evaluated T.Co and halted any 
further discussion.  The ideal model of selection does not take account of this. 
 
Following the analysis of T.Co’s existing applications portfolio and needs, T.Co 
were advised by the Academic Team that it was in the company’s best interest to 
consider a packaged software strategy.  This was accepted by the Managing Director 
initially.  However, following problematic sales presentations for the client-tracking 
project, the Managing Director changed his mind believing that the potential of 
custom development had not been explored fully – a position which he maintains to 
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date.  It really was the selling activity of Vendor B who were demonstrating the 
Goldmine product that motivated this shift.  The vendor did not tailor the sales pitch 
to T.Co.  This demonstrates how, even initially, although the reasons for packaged 
software had led to the selection process being enacted, the process raised further 
reasons for non-adoption and  it was formally halted. 
 
However, the project team were still interested in pursuing the packaged software 
route when they were approached by Vendor E, who sold the same product as 
Vendor B.  This time, the project team vetted the first presentation without the 
Managing Director being present.  The project team used this to assist Vendor E in 
further tailoring their sales presentation in line with the requirements of T.Co.  This 
resulted in a highly personalised second sales pitch that captured the imagination of 
the Managing Director.  Concurrently, the project team had managed to engineer the 
sale of the implementation of packaged software over a custom development and a 
previously unpalatable packaged software product.  This was because they worked 
with the vendor to influence the decision making process of the Managing Director 
by ensuring that the sales pitch satisfied his problem.   At the same time, it also 
satisfied the other problems of the staff (such as the Research Manager’s workload) 
involved and Vendor E (who wanted to sell a product), which were not necessarily 
high on the agenda of the Managing Director.  Thus, although there may well be 
different agendas behind the reasons for packaged software adoption, they may not 
always be in conflict.  Moreover, this process demonstrates the role of the market in 
terms of the actor’s capabilities to convince those in a consumer organisation to 
adopt packaged software.  Vendor B and Vendor E offered the same product.  Even 
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though Vendor E’s offer ended up being marginally higher in cost than Vendor B’s, 
they were selected as they were perceived to be capable of doing a more skilful job.   
 
The highly personalised sales pitch did however, have repercussions.  Following the 
difficulties of the workflow day, the Managing Director speculated that the 
salesperson may have raised expectations to unreasonable levels.  Previous research 
suggests that sales presentations are only useful for showing ‘bells and whistles’ as 
the buying group may consist of representatives of many departments leaving the 
sales person with no option but to pitch it to the lowest common denominator (Gross 
and Ginzberg, 1984).  The ‘bells and whistles’ approach won the contract, but then 
led to difficulties as the consultant attempted to curtail expectations in the workflow 
day where further reasons against adoption emerged as a result. 
 
In summary, in addition to shedding light on the role of selling the idea of package 
adoption before selection is enacted, this discussion also demonstrates how this 
continues into the selection process.  Moreover, these selling acts might result in 
further reasons for adoption, but critically reasons against adoption too.  This further 
implies that just because the selection process begins, it does not mean that it will 
end with the implementation of a product. 
 
6.2.5 Cost 
Cost emerged as a consideration throughout the process, but not as might be 
expected.  Lower cost is generally reported as a key decision factor in packaged 
software selection over custom development (Chau, 1995; PriceWaterhouse, 1996).  
However, this study suggests that as a reason for package adoption (and maybe even 
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custom development), the importance of cost may sometimes be overstated.  The 
experiences of T.Co illustrate that although costs were a consideration it was not just 
a question of them being lower than custom development - they were sometimes 
accepted, rejected, increased and decreased.   
 
The first  instance of cost in the study relates to the migration project.  Initially, the 
project was refused as it had instantly run over the budget of £50,000, a figure that 
was transplanted from the client-tracking estimate.  More specifically, and once the 
initial overall costing ‘problem’ was dealt with by convincing the senior 
management team (in particular the Managing Director) of the case for investment, 
there were few queries about cost in relation to the Windows, Microsoft Office, 
Outlook and Sage packages.  Interestingly, the Managing Director advocated 
increased costs in relation to the retention of the Filemaker Pro database package 
environment.  It was suggested by the project team, that, as the Microsoft Office 
suite included the Access package, the Filemaker Pro applications could be moved to 
this (and improved in the process).  This would have negated the need to purchase 
many Filemaker Pro Windows licences to replace the Apple Mac licences.  It was 
however, decided by the Managing Director that to switch to Access was too risky 
and he preferred to increase expenditure instead.  Yet again, efficiency became 
subservient in the decision making process and the Managing Director’s view 
dominated. 
 
Cost was also not regarded as a very important issue in relation to the OneSource 
project, despite this being relatively significant in the other two projects.  This was 
probably the case as the costs were known up front.  These did not change, as they 
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did in the other projects, because the implementation of the package was very 
simple.  Moreover, the Research Manager had spent a good deal of time focussed 
upon priming the Managing Director and the rest of the Board for what was to come 
and convincing them of the multiple benefits of the purchase.  Clearly there are 
parallels here with much of the information systems literature that espouses the 
importance of top management support (Pinto and Slevin, 1987; Lockett et al., 1991; 
Bashein et al., 1994).  Moreover, the research function was seen as a critical 
function, which may explain the lack of resistance to the expenditure.  There was 
also no real perceived alternative as the TMP application was proving inadequate 
and other packages were instantly dismissed by the Research Manager based on her 
previous experience. 
 
With respect to the client-tracking project, cost was raised as an issue on multiple 
fronts.  An initial issue in relation to cost was which packages T.Co could afford to 
purchase.  A leading vendor in the marketplace instantly dismissed themselves from 
the T.Co search advising them that they could not afford such a package.  Even if 
T.Co could have afforded the package, there might still have been questions on the 
vendor side in respect of whether it would have been cost effective to get involved in 
an implementation at a small company as their ability to realise their economies of 
scale would have been less. 
 
As costs for the packages became clearer, the Managing Director felt that it would be 
cheaper to build a new system in the Filemaker Pro environment.  This was because 
the existing systems had cost very little to develop and maintain in the past.  Because 
of this, the Managing Director took a lot of convincing by the project team that 
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packaged software would be a better way forward.  Indeed, in the end, the cost factor 
did not change his mind, it was the ‘wow factor’ of the sales demonstration of 
Vendor E that did so.  Ironically, at this point, costs in relation to the project actually 
rose with the previously tight budget being doubled.  This is not dissimilar to the 
concept of ‘contagion’ whereby as those in organisations begin to realise the 
‘benefits’ of using IT, costs escalate dramatically in an uncontrolled fashion (Nolan, 
1973; Gibson and Nolan, 1974). 
 
The various packages discussed in the study demonstrate an important point.  
Although it has been suggested that the costs of package selection, implementation 
and usage can be predicted quite reliably (Golland, 1978; Heikkila et al., 1991), this 
study suggests the matter is more complex.  Certainly, the licence fees associated 
with the packages purchased were a relatively standard matter, as were baseline 
maintenance agreements.  However, this study also questions existing theories of 
packaged software which assert that they are universally easier to predict than 
custom development.  If this is the case, then why did the migration project and 
client-tracking projects both go over the original estimates?   
 
If the initial ‘transplant’ of the cost from the client-tracking project and to the 
migration project is put aside – there were still cost increases in relation to the 
package selection, implementation and usage processes.  Part of the answer is that 
the number of licences increased due to company expansion.  This also led to the 
need for a greater training budget.  Additionally, more training had to be provided to 
existing staff as the packages brought with them new ways of usage which led to 
difficulties such as the Email RTF problem.  With regard to the client-tracking 
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project, the original estimate of the project was shown to be sensible in the end.  
However, the Managing Director had previously slashed this budget with no good 
reason and then reinstated it after he saw the package in a different light with 
expanded coverage.  Like the cases of Threads (Holland and Light, 1999a) and Fox 
Meyer (Bicknell, 1998), the overall costs for the packages were far more 
unpredictable.  This is because the realities of organisational life (where decisions 
are made on a whim, inadequate information and where the situation may rapidly 
change) have to be taken into account. 
 
6.2.6 The Tried and Tested Solution with an Associated Knowledge and Skills 
Base 
Whilst the broad availability of a support network was important to T.Co, the 
robustness of the packages they considered was implicitly accepted.  Moreover, even 
where evaluations of others’ experiences with the packages were undertaken, this 
was mostly concerned with the nature of the support network. 
 
T.Co had already experienced difficulties in supporting their custom applications, 
precisely because they were custom applications.  Moreover, the development team 
came from in-house and were not information systems professionals.  Therefore, 
T.Co had a very restricted avenue of support which ended with their Apple Mac 
support team who were technically oriented.  If they had problems with the 
functionality of the software, there was nowhere to turn.  Consequently, there was 
great appeal in purchasing a product that other people were using and that they could 
view before they adopted it.  However, T.Co did not attempt to find out about the 
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quality of the production of the products themselves, as is suggested to be typically 
the case by (Sawyer, 2001).     
 
With regard to the packages implemented as a result of the migration,  the site visits 
were merely used to assess vendor capabilities.  The functionality of the packages 
was in no way in question.  The T.Co team ‘knew’ that Microsoft products were 
tried and tested solutions with a broad skills and knowledge base.  They knew, for 
example, that they could recruit new staff and they would generally be familiar with 
the Windows environment and Microsoft Office applications (in contrast to the 
coverage of the Apple Mac environment where they had often had to train new 
staff).   
 
In a similar vein, OneSource was viewed as a tried and tested solution because the 
Research Manager had used it in a previous role.  Moreover, the case was made that 
this was widely used in other settings, adding to the idea of tapping into a broader 
knowledge base.  However, the Research Manager’s assessment of OneSource as 
‘the’ product was never questioned. 
 
In relation to the client-tracking project, like many organisations, T.Co undertook 
reference site visits which they found very useful for finding out about vendors and 
also, to some extent, about the packages on offer. However, the project team did not 
find the visits as useful in terms of assessing functionality capabilities as they 
claimed they operated very differently to the reference sites that they visited.  In 
respect of the client-tracking project, the tried and tested solution idea for T.Co was 
very much about buying into a support network rather than viewing the package 
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selected as a solution that had worked elsewhere and would work for them.  As the 
project progressed, it also became apparent to certain senior managers that, by 
selecting the package they chose, it might be possible in the future to advertise jobs 
in Sales for example, which asked for familiarity with Goldmine.  
 
In summary, the experiences of T.Co suggest that the reason for buying a ‘tried and 
tested’ package might be concerned as much with buying into a support network and 
wider user base as it is with buying a well built product.  Indeed at T.Co, the 
reliability of the construction of the packaged software products they implemented 
was taken for granted.  Moreover, T.Co’s experiences have demonstrated that this 
reason for adoption may emerge after the decision to adopt has been made. 
 
6.2.7 Freeing up the Information Systems Related Staff 
The T.Co study begins with no information systems staff presence in the 
organisation.  Systems development at that time was user-led, with technical support 
provided externally.  Therefore, there was no information systems staff group to 
release for other work.  However, the Research Manager was engaged in any 
development work that was required and so she was the nearest equivalent.  As the 
TCS programme got underway, however, the Associate became the IT Manager and 
she was appointed an assistant.  As the project evolved, it became clear that packages 
would be a way of freeing up the Research Manager, IT Manager and the assistant.  
The key area this would help with was the reduction in problems arising from the 
Apple Mac infrastructure.  For the Research Manager, the OneSource application 
was also explicitly linked with the ability of the package to be used by others and a 
lack of the need for her to develop the package further, thereby freeing her to 
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undertake more value adding work.  It remains to be seen how the IT Manager’s role 
will be impacted post ‘go live’ of the client-tracking project. 
 
Consequently, it is not guaranteed that packaged software will ‘totally’ release 
information systems staff from development and maintenance activities.  Yet, also if 
custom development does occur alongside packages (or indeed on its own), then this 
may contracted out anyway as demonstrated at the home wares company described 
by Light (2001a) and the web development project outlined by Levina (2002).  Thus, 
if the need for custom development is recognised during or after the process of 
selection, questions are raised as to whether the reasoning behind the initial decision 
to implement packaged software might change. 
 
6.2.8 Implementing Change to Working Conditions 
A good deal of the literature on packaged software highlights that it may be used as 
an excuse to enact change because it embodies particular ways of work that the 
organisation should adopt in order to maintain the future support of the vendor 
(Champy, 1997; Glass, 1998; Soliman and Youssef, 1998).  Therefore, this may be a 
hidden reason underpinning other arguments for adoption.  At T.Co however, 
although there was an agenda of change, this was not initially linked with the 
adoption of packaged software.  It was only as the packaged software was selected, 
implemented and used that this became a reason for its adoption. 
 
The migration, OneSource and client-tracking projects brought with them explicit 
agendas for making the approach of staff at T.Co toward information systems more 
professional and streamlined.  This was manifest in the various data cleansing 
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exercises and the implementation of common data entry standards throughout the 
organisation.  Much of this activity was desired anyway, but it was later held as 
crucial due to the implementation of the packages.  T.Co also had a history of 
monitoring of various kinds.  This is evident in the Research Log application which 
was in existence solely to provide performance management information to the 
Operations Manager.  Indeed, knowing at what stage of the process clients were at 
was a key part of the everyday life at T.Co.  However, with the packages, T.Co’s 
senior management wanted to increase the capability for monitoring of various 
forms.   
 
As a result of the migration project, T.Co implemented a shared diary system using 
Outlook.  This instantly allowed anyone in the organisation to see what anyone else 
was, reportedly, doing.  Interestingly, the culture of the organisation was so used to 
monitoring, that staff expected this and accepted the application without any reported 
resistance (I was never able to find out if staff developed ‘work arounds’).  I did ask 
several members of staff how they felt about this and they were surprised that I 
would mind it myself.  This answered my question! 
 
In contrast, resistance was evident with the onset of the client-tracking project.  
Obviously, the name suggests that some form of monitoring was taking place.  The 
case highlights how the consultants had a different agenda to the senior management 
of T.Co.  In 1999, a senior consultant had reported that an application, such as the 
client-tracking package, would be very useful for monitoring client progress and also 
for helping them identify how much of their time they were spending with a client 
(and therefore how much money they were making or losing).  By January 2001, 
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when a consultants’ requirements meeting was held, the consultants’ wish list 
questioned why a computerised tracking system was needed, for whose benefit was 
the system, what was its primary aim and how much extra work would it cause them.  
The consultant spokesperson at the meeting was worried that it was them, as well as 
clients, that were going to be tracked.   This resulted in manoeuvring by the non-
executive director present to repackage the project as one that would allow the 
consultants to make sure T.Co were keeping their side of the bargain.  However, 
before the selection process, packaged software was never mentioned as a catalyst 
for change in respect of the desire to monitor.  Indeed, whether senior management 
intended or not, the client-tracking package will offer capabilities to monitor process 
that it supports and by default, those that perform those processes.  However, once 
selection had taken place, the IT Manager did begin to use the package to suit her 
own agenda.  She claimed: “in preparation for the Goldmine project, our existing 
data will have to be cleansed and constraints put in place to prevent data becoming 
‘dirty’ again”.  However, as the package is yet to be implemented, the extent of the 
changes to the working conditions, most interestingly in relation to the consultants, 
remain to be seen. 
 
6.2.9 Bravado 
There was definitely a good deal of bravado associated with the adoption of the 
packages in this study.  The whole ethos of the projects during the time that I had 
spent with the company was grounded in bullishness and the desire to impress, 
aspects brought out in the Fashions and Fads Literature – cf. (Abrahamson, 1991; 
Newell et al., 2001).  Although not particularly widely discussed in general in 
information systems, ideas related to this can be seen in the push of ideas such as 
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ERP and Knowledge Management (Galliers and Newell, 2001), BPR (Hammer and 
Champy, 1994) and in the light of recent events, such as the ‘Dot.Com Boom’ 
(Howcroft, 2001).  At any opportunity, T.Co senior management would highlight 
their use of new technologies (the packages) as ‘state of the art’ and ‘leading the 
way’, although they would always temper this as being nothing without the personal 
service they provided.  The company newsletter was the standard vehicle for this 
form of publicity.  The Research Manager was quoted as saying “OneSource offers a 
competitive advantage in terms of quality of research and level of service to our 
clients.  OneSource adds a professionalism and efficiency that should turn a Gold 
Service into a Platinum one.”  Also, on several occasions, the Managing Director, 
stated his personal objectives of the two year TCS as ‘First Class Systems and First 
Class People’.  The ‘label’ of the software was used to show off, impress and 
demonstrate legitimacy.  However, the Managing Director also wanted to ensure that 
the system was “nothing without our staff” and therefore it was later re-labelled, 
when incorporated with the new TMP application, as the T.Co Research Database. 
 
Much of this bravado was because T.Co wanted to capture a larger proportion of the 
market that was held by ‘the big boys’.  The assumption was that, with the new 
infrastructure in place, they would be able to ‘take them on’.  Moreover, because 
their clients mainly originated from ‘Blue Chip’ companies, they felt it necessary to 
prove themselves as a legitimate and suitable service provider.  The bravado 
associated with the reasons for adoption was further used by various T.Co staff well 
into selection, implementation and usage.  In addition to those examples above, 
bravado was present in determining which aspects of the functionality of a package 
T.Co would adopt, and which it would not, because their way was better.   
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The summary findings relating to the reasons for packaged software adoption, the 
purpose of this section, can be seen in Table 6.1 at the end of this chapter. 
 
6.3 Package Software Selection: The Definition of User 
Requirements 
The requirements gathering processes at T.Co have varied in length, depth and 
significance in relation to product identification, assessment, selection, 
implementation and usage.   
 
For the migration related packages, the requirements gathering processes were 
minimal.  In fact, as the process was viewed as a ‘straight swap’, the only implicit 
requirement was that they worked as least as well as the same packages had in the 
Apple Mac Environment.  Even then this was assumed because of the ‘reference’ 
provided by the external IT Director and their usage by other organisations.  The 
selection process was, in effect, not enacted. 
 
For OneSource, the requirements gathering process was informal.  A formal systems 
development methodology was not used in much the same way as is reported in 
some custom development projects (Fitzgerald et al., 2002).  The purchase decision 
was base solely on the requirements of the Research Manager despite the expansion 
of the roll out to other areas of the organisation.  It might be argued that the Research 
Manager was a very well informed user who knew T.Co business rules and 
requirements in great detail.  Even so, other users, who may have made useful 
contributions, were ignored.    However, even without the involvement of a number 
of users in the requirements gathering process, the application was initially received 
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very favourably.  The view of the application has, however, changed somewhat 
following usage and consequent changes in objectives as discussed in section 6.4.1.  
Despite studies such as those by (Flynn and Davarpanah Jazi, 1998; Peppard, 2001), 
that state user involvement in the requirements gathering process for packaged 
software is incredibly important, it is arguable that this is not necessarily a 
prerequisite for success (Wilson and Howcroft, 2002). 
 
In contrast to the migration and OneSource projects, the process of requirements 
gathering for the client-tracking project was intensive.  Between August 1999 and 
December 2002, no less than six attempts at requirements gathering can be traced at 
T.Co.  These involved many members of staff, although generally sourced from 
senior management.  One attempt at requirements gathering was even initiated by 
Vendor E despite them previously being sent relatively clear documentation.  In 
retrospect, it is possible to argue that the vendor wanted to use the package as the 
basis of the requirements gathering process in order to make their job easier and 
maintain the economies of scale on their part (cf. the appearance of ‘absent’ 
functionality when pressed by members of the project team at the workflow day). 
 
Yet, ultimately none of the requirements gathering processes mattered as the 
Managing Director used his own internalised requirements to evaluate the package in 
the end.  Furthermore, the extension of the coverage of the package at that time 
placed the requirements gathering process further into the hands of the Managing 
Director (and the vendor to some extent), especially as limited attention had been 
paid to obtaining the views of those in the area affected.  Moreover, the vendor 
arguably took advantage of this to reorganise the implementation to suit their own 
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agenda.  That is, to implement what they viewed as the most standard (and also the 
most financially rewarding) part of the project. 
 
The ideal model of packaged software selection suggests that requirements gathering 
and user involvement are crucial to success.  The data presented here however, 
highlight how requirements gathering may take on differing degrees of importance 
and also be enacted in more or less intensive ways.  The case data also suggest that 
contrary to expectations, limited emphasis upon requirements gathering may not 
necessarily lead to failure and vice-versa (a point made in respect of more traditional 
custom developments by Wilson and Howcroft (2002).  Finally, in a market oriented 
environment, it is clear that all requirements may not be perceived as equal, nor may 
they be understood up front.  As Quintas (1994) states, different types of users (such 
as customers, managers, operatives) will have different degrees of access to 
developers at different times – what he calls ‘forms of producer-user relations’.   
 
At T.Co, the requirements were finally very broadly defined by the Managing 
Director in respect of Goldmine and the migration packages.  When he was 
convinced that the packages could do what he thought they should do, progress was 
made.  In a similar fashion, OneSource requirements were determined by the 
Research Manager, but the Managing Director had the final say.  In each of these 
scenarios, other users, who were in some cases closer to knowing what their 
particular requirements may have been, were either not included in the selection 
process (OneSource and the migration packages) or were included only after the 
product had been selected (Goldmine).  The effects of not involving other users 
earlier in the process of the Goldmine selection has further elongated the process of 
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requirements gathering beyond the selection of the product.  Adding to Montazemi et 
al's (1996) study which suggests that information systems staff may lack 
organisational knowledge, it is possible to argue that various senior managers or end 
users may not have this knowledge either.  
 
This may be a futile argument in any case.  In respect of OneSource and the 
migration packages, it is interesting to see that a lack of user involvement has not led 
to total failure.  It may therefore be that case that sometimes it does not matter 
whether users are involved and that in these cases it would be ethical for those in the 
position of determining this to explain this to users (which of course assumes they 
were interested in getting involved in the first place). 
 
The summary findings of this section can be seen in Table 6.2 at the end of this 
chapter. 
 
6.4 Packaged Software Selection: Evaluation 
Various approaches to package evaluation are apparent in the T.Co cases.  In respect 
of the migration project packages, these were instantly accepted as the commercial 
standard or the equivalent of what T.Co had.  Therefore, there was no assessment of 
these applications and selection was automatic.  There was minor wavering over 
whether Filemaker Pro would be replaced by Access but this was rapidly dismissed.  
The Managing Director felt that this would present too greater risk technologically 
and organisationally even though the financial cost of keeping Filemaker Pro was 
greater than that of moving to Access.  In sum, evaluations were not performed to 
any great extent as there was no perceived alternative. 
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Similarly, OneSource was identified as the ‘best’ solution in a relatively simple 
fashion.  The Research Manager had worked with it before, was viewed as the expert 
in the area and had the opportunity to sell the idea to the Managing Director.  In this 
case it was also possible to trial the product as suggested by Kunda and Brooks 
(2000).  This however, was a façade of an evaluation as it was not about determining 
if the package was the one to choose.  It was about doing what was necessary in 
order to obtain the approval of the board.  In this case it translated into using the 
software so the Research Manager could say, yes it does the job.  Moreover, the 
Research Manager used this time to build a stronger business case for adoption by 
suggesting to the Board that the sales department could also benefit from its 
purchase. 
 
The process in relation to client-tracking was much more complicated.  
Experimentation for example, was not a viable option.  This was because the 
package would need to be implemented, widely diffused and widely infused in T.Co 
in order for any experimentation to take place.  A variety of channels were used to 
identify suitable products though.  As with OneSource, a member of staff, the 
Marketing Manager, had used a similar application in a previous role and 
interestingly the same application was chosen although it was never clear whether 
this was significant factor in its selection.  The assessment process was fairly 
traditional in that a requirements document was created and sent out to selected 
companies for tender.  Additionally, reference site and vendor premises visits were 
undertaken.  The visits to vendor premises were used, in conjunction with mediocre 
sales presentations, to rule out products.   
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Initially, no explicit criteria were used to assess each vendor or the products they 
were selling.  Instead, the requirements of each member of T.Co staff on the project 
team were interpreted as variously fulfilled on a presentation-by-presentation basis.  
It was only after three failed presentations that coaching was performed with a third 
vendor to link the package on offer with T.Co requirements.  At the second 
presentation by this vendor, the Managing Director then made explicit his criteria by 
listing a range of business functions on a whiteboard and ticking these off as he 
asked the vendor if they could be met.  At this stage, the explicit selection criteria 
were associated with functionality.  However, the case also demonstrates softer 
criteria in terms of the mutual respect of the Managing Directors’ of T.Co and 
Vendor E.  The combination of a clear, personalised sales presentation and the 
development of a relationship with the client won Vendor E the contract for a 
product that had previously been dismissed. 
 
In contrast to the ideal model, T.Co’s experiences suggest that evaluation may not 
take place, and even when it does, criteria may be highly personal and politically 
loaded.  To further explore these ideas, this section will now refer to the two most 
widely used evaluation criteria in packaged software selection – the functionality of 
the package and the vendors of the package. 
 
6.4.1 Functionality Considerations 
The functionality of packaged software is widely accepted to be a significant factor 
in the evaluation of packaged software (Lucas et al., 1988; Chau, 1994; Deloitte and 
Touche, 1996).  However, much of the literature presents studies that suggest that 
people in organisations know what they want, or do not want, in order that they can 
 210
make the decision about whether packaged software, or a particular product, can 
satisfy their needs (Welke, 1981; Martin and McClure, 1983; Sharland, 1991; Nelson 
et al., 1996).  In some ways at T.Co this was the case, and in others it was not, as is 
now demonstrated. 
 
At the beginning of the project, the personnel of T.Co had varying levels of 
knowledge of what they wanted from the packages they were to implement.  In 
respect of the Windows, Microsoft Office, Outlook and Sage applications, these 
were thought to be relatively clear as they had similar applications in their Apple 
Mac environment.  Consequently no evaluation of functionality was performed. 
 
In respect of OneSource, the requirements were also relatively simple and were 
easily satisfied initially.  The Research Manager perceived that alternative packages 
were not available and that OneSource was the product of choice.  Even in relation to 
the existing TMP application, there was no real decision to be made.   The Research 
Manager knew what information was required by clients for conducting their job 
searches as this was very well established within T.Co.  She also knew what 
OneSource was capable of due to her previous experience with the package.  The 
OneSource experience highlights how, even where there is the potential for a 
decision to be made it may not happen if it is not perceived as such.  Also, it is 
shown again that no evaluation of a product may occur at the time it is being 
selected. 
 
The client-tracking project was another matter however.  It was initially intended 
that Goldmine would be rolled out in the research department but this changed at the 
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successful sales presentation when the Managing Director ‘saw’ the capabilities of 
the package.  The scope and budget of the project were instantly increased as the 
objectives for the package became more demanding.  With respect to requirements, 
many members of T.Co staff were involved in various requirements gathering 
exercises in the run-up to the investment decision, and beyond.  These began in 
1999, and due to the effort put into these activities, it would have been expected that 
the requirements would have been fairly well defined.  Indeed, the requirements 
documentation was very comprehensive.  However, on many occasions the people 
involved were heavily influenced by existing ways of work, despite what they said 
about wanting to adopt best practices.  The members of T.Co had been inculcated 
with the ways of work that were embedded in the Filemaker Pro applications.  
Unfortunately, the technical capabilities of this development environment (it was 
incapable of being used to develop relational databases, for example) and the lack of 
formal system development expertise, had led to very inefficient ways of work.  The 
members of T.Co did not realise this, as it was all that they had ever known, but they 
knew that they were very busy and something needed to change.  However, what 
they did not know, for example, was that mail merges could be done automatically, 
without selecting each individual record in a database manually, and that it was the 
data that were exported to a word document, rather than the word document being 
exported into the Filemaker Pro application.  At meetings a frequent comment was 
that ‘Filemaker Pro will not let us work like that’.  As Gremillion (1982) points out, 
a package may not approach work in the same way a user would.   
 
It really was not until various members of staff began to see demonstrations of 
various packaged software applications that they realised what was possible.  This 
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was especially true for the Managing Director who, up to the personalised sales 
presentation, was more interested in going down the customised route.  The problem 
then shifted the other way and the IT Manager was engaged in a process of 
managing expectations as the various groups increased their objectives for the 
package.  The IT Manager was very successful in this.  However, the picture 
changed again at the workflow day.  The consultant attempted to further pare down 
expectations without finding out what the current expectations were and with little 
appreciation of the needs of T.Co.  His attempts at driving through a standard 
blueprint of the package failed as those in the meeting withdrew from the process 
and viewed the package as incapable of supporting their needs.  In the end, the 
Managing Director repackaged the project using his interpretation of the 
requirements.  However, within these parameters, the Research Manager in 
particular is still pursuing the issue of functionality through the second workflow 
document and it is expected by the IT Manager that this will be further shaped by 
other staff members in the future before it is eventually signed off. 
 
These experiences further suggest that evaluation of functionality was only 
undertaken where it was perceived by someone to be necessary. 
 
6.4.2 Issues Related to Vendors 
T.Co dealt with various intermediaries in the packaged software supply chain 
throughout the period of the study. 
 
In order to implement the Windows, Office, Outlook and Sage Packages, T.Co 
sought the support of a vendor.  Although there was the façade of a selection 
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process, the decision as to which vendor would get the job had been made very early 
on based upon recommendation by an external consultant.  It would have been 
interesting to see if the decision would have changed if the other assessed vendors 
had performed better.  Nevertheless, the IT Manager believes that the selected 
company have proved to be a good choice.  The evaluation therefore was based 
primarily upon the recommendation of the external consultant and not an extensive 
checklist as suggested by Martin and McClure (1983) and Welke (1981). 
 
The evaluation process for the vendors of OneSource was similarly very simple.  
Only the developing organisation sold and supported the product and therefore no 
evaluation process took place.  On the surface, vendor considerations for the 
OneSource product became defunct as there was no choice as to who would sell or 
support the product.  However, implicit within the case is the idea of whether or not 
the Research Manager would have chosen the product had her past experiences with 
it been problematic.  I questioned the Research Manager about this and she said that 
prior support for OneSource had been good and she saw no reason why it would not 
continue to be in the future.  In respect of evaluation, this implies that historical 
experiences of the package were transferred to the one in question as a short cut to 
evaluation. 
 
T.Co used a charitable organisation to identify potential vendors of the client-
tracking package.  The result was that the T.Co IT Manager was bombarded with 
telephone calls and marketing information from many companies.  From this, she 
identified four companies that T.Co would send their requirements to.  Vendor D 
was the producer as well as the seller of the software and they instantly discounted 
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themselves as being too expensive for T.Co.  In essence, T.Co were evaluated in 
contrast to the ideal model which assumes control by the consumer organisation.  
The other direct approach was to Vendor A, but they were discounted by T.Co as 
they seemed comparatively expensive and communications had been difficult from 
the outset.  Vendors B and C, were the ones that were invited to give sales 
presentations – both were resellers rather than the developers of the products on 
offer.  Vendor C was discounted merely as the product was not perceived as 
providing the functionality that T.Co required even though the seller was deemed 
satisfactory.  Vendor B was discounted because the product (Goldmine), was not 
perceived as meeting the needs of T.Co.  This vendor did not pay any attention to the 
needs of T.Co and demonstrated a standard, rather than personalised, product.  In 
these cases, it was important that the vendor and the product stood up well to T.Co’s 
requirements.   
 
These results led the Managing Director to demand investigation into the capabilities 
of Filemaker Pro, and as part of this process, the developers of the package were 
approached and asked if it could satisfy T.Co requirements (of course they could as 
it was merely an environment within which custom development could be 
performed).  Concurrently, the project team had continued their search for a package 
and had been approached by another vendor.  An initial sales presentation was held 
to ‘vet’ the vendor without the Managing Director being present.  The team knew 
that they could not afford another problematic presentation so this seemed to them to 
be the safest option.  The strategy worked as they used the first presentation to 
further guide the vendor in relation to their requirements and this resulted in a 
successful sales pitch at the next presentation where the Managing Director was 
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present.  This emphasises the diversity in, and political nature of, the package 
evaluation process, a point made widely in the custom development literature 
(Wilson and Howcroft, 2000). 
 
Relationships with Vendor E initially started out well as the Managing Director of 
the Vendor E struck up a rapport with the Managing Director of T.Co.  The IT 
Manager claimed that this had been a significant factor in the Managing Director’s 
evaluation of the product.  Indeed, the Managing Director was incredibly vocal in his 
praise for the approach of Vendor E because their Managing Director had been 
involved very early in the project.  He saw this as “intelligent, respectful and the 
basis of a good working relationship”.  Therefore, it can be seen how very personal 
criteria can be used in the evaluation process. 
 
However, when the consultant arrived for the workflow day he was very much 
geared towards offering a standard solution and had not appreciated the requirements 
of T.Co whereas those involved in the sales presentation had understood these.  A 
similar situation arose in the study by Skok and Legge (2001).  However, in contrast, 
there was no fear on the part of those at T.Co in respect of the consultant holding too 
much power, influence and knowledge that might be perceived as disappearing when 
he did.  For example, Vendor E’s consultant had obtained minimal information about 
the requirements of T.Co and this meant that he lost the respect of staff involved in 
the workflow day as he could not personalise the benefits of the package and realise 
his apparent agenda for implementing the package with minimal configuration.  This 
demonstrates how evaluation continues after the ‘evaluation period’ in the ideal 
model.  Goldmine had effectively been chosen at this point, but because of the 
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problems of the workflow day, based predominantly upon the skills level of the 
consultant, the project nearly halted before the final purchase was made.  This 
further suggests that product selection does not automatically lead to purchase.  
 
The skill sets of vendors are generally discussed in the literature in terms of whether 
or not these are available due to market conditions.  The quality of the skills sets are 
also related to this, in relation to the idea that if demand for a package is high, then it 
may be difficult to obtain highly experienced consultants and implementing 
organisations may have to work with newly appointed consultants (Martin, 1998; 
Bingi et al., 1999; Sumner, 2000).  In the T.Co case, the consultant was a long 
standing member of staff at the vendor organisation and this therefore adds further 
questions about the quality of services that a company may be buying to assist with 
packaged software implementation.  As with custom development, it demonstrates 
an eagerness to instantly view the ‘developer’ as the expert.  Moreover, it also makes 
explicit that multiple evaluations of vendors may be present, because they are not 
homogeneous entities and because they may be evaluated by various people, at 
various times and in a variety of contexts. 
 
The summary findings of this section can be seen in Table 6.3 at the end of this 
chapter. 
 
6.5 Package Software Selection: The Final Selection Decisions 
In every purchase scenario, the decision to purchase was made by the Managing 
Director with reference to the Board.  In contrast to the guidance of Kunda and 
Brooks (2000), the IT Manager was not the sole driver of the process, nor the one 
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who made the selection decision.  The situation was in fact similar to Siemens Power 
corporation (Hirt and Swanson, 1999), where the information systems staff generated 
the conditions within which senior management could make a decision.  At T.Co, 
they sometimes did not even do this.  The study also reflects the view that the focus 
is on senior management rather than end user involvement (Sawyer, 2001). 
 
In respect of the migration project, it was perceived by the Managing Director that 
there was no decision to make in respect of the packages.  T.Co needed to adopt the 
industry standard.  The only package decision that arose was concerned with whether 
or not the company should move their custom applications from the Filemaker Pro to 
the Access environment.  Again, this decision was determined by the Managing 
Director who felt that staying with Filemaker Pro was best for the company.  The 
real decision in respect of the migration project was related to who the 
implementation and support contract would be given to.  Again, this decision was 
made by the Managing Director and, as mentioned earlier, although there was a 
façade of a selection process, personal recommendation rather than the 
implementation of an ‘objective’ selection and evaluation process was used. 
 
It was also perceived that there were no alternative packages to OneSource.  The 
Research Manager was perceived as an expert in the area, and she thought the 
application was suitable.  A trial of the software was performed to demonstrate her 
argument and facilitate the development of a business case for presentation to the 
Managing Director and the Board.  However, this was viewed as a matter of routine 
and really it was not the package that was being approved, it was the financial 
expenditure. 
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Despite an extensive process of requirements gathering and package evaluation, the 
selection of the client-tracking application, Goldmine, was based upon a sales pitch 
that convinced the Managing Director that this was the right product.  To some 
extent, the coaching of the vendor by the project team relied upon the prior 
requirements gathering and evaluation processes in respect of client-tracking.  
However, the coaching had not taken account of the Managing Director’s declaration 
that the package should be rolled out to other areas, where requirements gathering 
and evaluation had not happened.  Moreover, even though the selection decision in 
respect of Goldmine has been made, purchase has yet to follow.  Indeed, as 
mentioned earlier, the project nearly stalled after selection because of problems at 
the workflow day.  Even after the recovery from this, the workflow document is still 
under negotiation and until then, there is still time for the project to be stopped and 
another product (or custom development) to be chosen instead.  Indeed, the potential 
of open source software is currently being investigated as a mechanism for the 
development of a knowledge management application at the company. 
 
A summary of the findings in relation to the final selection decision can be found at 
the end of this chapter in Table 6.4. 
 
6.6 Implications of Packaged Software Selection for 
Implementation and Usage 
This section briefly considers the issues from the cases that arise in respect of the 
implementation and usage of packaged software in relation to selection.  It begins by 
examining some of the issues associated with implementation and then considers 
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issues of usage in terms of the functionality of the packages, vendors and 
implementation partners and customisation, maintenance and upgrade. 
6.6.1 Implementation 
Up to December 2002, only the packages associated with the migration and the 
OneSource projects have been fully implemented.  Both of these implementations 
were perceived by the IT Manager and Managing director as being fairly 
unproblematic.  The client-tracking project however, is only partially implemented 
and already has proven difficult.  The projects are interesting from an 
implementation point of view as they provide further illumination on the potential 
links between this and selection.  In order to discuss these potential links I refer to 
the broad categories relevant to success and failure that I introduced in section 3.6 on 
page 74.  
 
It is argued that user involvement in selection is necessary in order to determine 
functionality requirements and facilitate change processes (Gremillion, 1982; Gibson 
et al., 1999; Al-Mudimigh et al., 2001; Akkermans and van Helden, 2002).  
However, user involvement was minimal in relation to the migration and OneSource 
projects yet broadly they were reported as being received satisfactorily. In contrast, 
in the light of the implementation activity that has been undertaken so far in respect 
of Goldmine, the consequences of user involvement are unpredictable.  Certain users 
were involved in the selection process but the selection decision ignored much of 
this.  As the early stages of implementation have been carried out, the users have 
become involved again and raised objections to the package.  However, it remains to 
be seen whether, when the package is finally implemented, this will matter. 
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An appropriate business process change is often associated with successful 
package implementation and therefore it is argued that this needs to be considered in 
the selection process in terms of choosing a product that most closely resembles the 
intended ways of working (Lucas et al., 1988; Holland et al., 1999a; Markus and 
Tanis, 2000).  In the migration project, the intended ways of working were not 
fundamentally different to those that were in place already.  The changes that did 
occur related to the implementation of an electronic diary – which went smoothly, 
and the introduction of electronically supported remote working – which did not.  
However, even though the latter change had been anticipated and trained for, it had 
nothing to do with a misfit between the intended ways of working and the package.  
Rather, it was the ways of remote working made available by the package that were 
the problem.  This suggests that changes associated with packages cannot be 
predicted with any certainty prior to, or in the process of selection, as it might not be 
until later that the full ramifications of their adoption are clear.  This point is also 
made in two other packaged software studies (Hanseth and Braa, 1998; Hanseth et 
al., 2001)   
 
Top management support in implementation is linked to selection on the basis that 
there are benefits to be attained from enrolling them early in the project.  At T.Co, it 
would have been impossible not to involve senior management, partly because it was 
a small company and partly because of the organisational cultures.  More accurately 
however, the T.Co experiences highlight that it may well be more important to have 
senior management feel as though they have been involved in selection.  This is most 
starkly highlighted in the Research Manager’s successful attempt to seek agreement 
from the Managing Director and the project teams engineering of the acquiescence 
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of the Managing Director to the purchase of Goldmine.  This has significant 
consequences for the client-tracking project when problems arose because, as the 
Managing Director had sanctioned and taken credit for the decision, he had to 
intervene. 
 
Implementation has been suggested to be more successful if personnel capabilities 
are sufficient (Holland et al., 1999a; Skok and Legge, 2001; Kraemmergaard and 
Rose, 2002).  Therefore, the implication for selection is to ensure that the personnel 
capabilities, for the selected package, are present or obtainable.  At T.Co, the 
personnel capabilities for the implementation of the packages were conceptualised as 
internal and external at the selection stage.  The migration packages were 
implemented by an external vendor who was perceived to have the capabilities.  The 
support of the IT Manager, an external consultant and the TCS academic team were 
also used.  Indeed, the IT Manager was provided with extensive training that was 
tailored to the project at hand (in terms of familiarity with the setting up, and 
administration of, a Windows network).  It was also identified that extensive training 
would be provided to the end users even though they had used the packages before in 
the Apple Mac environment.  In addition, the Managing Director decided that to 
select Access over Filemaker Pro would be too risky as they did not have the skills 
in that area.  For OneSource, personnel capabilities were not given much thought in 
the selection process as the Research Manager had used the application before and 
was also the Filemaker Pro developer in the organisation (so the link with the TMP 
application was not perceived as a problem).  However, it was determined in 
implementation that assistance from one of the TCS academics would be required to 
help in making the link between the package and the TMP application.  Aside from 
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this, the implementation of OneSource proceeded smoothly with a minimal amount 
of informal guidance to end users in terms of usage.  Finally, in much the same way 
as the migration project, the personnel capabilities for the implementation of the 
client tracking project were thought of in terms of external and internal resources.  
Most significantly however, despite the vendor selection process eliminating those 
which were perceived as incapable, problems still arose into the beginning of 
implementation.  Therefore, even if personnel capabilities are considered before 
implementation, there is no guarantee of success. 
 
Understanding the capabilities of the package is assumed to be important prior to, 
and in, implementation because if this is the case, then the ‘right’ product is likely to 
be chosen and implemented leading to user satisfaction (Al-Mudimigh et al., 2001; 
Akkermans and van Helden, 2002).  The experiences of T.Co suggest that 
understanding the capabilities of the package at any point is no guarantee to success.  
This is because it depends upon who’s understanding of the capabilities emerges 
from the selection process.  Even then, it ignores the point, as shown by OneSource, 
that the ‘right’ product, may become the ‘wrong’ product due to issues not associated 
with the technology in question.  Moreover, even where the capabilities of the 
package may be universally agreed as appropriate, once implemented, they may 
bring unanticipated changes in working practices (Robey and Boudreau, 1999).  
Therefore, it is necessary to think of the ‘capabilities’ of the package, not only in 
terms of the technological capabilities, but also their capacity for ‘requiring’ new 
capabilities of those in the organisation.   
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Package software implementation studies suggest that appropriate decisions 
regarding customisation and/or configuration are critical to success (Holland and 
Light, 2003).  T.Co, enacted their selection processes with the intention that they 
would not undertake package customisation.  Therefore, packages were dismissed 
that were perceived as too far removed from T.Co requirements.  However, the 
problems T.Co have experienced in relation to the client-tracking project, post 
selection may lead to the requirement to customise the software (although the issue 
has yet to be raised). 
 
Recognition of an organisation’s legacy information systems is argued to be an 
important feature of implementation because knowing the ‘as is’ situation is argued 
to afford an appreciation of the extent of the required change (Lucas et al., 1988; Al-
Mudimigh et al., 2001; Holland and Light, 2003).  The link between selection and 
implementation on this front is shown in many ways throughout the T.Co case.  
Examples include the involvement of the T.Co consultants in the requirements 
gathering process for the client client-tracking project, and the overall recognition of 
the move from a number of isolated systems to one common system which was 
anticipated by the Managing Director, very early in selection, as a ‘total culture 
shock’. 
  
It is argued that undertaking a sound assessment of user requirements for the 
package is necessary in order to scope the project as changes to these during 
implementation may increase timescales and costs (Lucas et al., 1988; Gibson et al., 
1999; Markus and Tanis, 2000).  A sound assessment of needs is therefore, 
highlighted as important at the time of package selection.  Yet, the experiences of 
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those at T.Co suggest that this is not always the case.  Requirements gathering was 
undertaken to varying degrees with no causal link to success or failure evident as a 
result.  Moreover, this assertion assumes that user requirements are known in advice 
and ignores, again as shown at T.Co, the fact that these may emerge later. 
 
6.6.2 Management of Change and Expectations  
Finally, it is suggested that successful implementation requires the management of 
change and expectations in respect of the package (Markus and Tanis, 2000; 
Akkermans and van Helden, 2002).  The selection process therefore links with 
implementation via notions of user involvement and curtailing the various sales 
pitches that might be made.  This proved very necessary in the client tracking and 
migration projects, but not so much in with the implementation of OneSource.  
Ironically, where attempts were made at change and expectations management, early 
in the projects, this is where the most difficulties occurred. 
 
6.6.3 Functionality 
In terms of implications for usage, the functionality of a package is seen as important 
for two reasons.  First, the package needs to do what it was purchased for and 
therefore a package should be selected that ideally can be used ‘out of the box’.  
Secondly, however, it may be that there is no package that possesses the 
functionality, out of the box that an organisation may require, and therefore, in order 
to attain appropriate functionality, customisation may need to be performed (this is 
discussed in greater detail in section 6.6.5).  The purpose of this section is to focus 
upon the functionality issues arising from usage. 
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It was thought that the migration project involved a ‘straight swap’ of Apple Mac 
packages for Windows packages and, for the most part, this view was correct even 
though it brought a new feel to the familiar applications.  However, for most of the 
staff the Outlook application was an entirely new package with which to work.  
Therefore, training for the use of Outlook was provided to all staff by a specialist 
training company - another intermediary.  In general, the IT Manager felt that the 
training provided was adequate and this was further supported by the development 
and implementation of a super-user policy, that over time, helped with the settling in 
of the new portfolio.  However, although the training helped these staff familiarise 
themselves with the canonical processes, it did nothing to assist with learning about 
new non-canonical processes (Lee and Lee, 2000).  This resulted in remote staff 
being able to use Outlook without having learned that they did not need to save files 
in RTF format any longer as they were operating in a Windows environment, that 
RTF files took up more bandwidth than files with a .doc file extension and that they 
needed to synchronise their folders regularly.  The system ground to a halt as the 
staff did not know how to work with it.  They continued to use RTF files as they did 
not realise that this was no longer necessary.  Also, as they had never had email or 
electronic remote access, they were used to working on a higher capacity internal 
network, which did not require them to log on and off via the secure gateway 
software.  Now they were bound by the limitations of their home 56K maximum 
internet connection.   
 
This problem was presented very firmly at the door of the vendor, the IT Manager 
and myself by the Managing Director because he said the ‘technology was not 
working’.  The training organisation was never approached.  Clearly, the problem 
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did not just relate to technology.  No party predicted that the problem would arise; no 
one had experienced this problem before.  Initially, the vendor thought that it may 
have been that the lines used for the Virtual Private Network might have needed 
increased bandwidth.  However, it was their analysis of the network traffic that 
highlighted the problems stemming from the characteristics of remote worker usage.  
Although the problem was re-conceptualised by the IT Manager, academic team and 
the vendor, none of the T.Co complainants ever modified their view of themselves at 
least in public.  The problem remained one of the ‘technology’ rather than one 
brought about by particular usage of the technology.  This point is speculative but it 
would have been interesting to see if the problem would still have arisen had a more 
formal requirements gathering process been undertaken which better accounted for 
the idiosyncrasies of the working practices and skills levels of those at T.Co. 
 
Usage of OneSource was initially much more straightforward even though staff had 
not been involved in its selection and it had been rolled out to areas for which it had 
not previously been intended.  Even in the light of this, the package was initially 
reported as being a great success by all who used it.  However, because the package 
was opened up to a wider group than was originally intended (from Research to the 
Sales and Marketing function), towards the end of the study, these requirements have 
altered and the package has been highlighted as deficient.  For the Sales and 
Marketing staff, what was the ‘right’ product, has become ‘the wrong’ one, even 
though they did not have an application like this before.  It is impossible to 
determine if the requirements gathering process had been more formal, and had 
involved the Sales and Marketing staff, whether this would have changed the 
situation.  Indeed, it appears that the success of the package, in terms of its 
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acceptance by the Sales and Marketing department, has led to more demanding 
objectives for the package which were not intended nor can be satisfied - that is, the 
inclusion of overseas company data and non-corporate organisations.  This scenario 
is similar to that described by Adam and O'Doherty (2000) where, as managers 
learnt about the possibilities of a package, their objectives became more ambitious.  
In addition, it reinforces the work of Wilson and Howcroft (2002) who state that 
failure (and by implication success) may not be unilaterally agreed, nor hinge on the 
technical functioning of a system.  
 
6.6.4 Vendors and Implementation Partners 
It is far too early to draw any major conclusions from the selection process in respect 
of its long term effects vis-à-vis the choice of vendors and other implementation 
intermediaries.  However, enough data are available to highlight that the use of 
‘objective’ evaluation processes may or may not be used, carry weight and result in 
the expected outcomes. 
 
Although the migration project involved a formal evaluation process, this really was 
circumvented by the Managing Director’s highly valued criteria of personal 
recommendation which ensured that the preferred vendor was chosen.  Despite the 
lack of ‘rigour’ in the process, to date, those at T.Co report that they have made the 
best choice.  Similarly, in terms of the OneSource product, positive experiences have 
been reported by those who use the application, even though the vendor was not 
evaluated at the time of the purchase. 
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In contrast, despite the ‘rigorous’ evaluation process that was conducted in order to 
find a vendor and implementation partner for the client-tracking project, difficulties 
post selection have become apparent.  The difficulties with the implementation 
partner are well documented in terms of the implementation partner’s capabilities to 
deliver the product they sold to T.Co.  Given the effort that went into this process in 
contrast to the migration and OneSource projects, this is surprising. 
 
For each project, it remains to be seen how T.Co’s experiences of the selected 
vendors and implementation partners take shape over time. 
 
6.6.5 Customisation, Maintenance and Upgrades 
T.Co have not customised the Windows, Office, Outlook and Sage packages as they 
did not need to do so.  Indeed, it is arguable that most organisations would not need 
to customise these kinds of applications to any great extent with perhaps the 
exception of Sage.     
 
Maintenance agreements were implemented for these packages but interestingly 
issues of lock-in and switching costs were not placed upon the agenda.  Clearly, the 
migration to the Windows environment, and what were perceived as standard 
industry applications, minimised thinking about this.  It was felt by those at T.Co 
that they were already locked-in, but to the wrong platform and associated 
applications.  Indeed, one of the reasons cited for the move to the Windows 
environment was to increase the range of applications T.Co could access.  
Furthermore, as T.Co opted (whether knowingly or otherwise), to be locked into 
certain Microsoft products, it is possible to argue this was not a major issue as the 
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majority of other companies were in the same position and therefore although they 
were path dependent, they were in the major path. 
 
In respect of OneSource, the package itself was not customised.  However, new 
functionality was added in the form of the linkage with a revised TMP application.  
As Light (2001a) suggests, this may lead to the requirement for in-house 
maintenance if the OneSource package changes.  Even if the new client-tracking 
package replaces the TMP application, the linkage will still be present and this 
increases the chances for further reworking of any linkage between the two as both 
developments leave the hands of T.Co. 
 
The client-tracking project has not yet seen the requirement for customisation and it 
is here that it is likely to be the most costly.  At the close of this study, T.Co appear 
to be happy to bend towards the package and not customise the product.  However, it 
remains to be seen, in the light of the rejection of two workflow documents, as to 
whether this viewpoint is maintained. 
 
In relation to maintenance and upgrades, the consequences of the selection processes 
enacted for each of the packages remains to be seen.  A summary of the findings for 
implementation and usage can be seen in Table 6.5, at the end of this chapter. 
 
6.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the field study data with reference to the 
conceptual framework that was developed from the literature review.  The aim has 
been to demonstrate the problems of existing theories of packaged software selection 
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and provide a basis for the development of an alternative theory.  In order to more 
easily identify the bases for addressing the two aims of the chapter, I have 
summarised the findings in Table 6.1 to Table 6.5.  Each table is a summary of 
findings in relation to the various constructs in the conceptual framework.  The 
findings suggest that the process of packaged software needs to be theorized in a 
different fashion and this has resulted in revisions to the conceptual framework that 
are discussed in the next chapter. 
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Table 6.1: Summary Findings - Reasons for Packaged Software Adoption 
 
Reasons for Packaged Software Adoption 
 
- T.Co wanted to standardise to facilitate working with others and also to buy 
into non-value adding standardised practices.  T.Co’s practices were 
perceived as ‘best’ practices.  However, the adoption of the technology was 
sold to customers as T.Co having best practices. 
 
- Despite packages being ‘sold’ as the replacement for legacy information 
systems.  T.Co’s did however operate custom and packaged software 
therefore packages can also be viewed as legacy information systems. 
 
- T.Co were sold packaged software products 
 
- T.Co were sold the idea of packaged software over custom development 
 
- The costs of packaged software were given as a reason to abandon custom 
development and also stay with it.   
 
- The costs associated with packaged software are demonstrated  as potentially 
being more difficult to predict than reported in the literature. 
 
- T.Co was more interested in buying into a support network for a ‘tried and 
tested’ product rather than a rigorously built product.  T.Co was never really 
interested in the mechanisms by which a packaged software product had been 
built and whether it worked well for other purchasers.  Even when they 
undertook reference site visits, they did so with the intention of evaluating 
support mechanisms rather than products as they felt they operated 
completely differently to those that they visited. 
 
- The case for freeing up information systems related staff was used a few 
times, as a reason for packaged software purchase in terms of justifying 
investment on economic and strategic grounds 
 
- Packaged software was explicitly chosen to facilitate the implementation of 
senior management agendas for change Some agendas were made widely 
known and others were not.  These agendas, public or ‘outed’, were subject 
to varying levels of resistance. 
 
- Bravado was used on many occasions to fuel decisions to adopt packaged 
software 
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Table 6.2: Summary Findings – Definition of User Requirements 
 
Definition of User Requirements 
 
- The requirements gathering processes varied in length, depth and significance 
in relation to the evaluation and final selection decision processes 
 
- Varying degrees of involvement of end users in the requirements gathering 
processes was evident despite guidance and reports in the literature 
 
- Limited emphasis upon requirements gathering, and involvement of end 
users, may not lead to failure and vice versa 
 
- Reasons for packaged software adoption (and non-adoption) may emerge 
from the requirements gathering process 
 
- Requirements may be determined by the vendor or implementation partner 
 
 
Table 6.3: Summary Findings – Package Evaluation 
 
Package Evaluation 
 
- Package evaluation may be conducted in a more or less intensive fashion and 
this may not impact upon the perceived success of failure of the process 
 
- Evaluation can be a difficult process as it is not always the case that 
requirements are known or can be known.  In addition, requirements may 
change as evaluation proceeds 
 
- Evaluation criteria are dynamic, highly personal and may be variously 
interpreted as rational/irrational 
 
- Perceptions and feelings may be used in evaluation in favour of ‘hard’ 
criteria 
 
- Some requirements may be ignored when it comes to evaluation, in favour of 
the agenda/s of specific individuals or groups 
 
- The evaluation process may also lead to requirements gathering 
 
- The packaged software consumer organisation may be evaluated by a vendor 
or other implementation intermediary 
 
- Reasons for and against packaged software adoption may emerge from the 
process of evaluation 
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Table 6.4: Summary Findings – Final Selection Decision 
 
Final Selection Decision 
 
- The purchase decision may or may not be based upon all or part of the 
requirements gathering and evaluation processes 
 
- The reasons for the final selection decision may be simultaneously 
interpreted as rational and irrational 
 
- The purchase decision is highly political 
 
- Making the decision to purchase does not mean that a purchase will be made 
 
 
Table 6.5: Summary Findings – Implementation and Usage Issues 
 
Implementation and Usage Issues 
 
 
- Requirements gathering may continue 
 
- Evaluation may continue 
 
- The ‘right’ product may become the ‘wrong’ one 
 
- Lock in wasn’t a barrier to selection and was perceived in some ways as 
useful as it afforded stability in the business environment. 
 
- The selection process has implications for implementation and usage 
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7 Summary and Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the findings and presents the conclusions of the study.  It 
begins with a review of the research objective and an evaluation of the methodology.  
This is proceeded by the presentation of the overall conclusions of the study leading 
to a revised theoretical framework.  Recommendations for future research are the 
offered and the study is drawn to a close. 
 
7.2 Review of the Research Objective 
Despite trends towards the implementation of packaged software in work 
organisations (and society), the information systems research community still 
primarily focuses upon developing custom development theories, concepts, 
methodologies and the like.  Moreover, even where packaged software is the focus 
of study, most of the attention is directed towards the nature of the application type.  
Whilst useful, this approach is somewhat limited in terms of contributing to the 
development of concepts and theories about packaged software.  Consequently, the 
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research in this thesis aims to raise the profile of packaged software as an area 
worthy of serious attention. 
 
More specifically, this research has questioned the utility of existing theories of 
packaged software selection.  It is argued that packaged software selection theories 
rely upon a unitary view of work organisations which ignore the presence and 
importance of differing organisational realities.  Moreover, it has been demonstrated 
that existing theories primarily attribute control of the selection process to the 
consumer organisation when clearly market forces may influence this in different 
ways.  Additionally, is suggested that, in reality, the selection process may not play 
out in the well ordered and linear way it is currently presented. 
 
The objective of this study was, therefore, to develop an alternative theory of 
packaged software selection.  The intention was to develop a theory that would more 
plausibly account for the multiple realities of the process and the consequent 
potential ‘disruptions’ to what is usually described as a well ordered, linear process.  
In order to realise this objective: 
 
- Chapters 2 and 3 review the existing research on packaged software with 
particular emphasis upon processes of selection.  Chapter 2 examines the market-
oriented nature of packaged software and chapter 3, the organisational 
perspective.  The underlying thought of each chapter was how the issues that 
emerged may relate to the process of packaged software selection.  A conceptual 
framework, incorporating an ideal model of packaged software selection, which 
maps out the landscape of the literature in relation to packaged software 
selection, is developed on the basis of these two chapters. 
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- Chapters 5 and 6 tell the story of organisational experiences with a variety of 
packaged software products and emphasise the problems of the ‘ideal model’ of 
packaged software selection reported in the literature.  The conceptual 
framework developed earlier is used to structure this analysis.  The analysis leads 
to the development of a revised theoretical framework that is presented later in 
this chapter. 
 
7.3 Evaluation of the Research  
In chapter 4, a set of criteria to guide the conduct and evaluation of the research were 
formulated.  These criteria were: contribution to knowledge, appropriate 
methodological choice, the fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle, the 
principle of contextualisation, the principle of interaction between the researchers 
and the subjects, the principle of abstraction and generalisation, the principle of 
dialogical reasoning and the principle of multiple interpretations.  In this section, the 
research is evaluated on this basis.  Moreover, it is important to note that the 
evaluation explicitly incorporates an assessment of the strengths and limitations of 
the research. 
7.3.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
Myers (1997)  argues that a good indicator of interpretive research is that it offers a 
contribution to the information systems community in respect of whether the author 
has developed new concepts, applied new concepts or applied a well known theory 
in a new or unique way.  He also suggests that a good marker is research that offers 
rich insights into the human, social and organisational aspects of information 
systems development and application or if it contradicts conventional wisdom.   
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This study makes a contribution in the following ways: 
 
- It (further) develops the concept of packaged software 
- Chapters 2 and 3 offer an extensive review of the packaged software literature 
which offers rich insights into existing research in the area related to human, 
social and organisational aspects of information systems development. 
- The experiences of T.Co offer rich insights into human, social and organisational 
aspects of information systems development particularly in relation to packaged 
software (although parallels and implications are also drawn for custom 
development too).   
- The findings contradict the rationalistic theories of packaged software selection. 
- An alternative theory of packaged software selection is put forward. 
 
One limitation of the contribution is that it could be argued that the findings are 
based upon an insufficiently diverse data.  For instance, it is suggested that theory 
building from case data usually requires approximately 4-10 cases (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  Therefore, on the surface, as the study is based upon one organisation’s 
experiences with packaged software selection, this could be argued to be 
problematic.  However, as stated in chapter 4, case studies should be defined by an 
interest in individual cases (Stake, 1994).  In this study, there are many individual 
cases of packaged software selection, because multiple perspectives of the three 
projects were actively sought and presented in the data.  Even so, there is still the 
question of how representative the experiences at T.Co might be.  It could for 
instance be suggested that much of what happened was because it was occurring in 
and around T.Co and that other organisations might provide significantly different 
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insights.  Indeed, this is certainly the case.  However, it is arguable that the way that 
the data have been used to develop the alternative theory has lead to findings that are 
sufficiently abstract to have broader appeal, yet utility.  Nevertheless, it would be 
interesting to extend the study to incorporate the experiences of other organisations 
and different packages.  
 
7.3.2 Appropriate Methodological Choices 
There is consensus that methodological choices should be commensurate with the 
research objectives (Lawler, 1985; Silverman, 2001).  Therefore, qualitative research 
was undertaken in order to develop a better understanding of how packaged software 
selection is enacted and why it might occur in certain ways.  Clearly, a survey for 
example, would not have provided the rich insights into the process of selection that 
were necessary in order, as is recommended, to study over time a phenomenon in its 
real life context (Yin, 1989).   
 
Initially, it was intended to conduct case study research, but as the research 
progressed, the opportunity presented itself to obtain very rich data, with relatively 
secure access, via action research.  Indeed other aspects of the methodology emerged 
in a far from deliberate fashion as realistic researchers suggest is the case (Pettigrew, 
1985; Paul, 2002).  However, although the methodology emerged, it was also 
rigourous.  Great care was taken to follow the guidelines of case study research and 
then action research.  Data collection and theory development was also monitored 
and refined as necessary. 
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Further potential limitations of the methodology, and the ways in which attempts 
were made to deal with these are discussed as the research is further evaluated 
according to the principles of Klein and Myers, as detailed in sections (7.3.3 to 
7.3.8). 
 
7.3.3 The Fundamental Principle of the Hermeneutic Circle 
This principle upon which the following ones expand, suggests that we come to 
understand ‘the whole’ by considering its parts and their interrelationships.  The 
‘whole’ in this study refers to packaged software selection.  Consequently, it is 
possible to develop a better understanding of packaged software selection through 
the parts and interrelationships it comprises.  Thus, to understand packaged software 
selection more thoroughly, the constituents of the packaged software selection and 
their interrelationships were initially drawn from the literature and presented in the 
form of a conceptual framework which was used to guide the field work.  The field 
work further focussed upon gathering data about the constituents of the selection 
processes and their interrelationships.   
 
It is, however, important to note that it is incredibly difficult to understand the 
totality of a packaged software selection process in theory and practice.  The 
problem therefore, was determining when there was ‘a whole’ that was useful and 
thus when data collection and theory development could stop.  Data collection was 
stopped when it became clear that nothing of great significance was being added to 
as a result of additional data – that is, when theoretical saturation had been reached 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Strauss and Corbin, 1994).  
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7.3.4 Contextualisation  
The principle of contextualisation requires that the subject matter be situated in its 
contexts so that the emergent setting under investigation can be communicated to the 
audience.  For this study, I was fortunate to have been involved with T.Co for some 
time before much of the activity in respect of packaged software selection took 
place.  I joined the organisation in June 2000 and work did not begin properly until 
November that year.  This time also allowed time for acclimatisation in the 
organisation, especially as the decision to undertake action research was made fairly 
early on.  This action research approach also afforded regular access to the company 
that has allowed for quite significant insights into the contexts of the packaged 
software selection processes. 
 
Such good access was no guarantee to an ‘accurate’ portrayal of the contexts for the 
selection processes however.  Even where I was heavily engaged with the 
organisation, there was no guarantee that I would find out about the ‘real’ data about 
situations such as conflicting viewpoints.  Therefore, in order to improve the 
accuracy of the reporting of the context, various sources were used to clear up any 
misunderstandings and to try to find out as much about how situations were viewed 
by those involved, whether this was through documentation, cross checking 
formal/informal interviews or observation.  This process also aided the explicit 
consideration of my role, and that of others, in the development of the research as 
discussed next. 
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7.3.5 Interaction Between the Researchers and the Subjects 
This principle requires the researcher to explicitly consider their role and that of 
others in the development of the research.  The action research strategy used in this 
study clearly implies that there should be interaction between the researcher and the 
subjects in developing the outcomes.  The evidence for this is in the case itself where 
my role as action researcher ‘advisor’ to T.Co is outlined as is the role of others in 
making decisions and acting on these in everyday life.   
 
Thus, in respect of the field study, the aim was for data collection, reporting and 
analysis that was as faithful as possible to the various viewpoints of those involved.  
This was achieved through the application of the meta principle of the hermeneutic 
circle and then by cross checking my interpretations with other members of the 
academic TCS team and those others involved in the packaged software selection 
processes.  The aim was to develop shared meanings of the data in question at any 
given time.  The findings of this study therefore comprise interpretations of my own 
and others who were involved in the study.  However, as different people interpret 
data in different ways, this leads to multiple realities (Kaplan and Duchon, 1988).  
The study aims to communicate, and heavily relies upon, these diverse realities in 
order to development the alternative theory of packaged software selection.  
However, because I have ‘controlled’ the study, the work is ultimately presented 
from my perspective, a typical criticism of interpretive studies.  
 
7.3.6 Abstraction and Generalisation  
Abstraction and generalisation are not prerequisites for interpretive studies.  
However, this study does offer opportunities for relating ideas to multiple situations 
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although it is important to point out that these are not characterised as universal laws 
as with positivistic studies (Denzin, 2001).  Instead, this research offers 
generalisations that relate to the development of concepts and theory which may be 
intersubjectively understood to be useful (Walsham, 1995b).  These generalisations 
relate to the further development of the concept of packaged software and theory 
about packaged software selection.  The contribution in this respect was outlined in 
section 7.3.1 and is discussed in greater detail in section 7.4.  
 
7.3.7 The Principle of Dialogical Reasoning  
This principle advocates sensitivity to the possibility that theoretical preconceptions 
might influence the findings of a study.  First, it is suggested that the researcher 
should make the philosophical assumptions of the research as transparent as possible 
and relate the strengths and weaknesses of this to the work at hand.  In chapter 4, the 
philosophical (interpretivist) underpinnings of this study are clearly articulated and 
critiqued.  Moreover, the difficulties of the approach are alluded to in this evaluation 
section (for example in relation to the idea that it is the researcher who has the final 
say over what gets interpreted - written down - and how.  This principle also 
suggests that the research findings might not support the initial theoretical 
preconceptions of the study and that the researcher must be aware of the need to 
revise these as necessary.  There are five key points at which the theoretical 
preconceptions were altered as a result of the study.  Illustrative examples are 
provided in Appendix B. 
 
1. This study was very much influenced by two years’ previous experience of 
undertaking research into ERP packages in a business school setting.  As 
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mentioned in chapter 4, the original study was intended to be about another 
application type (CRM).  This was the source of the first contradiction between 
the very loose theoretical proposition (i.e. the theory of CRM software) and the 
shift towards a study packaged software.  It was during the initial literature 
review that my position shifted as a ‘new story’, albeit from the literature, began 
to emerge.  That was, packaged software selection represented a potentially more 
relevant and theoretically rewarding area of investigation in information systems. 
 
2. This shift in position led to a review of the various theories of packaged software 
selection and from this emerged the ideal model (Figure 3.1).  In conjunction 
with the fieldwork for the migration and OneSource projects, it became clear that 
existing theories of packaged software selection were not necessarily played out 
in organisational settings in a well ordered fashion.  The ideal model of selection 
gleaned from the literature was therefore adapted in the light of this (see iteration 
1, Appendix B). 
 
3. The revised model was further questioned when the client-tracking project field 
data began to emerge and the roles of the ‘market’ started to become clearer.  
This resulted in further theoretical revision (see iteration 2, Appendix B).  This 
was later further affirmed by aspects of the OneSource project and, as a result, 
the migration project was revisited too. 
 
4. As the OneSource package bedded in, and the client-tracking project selection 
process further progressed, the origins of the beginning and end of the selection 
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process were questioned, leading to another cycle of revision (see iteration 3, 
Appendix B). 
 
5. Finally, as the study was written up and the theoretical preconceptions were 
further refined, a final conceptual framework resulted.  This is presented later in 
this chapter. 
 
This principle compares sympathetically with the theory-action cycles required of 
action research. 
7.3.8 The Principle of Multiple Interpretations  
The principle of multiple interpretations requires the researcher to examine the 
influences of social context upon actions in the study.  This means seeking out 
multiple viewpoints and the reasons for these.  The whole basis of this thesis is the 
idea that there are multiple realities that may influence any given packaged software 
selection process making this perhaps one of the most important principles in this 
study.  Consequently, a broad variety of viewpoints have been made evident in the 
literature review, but more particularly in the fieldwork.  For example, the T.Co case 
illustrates differing viewpoints between the following individuals and groups: 
 
- Consultants/T.Co senior management; 
- T.Co senior management/T.Co staff; 
- T.Co Managing Director/T.Co IT Manager; 
- Vendor E/T.Co end users; 
- T.Co senior management/myself.   
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Where these differences in perspective have arisen, the aim has been to find out 
about, and tell the story of why this may have been, or was perceived to have been 
the case. 
 
7.4 Interpretation of Research Findings 
The findings from the experiences of T.Co in relation to packaged software selection 
are summarised in the concluding section of chapter 6 and therefore I do not intend 
to repeat these in any detail here.  In this section, however, I wish to draw out the 
main overall findings from the research.  This includes the development of the 
concept of packaged software and, the primary contribution, an alternative theory of 
packaged software selection.  The theory is represented in a theoretical framework 
and is compared with the conceptual framework, presented in Figure 3.2, that was 
used to guide the research. 
 
7.4.1 The Development of the Concept of Packaged Software 
Typical definitions imply that packaged software is pre-built, licensed for use and 
commercial in nature.  In this thesis, there is a development of this concept in 
recognition of the idea that some packaged software is often ‘given away’ – web 
browsers and Internet email application such as Alta Vista for example.  
Consequently, it is suggested that packaged software should be thought of as ‘pre-
built software that is intended to be licensed for use’.  This concept has scope for 
packages that are licensed on a no charge basis.  The concept is also inclusive of the 
variety of package applications types available including the commonly researched 
ones that are used to support organisational activities and those that have received 
less attention such as operating platforms and those found in wider society.  Those in 
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the latter group include operating platforms, entertainment applications such as 
PC/Console games, reference works such as Microsoft Encarta and ‘Domestic 
Automation’ packages such as those to assist in home improvement, legal and 
financial management activities. 
 
7.4.2 An Alternative Theory of Packaged Software Selection 
The major contribution of this study has been to develop an alternative theory of 
packaged software selection.  In chapter 3, it was shown that existing theories of 
packaged software selection broadly comprised a linear model of activities 
associated with identifying user needs, evaluating software on the basis of those 
needs and then selecting the most suitable packaged on this basis.  Drawing upon the 
literature and undertaking the study of T.Co brings out a range of issues that suggest 
the process is far from certain, linear and objective in nature, as summarised in Table 
6.1 to 6.5 of the previous chapter.  These findings form the basis of the revisions to 
the conceptual framework resulting in a refined theoretical framework that represents 
a development of the theory of packaged software selection.  The revised framework 
is illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
 
Whilst this framework may look like it is an attempt to develop an objective 
embodiment of reality in respect of packaged software selection, I would draw on 
Lewis' (1994) perspective of entity models which have been subject to the same 
label.  Lewis (1994) states that entity models can also be viewed as a representation 
of an interpretation of reality, and therefore, may be used as a way of negotiating a 
shared understanding of a problem domain.  Thus, the framework above can be used 
to view various perspectives of the packaged software selection process in order to 
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facilitate an appreciation of multiple realities rather than the reification of ‘one, true 
reality’. 
 
Requirements
Gathering
Selection
Decision
Evaluation
May lead to 
and influence
May lead to 
and influence
May lead to 
and influence
Packaged Software Selection Process
Multiple 
realities of those 
in Market and 
Organisational 
Environments
Reasons for and 
against the 
adoption of 
packaged 
software
Implementation 
and Usage
May lead to and 
influence
May lead to and 
influence
May lead to and 
influence
May lead to and 
influence
Figure 7.1: The Revised Theoretical Framework 
 
In order to explain the alternative theory in greater detail, the constituents of the 
revised framework are now discussed. 
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The framework explicitly acknowledges the presence of multiple realities of the 
packaged software selection process.  Essentially, this refers to the idea that various 
groups or individuals will be involved in the process either as part of the 
organisation environment into which any selected package may be implemented or 
from the market environment where the package was created.  Because of these 
multiple realities, it is possible that differing views of what is rational may emerge.  
Furthermore, these multiple realities may bring with them multiple agendas which 
may complicate the process of selection and may mean it is not enacted in a 
rationalistic fashion in the way that the initial conceptual framework, and more 
specifically, existing packaged software selection theories may suggest.   
 
The presence of multiple realities may shape ideas about reasons for and against 
packaged software adoption before, during and after the selection process is 
enacted.  This is in contrast to the initial framework as there is no assumption that 
those involved in the selection are aware of the reasons why they may or may not 
choose packaged software before they embark upon the process.  The framework 
suggests that these reasons can emerge before the decision to adopt packaged 
software is made in the same way as the initial framework.  However, as the 
selection process is enacted, it is argued that further reasons why packages should, or 
should not, be adopted may emerge.  For example, they may emerge through 
requirements gathering or evaluation activities.  Similarly, reasons may also emerge 
when a package is implemented and/or used in an organisation.  The emergence of 
these reasons, at whatever point, may lead to the continuance or discontinuance of 
adopting packaged software or indeed a particular product. 
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Again, in contrast to the initial framework, the implementation and usage of a 
package that is subject to the selection process is not guaranteed.  This is because the 
selection process itself is not treated as having to be completed.  However, where a 
package is selected, implemented and used, the nature of the selection process can 
impact upon this.  For example, as with custom development, minimal user 
involvement in selection may or may not hinder implementation and subsequent user 
acceptance.  Furthermore, it is useful to note that the process of selection continues 
into implementation and usage.  As people get more involved with a package, they 
may change their perceptions of that package, and reasons for or against may emerge 
as requirements gathering and evaluation processes continue.  Both of these may 
result in decisions to continue with the package or not – even sometime after the 
package has ‘gone live’. 
 
In terms of the heart of the framework, the selection process, requirements 
gathering is still included.  However, the revised framework clearly acknowledges 
that differing, potentially competing sets of requirements will be brought to bare in 
the process of selection.   Critically, these requirements may be determined by those 
in ‘the market’ as well as those in the selecting organisation.  Further, because of the 
nature of packaged software development, requirements may be indirectly dictated 
by others in different organisational and market environments.  Questions therefore 
arise as to whose requirements are used, if any, in the selection process.  Although 
requirements gathering is included in this framework, it has been shown that whether 
this is played out or not depends very much upon the nature of the selection process 
and the product in question.  Finally, the logic of the framework asserts that ‘all’ 
requirements may not be known at the end of any requirements gathering process 
 250
which is different to the initial framework where these appear to be set before 
evaluation takes place.  This is because processes of evaluation and selection 
decisions resulting in implementation and usage may reveal new requirements or 
quite simply they may change. 
 
The evaluation process also remains in the revised framework.  However, although 
the results of the evaluation process may be used in making the final decision about 
which package is to be implemented, there is no guarantee of this.  Similarly, there is 
no guarantee that any evaluation may occur in the first place.  Furthermore, as with 
the rest of the process, evaluation is not viewed as a one-time effort.  Evaluation may 
occur numerous times throughout the process of selection, and beyond, in order to 
obtain new requirements or inform a selection decision.  Moreover, because the 
framework emphasises the role of multiple realities, there are consequently multiple, 
co-existing, and sometimes competing, evaluations that further complicate the 
process of selection. 
 
Finally, the selection decision is included.  In the initial framework selection is 
argued to be undertaken on the basis of the evaluation process.  However, it is clear 
that this may not necessarily be the case.  Decisions may be made on the basis of no 
evaluation and the effects of this may be variously interpreted as positive and 
negative.  Moreover, if the selection decision is a ‘no’, this may result in the need for 
further requirements gathering and evaluation.  This is similarly the case where the 
decision is a ‘yes’, because the product enters the implementation phase and usually 
results in usage.  This is for two reasons.  First, the selection decision does not 
necessarily imply that a purchase will be made – at T.Co for example, 
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implementation began even though a contract had not been signed.  The contract still 
has not been signed, and will not be, until the requirements have been finalised to 
T.Co’s satisfaction.  Therefore, the selection decision does not automatically mean 
that implementation will begin, or will be completed.  Secondly, even if a package is 
purchased, and implemented, it may not be used, or used as widely as expected. 
 
In summary, the revised theory suggests that existing theories of packaged software 
selection are flawed and naive conceptualisations of the realities of the process.  
Whilst the concepts of requirements gathering, evaluation and the selection decision 
are useful to help us understand the process of selection, it has to be pointed out that 
they cannot be viewed or arranged in a simplistic fashion.  Realistically, attempting 
to simplify packaged software selection to some extent is useful and necessary (in 
fact this is what the alternative theory here does) however, this study demonstrates 
the problems of over-simplifying the process to the point where it becomes 
meaningless and inaccurate.   
 
7.5 Recommendations for Further Research 
The study presented here, and specifically the theory of packaged software selection 
put forward, suggests several avenues for further research.  Of course it is impossible 
to draw out every possible aspect worthy of further investigation, so instead listed 
below are a few that I think are particularly interesting, relevant and significant: 
 
Packaged software and custom software have been viewed as different in terms for 
example of development (Sawyer, 2000) and development/implementation (Kelly et 
al., 1999b).  However, this study suggests, that there are also many similarities 
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between the two approaches.  Specifically, custom development could benefit from 
conceptualisation from a market-oriented perspective.  Although it is suggested that 
custom development is undertaken internally within an organisation (Krishnan, 
1998), the use of external contractors is widespread (Light, 2001a; Levina, 2002).  
Further research might also look more closely at the parallels between custom or 
packaged software development and implementation in organisations in terms of the 
rhetoric of user involvement and agendas for information systems-driven 
organisational change. 
 
The processes of selection described in the study indicate political and power 
implications for the adoption of packaged software due to the existence of multiple 
realities.  Other studies have suggested that, like selection, product development is 
not a clear-cut or rational process of innovation diffusion and adoption.  Rather 
products are gradually shaped through cyclic processes of versions where inclusion 
is selective (Scott and Kaindl, 2000; Light, 2001a; Pozzebon, 2001).   Although 
politics and power have been studied in relation to custom development, it would be 
interesting to see the similarities and differences emerging from packaged software 
contexts especially where levels of commercialisation and supply chain 
intermediation are high. 
 
The market-oriented perspective on information systems development suggests that 
consumer organisations need to rethink their approach to the information systems 
function in terms of skill mix and roles (Sawyer, 2001).  Perhaps the most important 
theme relates to the competence of non-information systems and information 
systems personnel to undertake the necessary organisational and information systems 
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related activities that the selection of packaged software requires in a similar fashion 
to other sourcing agreements (Currie and Willcocks, 1998; Willcocks and Sykes, 
2000).  Further research in this area would therefore be useful.   
 
There is scope for investigating the role of fashions and fads in information systems 
in relation the academic and practitioner communities.  Theories of fashion setting 
networks suggest that innovations diffuse in terms of social band wagon effects 
where information about adoption and the adopters create social pressures for further 
adoption rather than the innovation per se (Newell et al., 2001).  In the context of 
information systems, and specifically packaged software, this further emphasises the 
problems of rationalistic theories of selection.  For example at T.Co. a great deal of 
bravado was used to justify selection in order for the company to retain legitimacy in 
it’s field rather than improve efficiency.  This idea has already been examined 
somewhat in respect of the spurt of ERP studies that were witnessed in the late 1990s 
(Westrup, 2002).  Yet, there is further scope for other contributions. 
 
Although the ethics of software vendors have not been a raised to any great extent by 
this study, the revised theory presented here suggests it is a matter worthy of further 
investigation.  For example, the sales pitches of companies such as SAP used in 
selection processes, have widely reported the package as providing enterprise-wide 
support for business processes, yet organisations, such as the University of 
Nebraska, have found fit between the package and their processes to be as low as 30 
per cent in some areas (Sieber et al., 2000).  Further into the lifecycle, it would also 
be interesting to study the effects of lock-in and monopolistic positions such as that 
held by Microsoft in the market for domestic computing operating systems. 
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Finally, further research into the issues surrounding the use of packaged software in 
domestic settings is required given the increasing pervasiveness of home computing 
- in particular, the use of marketing approaches and how these might influence 
selection processes in contrast to those played out in organisations.  The theory 
presented in this study would certainly have resonance with domestic settings, but it 
is an area that requires further investigation. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
This study demonstrates that packaged software selection is far from objective and 
certain.  The multiple realities associated with packaged software selection play out 
in various ways beginning with the decision to adopt packaged software over custom 
development and through to the context of usage.  This study therefore asserts that 
whilst it may be necessary to simplify approaches to packaged software selection in 
order to make progress, over simplification can be problematical. 
 
The wider implication of the study is that it draws comparisons between packaged 
software and custom development.  Packaged software research has a chequered 
history, often being cited as a completely different approach to software 
development and implementation.  The problem with this assertion is that the lessons 
about custom development have not been carried over to packaged software research 
as appropriate.  This has, ironically, resulted in attempts to ‘custom build’ the wheel 
when one could have been ‘bought’ through reference to custom development (and 
potentially vice versa).  Indeed, one of the underlying threads of this thesis is a basic 
lesson from the traditional systems development lifecycle.  That is, be aware that 
mistakes made later in the process will usually cost a lot to undo. 
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Abstract 
Organisational dependence upon IT continues to grow yet experiences of satisfaction 
vary widely.  Problematic, aged IT is often cited as being a fundamental problem in 
this respect and this is commonly termed legacy information systems.  However, in 
this paper the author offers an alternative, and arguably more comprehensive, theory 
of legacy information systems that accommodates multiple viewpoints and 
recognises its inherent dynamism.  The paper suggests a theory of legacy 
information systems that comprises of the concepts of temporal effects, 
interpretations and characteristics.  It is argued that legacy information systems are 
constructed of many ‘legacies’ that are handed down continuously, forming an 
amorphous set of socio-technical interdependencies and relationships. 
 
Introduction 
Organisational dependence upon information technology (IT) continues to grow and 
is at the heart of many organisations operations and strategies, particularly in the ‘e-
era’.  In the midst of this, it is easy to focus upon the latest technologies, 
organisational concepts or just the ‘buss’ of the moment and hope to reap instant 
rewards (Markus and Benjamin, 1997; Howcroft, 2001) - but what about 
fundamental issues such as legacy information systems that we do not traditionally 
view as interesting?  The benefits of, information systems are espoused by vendors, 
consultants, people in organisations and academics yet we still struggle with them.  
                                                 
29 To be presented at the 2003 European Conference on Information Systems, Naples, Italy. 
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Legacy information technology, information systems and legacy systems have 
become widely favoured terms for the description of problematic IT by such groups.  
Although many studies have argued for multiple perspectives in areas such as 
systems thinking (Checkland, 1981), systems development (Wood-Harper et al., 
1985) and strategic information systems (Ciborra and Associates, 2000), attention to 
legacy information systems is scant.  In response, this paper explores the multiple 
meanings and characteristics of legacy information systems.  I have adopted the term 
‘legacy information systems’ for the remainder of the paper as it this is more 
inclusive and comprehensive than legacy IT or legacy Systems30.  I aim to 
demonstrate the connections and overlaps that exist amongst the constituents of 
legacy information systems and recognise that attempts to demarcate the subject 
introduces problems.  In offering a structure for the argument the idea is that the 
overall flavour of legacy information systems emerges.   
 
In the next section, I outline an alternative theory of legacy information systems.  
This is followed by a detailed review of the characteristics of legacy information 
systems as reported in the literature – the review is organised in subsections dealing 
with issues of longevity, functionality, perceptions of technology and structure.  The 
review is used to exemplify the proposed theory and is followed by a summary 
incorporating an illustrative theoretical framework.   
 
 
Multiple Views of an ‘Old’ Problem 
Throughout the field of IS the concept of legacy information systems is widely 
recognised.  However, the most pervasive notion has been that of technology that is 
                                                 
30 Legacy IT focuses upon technology and legacy Systems ignores the informing role that the term legacy information systems 
captures. 
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old, outdated, in a state of disrepair and that does not satisfy organisational demands 
(Nassif and Mitchusson, 1993; Alderson and Shah, 1999).  Furthermore, they are 
commonly associated with high maintenance costs, obsolescence, poor 
documentation and lack of technical support (Warren, 1999).  As Wendy Robson 
notes:  
 
Whilst legacy information systems a beneficial thing in lay terms in an IS 
management sense it represents the problems caused by past acquisitions that no 
longer fully match current needs. (Robson, 1997: 456)  
 
Of course, the list could be extended, yet it communicates the idea of the dominant 
perception of legacy information systems as problematic (and we shall explore the 
range of characteristics in greater depth as the paper progresses).  I would suggest 
that legacy information systems are not necessarily problematic or focused on IT.  
Instead, legacy information systems can also be viewed as an asset to an 
organisation.  It has for example, been argued that the real value to the organisation 
of legacy information systems lies in the accumulation of business rules, policies, 
expertise and know-how that they embody (Kim, 1997).  However, I do 
acknowledge that problems can arise when the legacy information system inhibits 
organisational adaptation to environmental change or strategic vision (Alderson and 
Shah, 1999).  Although legacy information systems are often linked with IT, it is 
important to highlight the inextricable interdependencies and relationships with the 
context in which it resides.   This has been referred to as organisation/business 
legacy and is, to some extent, a demarcation of the IT and Organisational context 
(Kawalek and Leonard, 1996; Bryant, 1998; Kelly et al., 1999a).  Considering the 
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‘softer’ aspects of legacy information systems is essential as will be highlighted 
throughout this paper. 
 
Strictly speaking, ‘legacy’ does not embody problematic connotations, nor does it 
necessarily embody good things.  Legacy merely implies something that is handed 
down and is therefore, in some senses, neutral (Allen, 1990).  Therefore, legacy 
information systems should be viewed as handed down IS.  We can argue however, 
that the concept legacy information systems embodies less than neutral 
characteristics when situated in a context.  In-context legacy information systems 
may hold favourable and unfavourable properties.  These properties may also be 
subject to interpretation via different lenses.  For example, the process of 
implementation of call centre technology into a previously paper based sales 
department leads to a revision in legacy information systems conditions.  At the 
same time this introduces processes that allow senior management to monitor 
telesales staff performance.  We can see that the legacy information systems 
conditions improve for senior management, yet they may deteriorate for those that 
are being monitored more closely.   
 
Furthermore, legacy information systems are not static.  Robson (1997) in her 
discussion of systems migration states that a legacy information systems issue is 
concerned with how to keep enough processing and human resources working to 
permit the phasing out and replacement with new systems.  Laudon and Laudon 
(2000) offer insights in much the same vein indicating that, typically an 
organisation’s legacy does not support newly designed business processes and that 
these business processes are islands in a sea of inherited legacy business practices 
from long ago.  Singh (1997) also refers to legacy as the 'previously installed'.  The 
 260
term installed, implies that 'once it's in, it's in' and it will not change.  Legacy 
information systems are dynamic, particularly when the in-context situation is an 
organisation.  In the previous example of the call centre, the IT based replacement 
for the paper-based system merely becomes part of the legacy information system.   
The process of implementation could also be seen as part of this.  If the senior 
management communicated that the technology was being implemented to monitor 
staff for instance, this would undoubtedly influence staff perception of the modified 
legacy information systems. 
 
Towards a More Comprehensive View of legacy information systems 
This section reviews the literature relating to the dominant characteristics 
traditionally associated with legacy information systems in order in order to 
highlight the problems of the current theories.  The issues are categorised as being 
associated with longevity, functionality, perceptions of technology, and structure.  
The author is aware that these issues are rooted in IT and that the argument for the 
theory of legacy information systems recognises organisational and social issues.  
Admittedly, much of what follows is very much the traditional view of legacy 
information systems as bad, old technology.  The review merely reflects the 
literature, even though on the surface it may be seen as conflicting with the aims of 
the paper.  In response, the author prefers to see the review as a useful platform for 
the development of an alternative theory of legacy information systems by 
highlighting the futility of predominantly technically loaded thinking. 
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Longevity 
Henderson (2000) rightly points out that as systems get older, inter-relationships 
evolve resulting in complex dependencies amongst various system components.   
Lauder and Kent (2000) infer a problematic consequence of the longevity of legacy 
information systems stating that mature IS grow old disgracefully.  They argue that 
although their lives may begin with a flexible architecture, repeated waves of 
hacking [changes] tend to petrify them resulting in accidental, inflexible 
architectures.  Adolph (1996) concurs stating that constant patching makes the 
system’s reliability questionable.   Swanson and Beath (1989) also argue that as a 
system grows, it loses architectural integrity, staff become less familiar with it and 
maintenance activity increases.  Therefore we have issues of complexity and 
inflexibility. 
 
The Swanson and Beath (1989) view introduces further issues related to staff.  These 
include the need to consider the capability of the organisation to be able to maintain 
and develop legacy information systems that has been in existence for a number of 
years.  This issue can then also be divided into two areas: capability to do it for 
themselves or availability of someone else to do it for them.  Legacy information 
systems may well have been constructed by people with skill sets that are scarce or 
unavailable in the current organisation and its environment (Singh, 1997; Taylor et 
al., 1997).  In 1995 for example, it was stated that fewer people were available with 
skills in the programming language, Assembly (Bennett, 1994).  In the late 1990s 
there was a deficit in certain packaged software configuration skills (Sumner, 2000; 
Willcocks and Sykes, 2000).  These skills and knowledge sets therefore become 
incredibly valuable to user organisations and contractor/vendor organisations.  This 
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situation may also be exacerbated when organisations are pushing and being pushed 
to develop IS staff to equip themselves with the skills sets necessary to implement 
new and emerging technologies (Brancheau, Jans et al. 1996).  There are also issues 
related to this in terms of perceptions of legacy information systems.  Are they just 
seen as what Adolph (1996) terms an 'old piece of crap'?  Obviously the skills 
problem, discussed above, could also be applied to external sources, however there is 
a further problem from the external perspective in terms of the availability of the 
hardware and software itself (Adolph, 1996).   How do people in organisations deal 
with discontinued product lines if a piece of equipment fails or they need to re-install 
software they have lost?  The author encountered an extreme example of this when 
engaged on another piece of research in 1998.  An external consultant working for a 
large retail group mentioned in an interview that he had spent the last four days 
searching the United Kingdom for a Winchester disk (which he obtained in the end!). 
 
Functionality 
Issues of functionality manifest themselves in many ways.  The most obvious is 
concerned with whether functionality meets existing requirements and, where it does 
not, how easy this is to remedy.  As Ramage et al. (2000) describe, legacy 
information systems is often what is left after a change has occurred in the 
organisation, but not the system(s), leading to a gap between the functionality they 
provide and the needs of the organisation.  Again, we can see connections amongst 
the characteristics of legacy information systems as contributors to this state of 
affairs.  For example, in the accompanying covering letter of the Kearney 
Management Consultants (1984) report it is suggested that it may be related to 
changes in emphasis from the 1960's and 1970's where relatively inflexible, costly 
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and complex machinery was used to automate simple repetitive tasks.  Looking at 
this in greater detail, Adolph (1996) suggests that functionality difficulties may occur 
for instance where users want features that can't be grafted onto the 'old' system, 
where there are limited storage capabilities or unusual restrictions such as 80 column 
records (perhaps due to a short term view of the longevity of the system, or 
limitations of the build later).  The issue of functionality, where this becomes 
problematic, is to some extent concerned with responsiveness Edwards et al. (2000).  
Changes in functionality may be required to respond to changes in the organisations 
macro-environment.  However, legacy information systems may also be responsive 
to user needs.  Bennett (1994) points out that the system may still do useful work and 
be reliable.  However, he also notes that users may extensively rely on 
undocumented features meaning that although the system may have value, issues 
may arise if that functionality fails at any time.  Recently, work has emerged which 
attempts to elucidate the problems of evolutionary complexity.  KaasbØll (1997) 
focuses upon developing an understanding of adaptive maintenance in relation to 
how numerous improvements may add up to negative effects.   In his example, 
several user led functionality improvements to the legacy information systems 
gradually slowed down the operation of the system to such an extent that the users 
complained.  KaasbØll (1997) cages this as ‘counter finality’ - the concept that 
individual actions may create collective results that were not intended.   
 
Perceptions of the Technology 
Many people in organisations do not realistically anticipate how long the information 
systems that they introduce are going to last for.  For example, in 2002, one of the 
largest financial services companies in the UK is still using legacy information 
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systems that were developed in the 1960s using the Assembly language.  Indeed, the 
year 2000 revealed many problems inextricably linked with perceptions of how long 
the various information systems would be in use for.  The problem with not 
perceiving that technologies may be in use for a number of years leads to the 
emergence several of issues.  In consideration of the dynamic characteristics of 
legacy information systems it has been conceptualised as forming part of the 
environment for new developments (Warboys et al., 2000).    As reported several 
years ago:  
 
“difficulties are foreseen in interfacing with existing equipment or 
systems.  To a large extent, this is a criticism of the suppliers of both 
office automation and data processing facilities who have failed to 
anticipate future needs and supply flexible interfaces.  It is also a result 
of a piecemeal approach to finding a solution where short term 
expediency has been taken at the expense of long term integration.  
Today's opportunity to buy a multiplicity of different equipment was 
quoted as 'leading to greater, and not fewer, such problems’.”   
(Kearney Management Consultants, 1984: 27) 
 
Even though the quote was taken from a report dated 1984, organisations are still 
experiencing legacy information systems problems bound up with this issue.  It is 
clear that that people in organisations and suppliers, need to take a longer-term view 
of what is essentially the development of their legacy information systems.  The 
problem also involves academia and society in general.  For example, associated 
with the idea of longevity are peoples’ attitudes to how long they anticipate working 
with an information system and this has no doubt been influenced by a number of 
groups.  Lehman (1980)  for instance, argues that in the 1950's the ecstasy of 
instructing a machine to undertake computations at undreamt of speeds 
overshadowed the rather dull need for a guiding theory and discipline.  Equally, it 
has also been suggested that developers think 'legacy information systems' work is 
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tedious (Adolph, 1996), and that they may prefer to work on new developments 
instead (Bennett, 1994).  How many undergraduate and postgraduate students want 
to learn about Fortran or Cobol after the advent of Java, Visual Basic and XML?  
Moreover, it has been suggested that, historically, IS development has received a 
higher priority than maintenance due to the growth of IS in the 1960's and 1970's 
(Swanson and Beath, 1989).  This may lead to action not being taken that attempts to 
synchronise the software with the organisational needs, the absence of knowledge 
management regarding legacy information systems and consequently, the need for 
the deployment of increased levels of resources required to understand legacy 
information systems when maintenance does occur (Bennett, 1994; Taylor et al., 
1997). 
 
A further issue associated with perception is organisational comfort in dealing with 
legacy information systems problems.  It is suggested that a dominant characteristic 
of problematic legacy information systems is that they are confusing, not well 
understood and display high levels of entropy (Taylor et al., 1997; Kelly et al., 
1999a) even though developers may assume that organisations know all about them 
(Adolph, 1996).  This confusion is equally traceable with regard to perceptions of 
what may 'solve' the problem.  Legacy information systems is often cited as 
embodying the critical business processes.  Indeed, Ramage et al. (2000) suggest that 
legacy information systems may be the sole explicit embodiment of a business 
process that has otherwise passed into tacit knowledge.  Lauder and Kent (2000) 
concur in arguing that legacy information systems can be an asset, as through years 
of debugging effort, they will have grown to reflect essential tacit knowledge.  A 
different approach is taken by Alderson and Liu (2000).  When trying to understand 
legacy information systems, they assume that any documentation, including source 
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code, is out of date and inaccurate.  They also assume that staff with technical 
knowledge of the system are unavailable.  Their suggested approach is to observe the 
operationalisation of the system.  Another view suggests that due to enormous 
investments in software, there is little likelihood that it can be replaced, it would be 
too costly to reprogram and there is minimal knowledge about what it does.  
Therefore, despite the imperfections of legacy information systems [where they 
exist] portions must be reused (Blum, 1996).  There are problems with all of these 
approaches: i) assuming that legacy information systems reflect reality denies the 
existence of users developing coping strategies such as 'work-arounds', ii) relying 
solely on observation of the operationalisation of the legacy information system 
cannot afford a full appreciation of the detail of its workings and iii) to assume that 
in every situation that it is not possible (or necessary!) to rebuild legacy information 
systems runs counter to organisational experience - not least the trend toward the 
replacement of bespoke/custom software with packaged software. 
 
Structure 
It has already been suggested that, over time, the structure of legacy information 
systems may degrade and this can lead to problems in understanding how the system 
works for the purposes of development and maintenance activities in response to 
organisational requirements.  Bennett (1994) suggests that legacy information 
systems will usually be characterised by absence of structure, little documentary 
support and generally only source code as a lens for understanding.  He also suggests 
that the reason for this state of affairs can be linked to the early days of software 
engineering where system clarity and structure were subservient to the need for 
operational speed.  Even though state-of-the-art techniques may have been used at 
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the time, such an approach may encourage maintenance that rapidly degrades 
structure.  The views of Lehman (1980) and Arthur (1988) agree with this arguing 
that software changes may have been poorly designed, imposed and implemented 
with little thought given to the need for a possible re-write of the design or the 
potential for the introduction of bugs.  Kearney Management Consultants (1984) 
have also stated that short-term expediency has overtaken the need for a view of 
long-term integration.   Moreover, the problem is exacerbated by the lack of formal 
documentation.   If documentation does exist, there is often a discrepancy between 
the documented description of the system’s function and its actual function (Adolph, 
1996).  The problem of having to deal with untidy structure is compounded in 
consideration of the dimensions of the legacy information systems.  It is argued that 
large software programs will comprise thousands of lines of code.  Arguably this 
makes them difficult to deal with, unlike small software programs (Bennett, 1994).  
Unfortunately, the issue is not that simple.  The complexity of the legacy information 
systems cannot be viewed in 'lines of code' terms.  Even from a technical 
perspective, the complexity may be in the line of code its self rather than the number 
of lines.  How does the line of code interact with other lines of code? What language 
has been used? How common is it?  Who understands it? Is the program connected 
to others?  Critically from the organisational perspective we need to consider the 
importance of the program and to whom. 
 
Discussion 
The analysis of literature reviewed for this paper reveals the prevailing view of 
legacy information systems as old and problematic.  However, the literature also 
opens up areas where the value of legacy information systems is very much subject 
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to interpretation.  The fact that a system (and its constituent parts) has been in place 
for some time does not necessarily equate with negativity.  People in organisations 
that are part of the legacy information systems will be valuable in themselves as may 
be the technical component - it may contain data of value and staff may be 
comfortable with its outputs and the way it operates.  Fine-tuning over a number of 
years may also mean that even though it is costly to maintain, it may support 
distinctive competitive strategies.  Conversely, more recent legacy information 
systems may display problematic characteristics for many reasons including the way 
they were introduced or the skills available to support a technical aspect if it has 
proved popular with other organisations (such as ERP packages). 
 
Despite predominantly focusing upon the technical perspective of legacy information 
systems the literature opens up inextricable links with ‘non technical’ issues which 
offer valuable support for the argument for a more comprehensive and inclusive 
view of legacy information systems.  A lack of technical expertise to maintain a 
system (new or old) is obviously not a technical problem although it is often treated 
as such.  It is perhaps more readily though of as a staffing problem.  Similarly, 
whether the technical component of a particular legacy information system is viewed 
as problematic or favourable may very much be concerned with the perceptions of 
the role and longevity of it by organisational members. 
 
Finally, contrary to their general treatment in the literature, legacy information 
systems can be interpreted as dynamic.  The environment comprises technical, social 
and organisational artefacts and we can see that these are constantly changing and 
impacting upon each other.  For example, the technical - through development and 
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maintenance activity, and the organisational - through staff turnover, and strategic 
responses to macro-environmental changes.   
 
Figure 1 details the thinking presented in the paper in the form of a theoretical 
framework.  It uses three concepts – characteristics, interpretations and temporal 
effects.   
 
‘Characteristics’ refers to the nature of the legacy information systems.  In this paper 
I have compartmentalised these under the headings of longevity, functionality, 
perceptions of technology and structure.  Clearly, these are artificial boundaries and 
badges, as the characteristics of legacy will vary dependent upon the situation and 
interpretations of that situation as shown in figure 1.  That is, for something to be 
characterised as legacy information systems, it has to be interpreted as such. 
 
‘Interpretations’ are concerned with how the characteristics of legacy information 
systems are viewed – essentially this highlights its subjective and interpretive nature.  
The argument here is that different viewpoints of the characteristics that constitute 
the legacy information systems may exist.  Note however, that some of these may 
have greater resonance due to the formations of intersubjectivities.  What is not 
discussed here is which characteristics are the ones that are ‘accepted’ and worked 
with – that is beyond the scope of this paper but clearly various areas of interest such 
as information systems maturity and evaluation hold potential interest here. 
 
‘Temporal Effects’ suggests that legacy information systems are subject to time-
based considerations.  Essentially, the characteristics of legacy information systems 
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will change over time due to such things as modifications to code, functionality 
extension and staff changes.  As a result of these changes, and changes in context, 
the way that these characteristics are interpreted will change too.   
 
In summary, the framework asserts that legacy information systems will have a 
variety of characteristics that are variously interpreted over time. 
 
Temporal 
Effects
CharacteristicsInterpretations
of
influence
require
influence
 
Figure 1: A Theoretical Framework of legacy information systems 
 
Conclusions 
This paper acknowledges that organisational dependence upon IT continues to grow 
although many still struggle to obtain the full benefits from its implementation and 
usage.  One source of the problem that is strongly represented in the literature has 
been conceptualized as legacy information systems.  Unfortunately, the concept has 
been used illegitimately throughout the Information Systems and Computer Science 
academic communities, and the commercial world.  Connotations of legacy 
information systems are generally strongly linked with ageing, static and problematic 
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IT although some aspects of the literature do argue otherwise.  However, these 
arguments have not been translated into a comprehensive view.  The alternative 
theory of legacy information systems that I offer here attempts such a view.  I am 
acutely aware that there may be problems with existing information systems that 
form part of organisations, particularly where these have existed for some time.  
However, it is also clear that legacy information systems (old, and not so old), may 
sometimes offer immense value to organisations, particularly when the concept is 
broadened to include social, organisational and technical considerations.  Perhaps 
therefore discussions should revolve around legacy information systems problems 
and legacy information systems benefits.  A final important strand in the paper is the 
advocacy of legacy information systems as inherently dynamic.  The interactions 
amongst social, organisational and technical factors are made clear – processes of 
implementation, maintenance and organisational restructuring are some of the 
exemplars that highlight this point very well.  I have been involved in discussions 
regarding a system developing into a legacy information system on many occasions.  
Perhaps the answer in consideration of the alternative proposed here, is that 
everything already is a legacy information system. 
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Appendix B: Illustrative 
Examples of Theory 
Development 
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Iteration 2 
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Iteration 3 
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